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Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, 
and the Public Good 
Marci A. Hamilton ∗ 
[When] principles break out into overt acts against peace and good 




[F]or such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the 
individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to 
legal punishments, if society is of opinion that the one or the other is 
requisite for its protection.  
John Stuart Mill‡ 
 
Our cases do not at their farthest reach support the proposition that a 
stance of conscientious opposition relieves an objector from any colliding 
duty fixed by a democratic government. 
 
Employment Division v. Smith §  
 ∗ Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva 
University. Thanks to my commentators, Ronald Garet and Mark Tushnet, and the 
participants of the Church Autonomy Conference held at Brigham Young University, 
especially Fred Gedicks and William Marshall. I also thank the Faculty Workshop at Hofstra 
University School of Law and Angela Carmella, Erwin Chemerinsky, Philip Hamburger, Scott 
Shapiro, and Lawrence Stratton for their helpful comments. I am deeply indebted to my 
hardworking and outstanding research assistants Jodi Erickson, Vivek Jayaram, Andrew 
Kopelman, Leo Mikityanskiy, and in particular, Rachel Steamer. 
 † An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, 1785, in 12 STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING 
A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 84, 85 (photo. reprint 1969) (William Waller 
Hening ed., Richmond 1823). 
 ‡ ON LIBERTY 87 (David Spitz ed., 1975). 
 §  494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gillette v. 
United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971)). 
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The only legitimate goal of a republican form of government is 
the public good, and the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, 
sits firmly under this horizon.1 If the public good is the end of 
government, all laws should contribute to the public good. The 
question this Article addresses is how to incorporate religious liberty 
into a system that is aimed at the public good. This Article situates 
the religion clauses in this constitutional context and answers that 
two principles define the parameters of religious liberty: (1) religious 
belief must be absolutely protected, and (2) religious conduct that 
harms others must be capable of being regulated. This second 
concept, which I call the no-harm rule, has become entrenched in 
Anglo-American culture after centuries of experience with religion as 
sovereign, separate ecclesiastical courts and legal spheres, and legal 
immunities. Each of those regimes has been rejected, because 
religious entities have not been unwavering servants of the public 
good.  
This Article’s focus on regulating harm caused by religious 
entities may well seem perverse in the United States, because 
“[t]here is a long history in this country of religion being reduced to 
Sunday school morality in service of the common good.”2 The 
reality, however, is that religious entities, like all other human 
 1.  JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 131, 135 (C.B. 
Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690); see also CHARLES LOUIS DE SECONDAT & 
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, 1 THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 43–47 (J.V. Pritchard ed., Thomas 
Nugent trans., Rothman & Co. 1991) (1748). See generally M.N.S. SELLERS, REPUBLICAN 
LEGAL THEORY: THE HISTORY, CONSTITUTION, AND PURPOSE OF LAW IN A FREE STATE 
(2003); M.N.S. SELLERS, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: REPUBLICANISM, LIBERALISM, AND 
THE LAW (1998) [hereinafter SELLERS, SACRED FIRE]. This republican principle is not limited 
to political theory; it also appears in Catholic Social Thought and in reformed theology. See 
infra Part III.C. The construction of the public good is a complex amalgam of history, 
religion, and culture. It is important to point out early in this Article, that it is not a purely 
secular construct. See William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 317 (1991) (“[T]he religious background of society will influence 
the nature of the state interest.”). Indeed, no element of the United States’ constitutional 
order is far removed from religious precepts and influences. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Direct 
Democracy and the Protestant Ethic, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 411 (2004) [hereinafter 
Hamilton, Direct Democracy]; Marci A. Hamilton, Why the People Do Not Rule (Aug. 2004) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
 2. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Religious Freedom and the Rule of Law: Exporting 
Modernity in a Postmodern World, 22 MISS. C. L. REV. 173, 174 (2003).  
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institutions, are capable of great harm to others,3 and the fact that 
their conduct is religiously motivated does not alter the fact of the 
harm. Like every other human institution, they are capable of being 
tempted to abuse their power. Fortunately, the Framers were a 
pragmatic and disillusioned group that instilled into the United 
States’ republican form of government a healthy distrust of any 
entity that holds power. The Constitution grants limited powers to 
each branch of government and pits governing powers against each 
other to limit their overreaching.4 The mechanism that restrains 
private entities and fosters their social responsibility is the rule of 
law.5 When it comes to the public good, the rule of law needs to 
govern religious institutions, just as it does other private entities. 
Since its inception, the United States’ constitutional system has 
been one of ordered liberty, not license.6 Accordingly, the principles 
of republicanism have informed the Supreme Court’s Religion 
Clause7 jurisprudence, with the Court in the vast majority of cases 
requiring obedience to legislative determinations of the public good, 
unless there is evidence of animus or hostility towards religion.8 
 3. A more elaborate treatment of the harm that religious entities render can be found 
in MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND RULE OF LAW (forthcoming 
2005). 
 4. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Calvinist Paradox of Distrust and Hope at the 
Constitutional Convention, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT (Michael W. 
McConnell et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES]; see also Hamilton, Direct 
Democracy, supra note 1, at 456–57. 
 5. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 13 (1997) (“Under the 
rule of law, citizens automatically have ‘rights,’ . . . [which are] the logical corollaries of 
justiciable restraints on private and public action . . . .”); Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law 
and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1345–46 (2001).  
 6. Ordered liberty has been remarkable in engendering a robust and pluralistic 
religious culture. See William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter with Equality? An Assessment of 
the Equal Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. 
L.J. 193, 216–17 (2000); see also DIANA L. ECK, A NEW RELIGIOUS AMERICA: HOW A 
“CHRISTIAN COUNTRY” HAS NOW BECOME THE WORLD’S MOST RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE 
NATION (2001). 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).  
 8. See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1315 (2004) (holding that in the absence of 
“hostility” or “animus” toward religion, a state’s denial of funding for vocational religious 
instruction in order to avoid establishment is constitutional); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507, 514 (1997) (“[N]eutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious 
practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental interest.”); Church of the 
2HAM-FIN 12/1/2004 7:29 PM 




“There is one condition attached to all exercises of freedom: that the 
use of the freedom will not breach minimal responsibilities owed to 
the larger society as those responsibilities are embodied in legitimate 
laws.”9 This principle is as valid for religious entities as it is for 
nonreligious entities. 
The corollary—that religious persecution is unconstitutional—
can also be analyzed as part of the republican matrix. Religious 
persecution shifts the focus from the public good to a single entity. 
The legislature’s responsibility to engage in a broad-ranging 
examination of the public good has been subverted by prejudice, 
ignorance, or both.10 Thus, the rule against religious persecution 
does not stand outside the republican form of government, but 
rather contributes to it.  
Yet, theoreticians of the First Amendment at times fail to advert 
to this larger, republican calculus. Instead, the focus of free exercise 
and even disestablishment theories is too often on the religious 
entities themselves, as though their well-being is an adequate proxy 
for the general public good.11 This focus on religious entities and 
their corresponding interests alone is myopic and antidemocratic. 
The needs of religious entities and the public good are not 
necessarily equivalent.12 Constitutional analysis is therefore inevitably 
faced with the question of how to square religious liberty with the 
public good.  
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) (“[A] law targeting 
religious beliefs as such is never permissible . . . if the object of a law is to infringe upon or 
restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral.” (internal 
citations omitted)); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990) (“We have 
never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise 
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. On the contrary, the record of 
more than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition.”). 
 9. Angela C. Carmella, The Protection of Children and Young People: Catholic and 
Constitutional Visions of Responsible Freedom, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1031, 1044 (2003). 
 10. The best example of this phenomenon can be found in the Court’s discussion of the 
City of Hialeah’s efforts to rid itself of the Santerians. See Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534–
40. 
 11. See, e.g., Kathleen Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising 
Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633; Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The 
Church-State Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385.  
 12. See generally Marci A. Hamilton, Religion, the Rule of Law, and the Good of the 
Whole: A View from the Clergy, 18 J.L. & POL. 387, 437 (2002). 
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Scholars and religious entities have suggested two paths to 
achieve religious liberty. One is judicial, and the other is legislative. 
Some have suggested that religious entities have a right to obtain 
exemptions from generally applicable, neutral laws in the courts.13 In 
the face of a long tradition of treating religious actors as responsible 
social actors that must obey laws governing conduct, the Court 
experimented with this approach between 1963 and 1990, during 
which it subjected some general, neutral laws to strict scrutiny, 
thereby rendering those laws presumptively unconstitutional.14 The 
doctrine required the courts to determine whether the conduct 
burdened by the law was central to the believer’s religious universe 
and then to assess whether the government had a compelling interest 
in the purpose of the law. The first inquiry would appear to be a 
violation of the Establishment Clause, with courts put in the position 
of assessing religious doctrine. The second put the judiciary in the 
position of second-guessing legislative judgment, as opposed to 
identifying invidious discrimination or religious persecution. 
Normally, when strict scrutiny is applied in the constitutional arena, 
it is because the law bears indicia of unconstitutional purposes—and 
therefore the courts need to look closely at the law to determine 
whether in fact the Constitution was violated. In these cases, the 
court was addressing neutral, generally applicable laws that bore no 
outward indication of any improper legislative purpose. The strict 
scrutiny operated not to smoke out constitutionally suspect 
purposes, but rather to place the religious entity in a position 
generally superior to the law.  
The approach was intolerable, however, because it threatened to 
make religious entities laws unto themselves and to undermine the 
rule of law, and therefore only a handful of neutral, generally 
applicable laws were subject to strict scrutiny. In 1990, the Court 
 13. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (1990) (“[C]onstitutionally compelled 
exemptions were within the contemplation of the framers and ratifiers as a possible 
interpretation of the free exercise clause.”).  
 14. Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 832–33 (1989) 
(unemployment compensation); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 
139–41 (1987) (same); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 
716–17 (1981) (same); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (compulsory 
education); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963) (unemployment compensation). 
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definitively rejected the approach in favor of general application of 
the laws governing conduct to religious entities.15 In response, 
religious entities urged Congress to pass the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA), which made all laws in the United States 
that substantially burdened religious entities presumptively illegal.16 
At least as applied to state law, RFRA was held invalid in 1997, and 
the approach remains only in the small number of states that have 
passed state-level RFRAs and as applied to federal law.17 The 
religious entities’ preferred means of securing religious liberty 
weighed the religious interest considerably more than the public 
good and came into serious conflict with the no-harm principle.  
The second path religious entities have followed is to lobby the 
federal and state legislatures to obtain exemptions from generally 
applicable, neutral laws. They have been quite successful.18 Under a 
republican form of government, this second approach is more 
 15. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S 872, 878–79 (1990). 
 16. Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it 
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person: 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(b) (1993). 
 17. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) (“The substantial costs RFRA 
exacts, both in practical terms of imposing a heavy litigation burden on the States and in terms 
of curtailing their traditional general regulatory power, far exceed any pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith.”); see also 
Alan E. Brownstein, State RFRA Statutes and Freedom of Speech, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605, 
644 (1999) (describing state RFRAs). Brownstein also compiled a helpful list of state RFRAs:  
Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment, S. 604, 1998 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998); New 
Jersey Religious Freedom Act, A. 903, 208th Leg., 1998 Sess. (N.J. 1998); New 
Jersey Religious Freedom Restoration Act, S. 321, 208th Leg., 1998 Sess. (N.J. 
1998); Virginia Religious Freedom Protection Act, H.R. 668, 1998 Sess. (Va. 
1998); Religious Freedom Protection Act, A. 1617, 1997–98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997) 
(vetoed following enactment); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1998, H.R. 
3201, 1998 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1997); Religious Freedom Restoration Act, H.R. 2370, 
90th Leg., 1997–98 Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997); Religious Freedom Restoration Act, S. 
1591, 90th Leg., 1997–98 Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997); Michigan Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, H.R. 4376, 89th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1997); Religious 
Freedom, H.R. 1470, 155th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.H. 1997); Religious Freedom 
Restoration, S. 5673, 220th Leg., 1997–98 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997); Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-80.1–3 (R.I. 1997); South Carolina 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, H.R. 5045, 112th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (S.C. 
1997). 
Id. n.4.  
 18. Many of these exemptions are detailed in HAMILTON, supra note 3.  
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legitimate, because the legislature is the most competent branch to 
consider and determine the public good. But while this approach is 
more sound theoretically, it has been implemented in an imperfect 
manner. The lobbying for religious exemptions has tended to occur 
behind closed doors, and legislators have been inclined to consider 
only the religious entity’s interest, rather than the larger public good. 
The problem is that legislatures have abdicated the public interest in 
favor of religious interests. In effect, the legislatures have acted as 
rubber stamps for religious interests, rather than as an independent 
body responsible for assessing and serving the public good. In a 
properly functioning republican system, the legislature weighs the 
claim for religious liberty against the harm that will ensue if an 
exemption is granted. 
The liberty that is consonant with the public good is ordered 
liberty,19 which takes into account both liberty and the public good. 
 19. This is true in the history leading up to the Constitution, and in Supreme Court 
case law across the spectrum of constitutional topics. See POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE 
AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA 1730–1805 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1991); Elisha Williams, The 
Essential Rights and Liberties of Protestants, reprinted in POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE 
AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730–1805, supra (urging obedience to laws involving “those 
things which are the objects of the civil magistrate’s power, viz. the civil interests of the 
people” but not on “matters of religion”); see also Boerne, 521 U.S. at 539–41 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“Religious exercise shall be permitted so long as it does not violate general laws 
governing conduct.”) (citing the Maryland Act Concerning Religion of 1649, negating a license 
to act in a manner “unfaithful to the Lord Proprietary”; the Rhode Island Charter of 1663, 
requiring people to “behave” in other than a “peaceable and quiet” manner; the earliest New 
York, Maryland, and Georgia Constitutions, prohibiting interference with the “peace [and] 
safety of the State”; the first New Hampshire Constitution, forbidding anyone from 
“disturb[ing] the public peace”; and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, prohibiting citizens 
from “demean[ing]” oneself in other than a “peaceable and orderly manner”); BERNARD 
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 77 (1967) [hereinafter 
BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS] (“Liberty, that is, was the capacity to exercise ‘natural rights’ 
within limits set, not by the mere will or desire of men in power but by non-arbitrary law—law 
enacted by legislatures containing within them the proper balance of forces.”); GORDON S. 
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–87 (1969) [hereinafter WOOD, 
THE CREATION]. The importance of “ordered liberty” in Supreme Court jurisprudence cannot 
be overstated. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 
U.S. 760, 774–75 (2003); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 667 n.7 (2001); County of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
720–25 (1997); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356–57 (1997); O’Dell v. Netherland, 
521 U.S. 151, 157 (1997); Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996); Goeke v. 
Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 120 (1995); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 345, 352, 360 (1993); 
Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134–36, 
150–54 (1992); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 22, 36 (1990); Butler v. 
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Ordered religious liberty in the United States is grounded in 
pragmatic experience,20 the history of abandoned religious privileges 
in Britain,21 and the early Americans’ experience of religious tyranny 
in Europe, all of which were viewed through the lens of the framing 
generation’s Protestant worldview.22 There was a time when 
churches did have autonomy from the law, and when the rights of 
religious institutions and their clergy were above those of ordinary 
citizens, but that was hundreds of years ago—before the common 
law was entrenched and before the creation of the United States. 
The current revelations of worldwide sexual abuse of children by 
clergy, when combined with the concomitant secret knowledge of 
their individual religious institutions reinforces what the Founders of 
this country knew in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: 
McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 416, 427 (1990); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370, 392 
(1989); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307, 309, 311, 313–14 (1989); Yates v. Aiken, 484 
U.S. 211, 215 (1988); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 744–47 (1987); Memphis 
Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 702–
04, 729–31 (1986); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680 & n.8 (1985); Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758, 769, 777, 787 (1985); 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58, 363 (1983); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 
431 U.S. 494, 499, 501–02, 504 n.10 (1977); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 665, 672–
75 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.3 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 
483 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 444 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 
701–04, 710–14 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340–41, 384–85, 401–
02 (1974); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65–66, 79 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453–54 (1971); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 655 n.7, 
666 (1971) (plurality opinion); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968); Tehan 
v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414 n.12, 417 n.17 (1966); Ker v. California, 
374 U.S. 23, 31 n.7 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1963); Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213–15 (1960); 
Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274–75 (1960) (per curiam); Napue v. Illinois, 360 
U.S. 264, 269 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 127, 151 n.2 (1959); Leland v. 
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 801, 803–04 (1952); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169–70 
(1952); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 119–20 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 
87–94 (1949); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 649–53, 659, 663 (1948); Screws v. United 
States, 325 U.S. 91, 95–97 (1945); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–28 (1937) 
(wherein Justice Cardozo coined the phrase). 
 20. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes put it best when he said that the “life of the law has 
not been logic: it has been experience.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 
(1881). That is perhaps most true in the ongoing struggle to find the proper balance between 
the two most authoritative structures of human existence, religion and the state. 
 21. See infra Part I.A. 
 22. See infra Part I.B. 
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religious entities often will abuse what power they have.23 To set 
aside the law for them without consideration of the public good is to 
choose liberty at the expense of order and to make society 
responsible for the harm religious institutions can cause. To be sure, 
religious institutions are no different from any other individual or 
institution on this score—all are human entities—but there has been 
a tendency in recent decades to forget or suppress this principle 
when it comes to religious entities. 
The drive to avoid the law by contemporary religious entities is 
not a new development, but it is an anachronistic one. There was a 
time in Western culture when established religious entities were 
sovereign and the clergy occupied a favored category under the law, 
and it would have come as no surprise to anyone that the institution 
was immune to the requirements of the law and that clergy were 
relieved of its requirements while all other citizens were not.24 For 
example, a citizen could be put to death for raping a child, for 
example, while a clergy member could commit the same crime and 
be sentenced to a year at a monastery.25 That, however, was centuries 
ago. Since the twelfth century, when the concept of the common law 
was first introduced by Henry II, the justifications for that special 
treatment have become increasingly hollow.26 The logic of Henry 
II’s attempts to place clergy under the same justice system as all 
others was ineluctable: the victim of rape or murder by a clergy 
member is just as injured as the victim of an ordinary citizen, though 
it took centuries for Henry’s intended reforms to be fully effected.  
 The internal logic of the common law, which has been worked 
out through Anglo-American history, has brought the United States 
to the understanding that the public good requires the deterrence 
and punishment of harmful actions, regardless of the identity of the 
actor. As the Court announced in its first free exercise case, well over 
a century ago, “Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary 
because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the 
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, 
 23. See infra Part II.B. 
 24. See infra Part II.A. 
 25. See infra Part V. 
 26. See infra Part II.A.2. 
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and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”27 
This principle was reiterated by the Court when it stated in 1971 and 
then again in 1990 that “[o]ur cases do not at their farthest reach 
support the proposition that a stance of conscientious opposition 
relieves an objector from any colliding duty fixed by a democratic 
government.”28 The “vast majority” of free exercise cases have 
recognized the principle that religious entities are subject to 
generally applicable, neutral laws,29 because otherwise the public 
good will be sacrificed. 
 This is not to say that every religious institution has conceded its 
obligation to obey the secular law or that the logic of the common 
law has met no resistance. When the Supreme Court reiterated in 
Employment Division v. Smith the familiar doctrine that the rule of 
law applies to religious entities, the response by religious entities—
spurred on by law professors—was to publicly proclaim their right to 
act above generally applicable, neutral laws.30 Their outcry resulted in 
RFRA.31 RFRA was a brash repudiation of the principle that laws 
governing conduct apply to United States citizens, regardless of 
identity, whether that identity is based on religion, or race, or 
gender. It was Congress’s most expansive benefit for religion in 
United States history, and in City of Boerne v. Flores,32 the Court held 
RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states because it was beyond 
Congress’s power.33 In that decision, the Court also adhered to the 
 27. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1879). The Reynolds principle has 
been reiterated in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990), and Sch. Dist. of 
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 249 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 28. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971), quoted in Smith, 494 U.S. at 
882. 
 29. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885; see also Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious 
Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 402 (1987) 
(“[O]ur law frequently and presumptively rejects arguments designed to shield from public 
and judicial view the internal behavior of significant institutions.”). 
 30. Hundreds of pages in the Congressional Record castigated the Supreme Court for 
presuming to hold that generally applicable, neutral laws apply to religious entities. City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530–31 (1997); see also Petitioner’s Brief at 36–37, Boerne 
(No. 95-2074). 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3 (1994) (“[RLUIPA] applies to all Federal law, and the 
implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or 
after November 16, 1993.”). 
 32. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 33. Id. at 536. 
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rule that unless a legislature indicates otherwise, every person, 
including every religious person, will be governed by generally 
applicable, neutral laws.34 
The most coherent reading of the Supreme Court’s Religion 
Clause cases shows that there is no defensible rule that would permit 
a religious defense to laws that govern conduct injuring third 
parties.35 There is an absolute right to believe,36 but at the same time 
there can be no constitutional right to harm others in the name of 
religion.37 If a legitimate legislature has duly enacted a law that 
 34. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. The Supreme Court specifically addressed “neutral law[s] of 
general applicability” in Smith, id. at 879, but the principle undergirding the decision was the 
rule of law—the principle that laws apply neutrally to all and that, therefore, the arbitrary 
decisions of individual government decisionmakers may not rule. In the interest of full 
disclosure, I represented the City of Boerne before the Supreme Court. 
 35. While this is true of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and is a view, in my 
experience, that American citizens hold generally, it is not held by some participants of this 
conference. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy, Then 
and Now, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1593; Esbeck, supra note 11; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, 
Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1789.  
 36. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (“The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, 
the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.”); Thomas v. Review 
Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (“[R]eligious beliefs need not 
be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First 
Amendment protection.”); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (White, J., 
dissenting); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965) (“The validity of what [the 
conscientious objector] believes cannot be questioned.”); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 
420, 443 (1961) (“No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs 
or disbeliefs.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 
1, 15–16 (1947)); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940) (“Thus the 
Amendment embraces two concepts,—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is 
absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.”); see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 
U.S. 705 (1977) (invalidating the compelled display of a license plate slogan that offended 
individual religious beliefs); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943) 
(invalidating a statute requiring school children to salute the U.S. flag during the Pledge of 
Allegiance, and noting that “[t]o sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say that 
a Bill of Rights which guards the individual’s right to speak his own mind, left it open to public 
authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind”). 
 37. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79 (“[A]n individual’s religious beliefs [do not] excuse 
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to 
regulate.”); Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940) 
(“Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, 
relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or 
restriction of religious beliefs.”); Reynolds v. United States, 494 U.S. 145, 167 (1878). Smith 
opened the door for legislators to create exemptions for religious entities, but there is no 
constitutional requirement of accommodation. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (“Oregon’s drug law 
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makes certain conduct illegal because it harms particular individuals 
or the public as a whole, that determination cannot be overturned in 
the courts by claims that the motivation for the illegal conduct was 
religious. Nor can it be overturned based on the contention that the 
religious institution is naturally autonomous from the law.38 The no-
harm principle is at the core of the Court’s Religion Clause 
jurisprudence.  
“Church autonomy,” the focus of this Conference, simply does 
not make sense in the context of the larger republican theory of the 
Constitution. “Republican liberty signifies government in pursuit of 
the common good, when no citizen is subject to the unfettered will 
of another.”39 Yet church autonomy would permit religious entities 
to avoid being legally accountable for the harm they have caused. 
 While this is not the article to provide an extended discussion of 
republicanism in the United States, a brief history should help the 
reader to understand the explanation of the religion clauses in this 
Article. Prior to the Constitutional Convention, the American 
experiment in government was a failure. Neither the Declaration of 
Independence nor the Articles of Confederation generated 
governing structures that had the capacity to serve the public good. 
The Declaration established thirteen states that were separate from 
Great Britain. Under the Articles, this federation of states was 
incapable of being coordinated to serve the larger good. At the same 
time, the state legislatures became vortices of corruption and 
unresponsive to the public crises of the day.40 The Framers gathered 
because a more suitable government was necessary, and the focus of 
the debate was on how to stem the human impulse to abuse power 
to the detriment of the people’s interest.41 The Constitution’s 
represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs . . . [however], ‘[o]ur cases do not at their 
farthest reach support the proposition that a stance of conscientious opposition relieves an 
objector from any colliding duty fixed by a democratic government.’” (quoting Gillette v. 
United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971))). 
 38. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. 
 39. SELLERS, SACRED FIRE supra note 1, at 100. 
 40. See Hamilton, Direct Democracy, supra note 1, at 421–22. 
 41. See BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 19, at 57–60; WOOD, THE 
CREATION, supra note 19, at 135; see also Hamilton, Direct Democracy, supra note 1, at 421. 
See generally Marci A. Hamilton, The Calvinist Paradox of Distrust and Hope at the 
Constitutional Convention, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 294–306. 
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representative structure was chosen and crafted for the purpose of 
making representatives accountable to the public good.42 
“Autonomy,” which means that an institution holds “[t]he right 
of self-government, of making its own laws and administering its 
own affairs,”43 stands in stark contrast to the relationship between 
citizens and the public good contemplated by republicanism. As 
participants in this Conference have used the term at times, and at 
base, autonomy means that the entity creates its own legal universe. 
That is a notion that cannot be reconciled with the entrenched 
principle of ordered liberty embodied in the United States’ 
republican system.44 There is no legitimate independent legal 
universe and no entity that exists completely divorced from the 
society. A purely libertarian state is an abstraction, because humans 
live as a society, which entails the inevitability that one entity may 
harm another.45 John Stuart Mill explained it as follows: “Though 
society is not founded on a contract . . . the fact of living in society 
 42. See SELLERS, SACRED FIRE, supra note 1, at 39–40 (discussing historical influences 
on the framing generation’s choice of a republican form of representative government and 
concluding they chose it because “[t]his conception of liberty as subjection to equal laws made 
by common consent, for the general welfare, maintained the old republican connection 
between political rights and substantive freedom”); WOOD, THE CREATION, supra note 19, at 
164 (“Only with the presence of the democracy in the Constitution [through an elected 
legislature] could any government remain faithful to the public good.”); Hamilton, Why the 
People Do Not Rule, supra note 1, at 43 (discussing Calvin’s influence on the Framers, and 
Calvin’s notion that “[r]epresentatives were to be watched by the people and tethered to their 
common good, yet they bore the independent duty to make decisions serving the people on 
behalf of God”).  
 43. 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 807 (2d ed. 1989). 
 44. The Establishment Clause reinforces the fact that limitations are necessary for 
religious institutions. “The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, coupled with the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of ordered liberty, preclude both the Nation and the 
States from making any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.” Wallace v. Jafree, 472 U.S. 38, 67–68 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(holding an Alabama statute requiring a moment of silence at the start of each school day 
unconstitutional). 
 45. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 142 (Mark Goldie ed., 1993) 
[hereinafter LOCKE, TWO TREATISES]. Locke explained:  
[T]he end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom. 
For in all the states of created beings, capable of laws, where there is no law there is 
no freedom. For liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others, which 
cannot be where there is no law . . . . 
Id. 
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renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a 
certain line of conduct toward the rest.”46 Once one comes to 
understand the no-harm rule (and its distinguished pedigree), 
autonomy, or immunity, of any institution—including religious 
institutions—from the rule of law becomes intolerable.47 
“Church autonomy” is not and should not be a doctrine 
recognized in the United States. In fact, the Supreme Court has 
never recognized a doctrine of “church autonomy,” notwithstanding 
the title of this Conference or the use of the term in other articles.48 
It is an unfortunate term that does not begin to describe the actual 
or proper relationship between religious institutions and the law and 
was ill-chosen when it was coined by a 1952 New York appellate 
court, not for the purpose of immunizing religious institutions from 
legal accountability, but ironically rather for the purpose of 
explaining that courts may investigate ecclesiastical questions when 
“necessary . . . to determine the civil or property rights of the 
parties.”49 The Supreme Court has never used the phrase to describe 
 46. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 70 (David Spitz ed., 1975).  
 47. Religious institutions and individuals come into conflict with many general laws, 
including child abuse laws, medical neglect laws, zoning laws, prison regulations, 
antidiscrimination laws, fair housing laws, breach-of-the-peace laws, among others. The scope 
of the potential harm to the public good arising from the breach of such laws is enormous. See, 
e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of 
Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990) (showing that the religious organization made no showing 
that sales tax imposed a substantial burden on religious beliefs); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 
599 (1961) (upholding a statute that proscribed retail sales on Sunday); Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 351 (Fla. 2002) (“[T]he First 
Amendment does not provide a shield behind which a church may avoid liability for harm 
caused to an adult and a child parishioner arising from the alleged sexual assault or battery by 
one of its clergy . . . .”); Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) 
(holding that a church’s appeal of compensatory damages awarded in the case of an eleven-
year-old boy who died from medical neglect did not succeed on a First Amendment theory). 
 48. See generally, Brady, supra note 11; Esbeck, supra note 11; Lupu & Tuttle, supra 
note 35. Professor Lupu has written a very insightful article arguing that church autonomy is 
indefensible in the discrimination context. Lupu, supra note 29, at 401 (noting that in the 
context of discrimination claims, religious “institutions engaged in constitutionally protected 
activities are entitled to no special autonomy rights by virtue of their function”). 
 49. Cadman Mem’l Congregation Soc’y of Brooklyn v. Kenyon, 279 A.D. 1015 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1952). In Cadman, the court explained: 
In controversies such as this, ecclesiastical or doctrinal questions may be inquired 
into only insofar as it may be necessary to do so to determine the civil or property 
rights of the parties. . . . The court’s jurisdiction is clearly established and a definite 
question is laid before us for determination. . . . I am not, however, in entire accord 
with the determination of the trial court. The Congregational Christian Church 
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its jurisprudence,50 and it appears in the Supreme Court’s cases only 
twice, solely as footnote references to law review articles.51 The 
phrase was delivered to the academic mainstream in 1981 by 
Douglas Laycock, who popularized the use of the phrase in his 
article, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of 
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy.52 While 
some have tried to transform the phrase into a notion of church 
freedom from the law, such an interpretation has not gained traction 
in the courts, which is as it should be. 
The courts have not approached the issue of religious 
institutional liability or responsibility from the standpoint of rightful 
autonomy, but rather have divided cases involving religious 
institutions into three categories that have been crafted in light of 
the larger principles of republicanism, order, and liberty. 
The courts’ religious institution jurisprudence can be summed up 
under three fundamental principles: First, religious individuals and 
institutions are absolutely protected in the creation and observance 
of their beliefs, including self-governance that is driven by 
ecclesiology.53 Following this principle, the Court has declined 
jurisdiction over “solely” ecclesiastical disputes, that is, 
(using the name collectively) is admitted to be one in which each individual church 
is completely autonomous. There is no hierarchy or single ecclesiastical authority 
beyond it to which it owes obedience. While through the years the various churches 
have associated themselves in matters of common interest within the framework of 
an underlying faith, what authority is vested in such associations, conferences and 
councils arises from the congregations. They are not designed or intended as a 
repository of any part of the church’s autonomy. 
Id. at 1015, 1017. 
 50. Indeed, it has been used by the Court only to quote the title of legal articles. Corp. 
of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 341–42 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(quoting Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of 
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1389 
(1981)); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 620 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (referring to Paul G. 
Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case, 1969 SUP. 
CT. REV. 347). 
 51. See supra note 50. 
 52. Laycock, supra note 50. By labeling the notion as a “right,” Professor Laycock gave 
the notion a status that it has not earned in either the Supreme Court’s free exercise cases or 
American history. See Lupu, supra note 29, at 400–01 (critiquing Laycock’s positing of a 
theory of church autonomy). 
 53. See infra Part IV.A. 
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intraorganizational disputes over belief.54 These are the cases often 
cited as proof of church “autonomy,” but they do not stand for 
independence from the law, but rather the legal principle that 
government may not determine belief—a principle that appears 
throughout First Amendment cases, whether they are religious 
institution cases, free exercise cases, or free speech cases.55  
Second, there are cases in which the courts have declined to 
mediate church employment disputes, on the ground that the adult 
employee voluntarily shouldered the church’s belief system. These 
are the judicially crafted “ministerial exception” cases. Under this 
reasoning, the relationship between a voluntary, adult religious 
employee and a religious employer has been shielded in some, 
though not all, instances from judicial intervention.56  
This Article focuses primarily on the third category of cases—
those involving (1) conduct rather than belief and (2) harm to third 
parties. The cases in this third group involve the conduct of religious 
institutions or individuals that harm innocent and unconsenting 
third parties, and they present instances in which the religious 
institution’s arguments for freedom from the law are at their lowest 
ebb. They are properly governed by “‘neutral principles of law’”57 
and have been explained by then-Justice Rehnquist as follows: 
 54. Id. 
 55. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990); Wooley v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
633–34 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940); Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879).  
 56. Compare Bryce v. Episcopal Church in Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 658 (10th 
Cir. 2002) (refusing jurisdiction over an employment dispute between a church and one of the 
plaintiffs who was clergy and therefore subject to the governance of the church, and a second 
plaintiff who “affirmatively interjected herself into the church’s internal ecclesiastical 
dialogue”), with Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 964 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that a minister’s sexual harassment claim was limited to certain inquiries, but that 
“[a]s Bollard makes clear, accommodating Title VII’s mandate and the First Amendment’s 
strictures does not mean peremptorily dismissing all sexual harassment claims brought by 
ministers against churches”), Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948 
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the ministerial exemption is not applicable to a sexual 
harassment suit brought by a member of clergy where the order did not argue its actions were 
motivated by religious belief), and McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 857–58 (N.J. 2002) 
(holding that the ministerial exception does not apply to lay employees). 
 57. See Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 357 (Fla. 2002) (citing Presbyterian Church v. 
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)), for the 
principle that “[t]here are neutral principles of law . . . which can be applied without 
‘establishing’ churches to which the property is awarded.” 
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There are constitutional limitations on the extent to which a civil 
court may inquire into and determine matters of ecclesiastical 
cognizance and polity in adjudicating intrachurch disputes. But this 
Court never has suggested that those constraints similarly apply 
outside the context of such intraorganizational disputes. Thus, 
Serbian Orthodox Diocese and the other cases cited by applicant are 
not in point. Those cases are premised on a perceived danger that 
in resolving intrachurch disputes the State will become entangled in 
essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups 
espousing particular doctrinal beliefs. Such considerations are not 
applicable to purely secular disputes between third parties and a 
particular defendant, albeit a religiously affiliated organization.58 
The Supreme Court’s religious institution cases operate from the 
principle of no-harm, which is part and parcel of the core principle of 
ordered liberty embedded in republicanism—the maximal amount of 
liberty is calibrated to achieve the minimal amount of harm.59 They 
reflect the Constitution’s larger orientation towards republican 
democracy, which rests on the no-harm rule, not a principle of 
autonomy. 
This Article makes the case that the Supreme Court has taken the 
proper approach in its Religion Clause cases by (1) favoring 
legislative determinations of the public good, which entails the 
exclusive power to craft exemptions from generally applicable, 
neutral laws, over judicially crafted exemptions; and (2) recognizing 
the obligation to obey neutral principles of law in the religious 
institution cases under the Establishment Clause.  
Both sets of cases rest on the same principles. Both recognize an 
absolute right to believe anything, and both demand the 
accountability of religious institutions to the public good when they 
act. The Court has allowed for expansive religious liberty in the 
context of an ordered society.  
 58. Gen. Council on Fin. and Admin. of the United Methodist Church v. Superior 
Court of California, 439 U.S. 1369, 1372–73 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1978) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added) (denying application for stay); see also Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 356–
57 (distinguishing internal church disputes from third-party harm cases).  
 59. See Carmella, supra note 9, at 1044 (“There is one condition attached to all 
exercises of freedom: that the use of the freedom will not breach minimal responsibilities owed 
to the larger society as those responsibilities are embodied in legitimate laws.”). 
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 This Article shows that the no-harm principle is a long-held 
moral and legal principle that history, philosophy, and theology 
support. It is the primary justification in Anglo-American culture for 
criminal law, tort law, and a significant amount of regulatory law.60 It 
is so well respected and entrenched that attempts to avoid it by 
contemporary religious entities cannot and should not succeed. 
Ultimately, the no-harm principle dictates that religious entities be 
treated and regulated as any other entity in society—that is, under 
the no-harm doctrine. There can be no church autonomy in a society 
that values citizens equally.  
This Article is divided into six Parts. Part II makes the case 
through history, philosophy, and theology that church autonomy is 
deeply at odds with ordered liberty and long-entrenched 
constitutional principles. The Framers of the Constitution and the 
First Amendment worked from within a republican frame of 
reference so that religious entities were not seen as beyond the 
boundaries of the law but rather as integral to society and therefore 
subject to the principle of no harm. This Part is subdivided into 
three sections. First, it describes the history of three abandoned 
religious privileges: the benefit of clergy, sanctuary, and charitable 
immunity. Second, it describes the Protestant and republican 
mindset at the time of the framing, a mindset that cannot be squared 
with church “autonomy.” Third, it introduces the no-harm rule 
articulated by John Locke, which informed the Framers and was later 
refined and made a pillar of modern democracies in the philosophy 
of John Stuart Mill. 
Part III explores possible philosophical and theological theories 
in the religious institution context and demonstrates their 
inconsistency with church autonomy and their consonance with the 
no-harm rule. 
Part IV describes the Supreme Court’s Religion Clause 
jurisprudence as it relates to religious institutions. This Part 
demonstrates that the same principles undergird the Free Exercise 
 60. See generally KEETON ON TORTS 6 (1984) (“So far as there is one central idea, it 
would seem that it is that liability must be based upon conduct which is socially unreasonable. 
The common thread woven into all torts is the idea of unreasonable interference with the 
interests of others.”); Richard Epstein, The Harm Principle—and How It Grew, 45 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 369 (1995) (referring to the “deep philosophical pedigree” of the no-harm 
rule, which is “universal and durable”).  
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Clause and the Establishment Clause in the Court’s cases—belief is 
absolutely protected, but conduct may be regulated by the 
legislature in the interest of the public good.61 The courts may not 
exercise jurisdiction when the issue is solely a matter of belief or 
ecclesiology, but they may and indeed must when the issue involves 
the application of neutral principles of law to a religious institution. 
Part IV further defines the no-harm principle. Part V employs the 
clergy abuse era in the United States Catholic Church as a case study 
to illustrate the necessity of a no-harm rule to deter abuses of power 
that undermine the public good. Part VI offers a short conclusion. 
II. THE HISTORICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND THEOLOGICAL 
BACKGROUND OF THE NO-HARM RULE 
Modern-day claims to church autonomy and the myriad 
privileges invoked in cases involving tortious or criminal behavior by 
religious individuals and institutions are remnants of the now-
discredited practices in Anglo-American history. There have been 
regimes during which religious entities were protected from the law. 
Their raison d’etre, however, has been overtaken by the growth of 
the common law, the rule of law, and the no-harm principle, which 
can be traced from John Locke through the Framers, John Stuart 
Mill, and his philosophical successors.  
The logic underlying the common law is that all similarly situated 
individuals should be governed by the same laws.62 In sum, the 
fundamental fairness that is at the foundation of the common law,63 
 61.  A third category in addition to belief and conduct is religious speech. Religious 
speech cases have been decided under the Free Speech Clause, as opposed to the religion 
clauses, and therefore will not be addressed in the analysis of this Article. Suffice it to say that 
conduct is not speech and cannot receive the identical treatment. Belief does no harm to 
others, speech may do some, but conduct has the greatest capacity for harm. Accordingly, the 
force of law is strongest against conduct, as between belief, speech, and conduct. Because 
conduct is distinct from speech in terms of the public good, I do not agree with the theories 
that have tried to translate the Free Exercise Clause into the Free Speech Clause. See, e.g., 
Robert W. Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation: Protecting Religious Land Use After Boerne, 68 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 861, 867 (2000); cf. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free 
Exercise Doctrine, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 925, 928 (2000) (advocating a free exercise 
doctrine that takes concepts from but is distinct from the Free Speech Clause). 
 62. A.R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW 5, 186–90 (1966). 
 63. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 5, at 1344–45 (noting that the common law “is 
grounded in a common well of values, a widely shared sense of justice and fairness, and 
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the rule of law, and the no-harm rule combined to impose an 
inexorable logic that has led to a rejection of the notion that 
religious institutions deserve special immunity from laws that 
prohibit harm.64 
From the third to the sixteenth centuries in Britain, church 
autonomy was in fact the order of the day. The Roman Catholic 
Church was cosovereign with the state, which means it was itself 
immune from prosecution. The Church was permitted to harbor 
fugitives from the law under the practice of “sanctuary,”65 and it 
then instituted the benefit of clergy, ecclesiastical courts that 
provided separate (and far more lenient) justice for clergy.66 After 
these privileges were rejected in favor of civil law, and after the 
Catholic Church lost its sovereign power in Britain, the Crown 
imposed legal liability on clergy and religious institutions. The spirit 
of the earlier privileges reappeared with the crafting of a judicial 
doctrine that shielded charitable, including religious, institutions 
from civil lawsuits demanding monetary damages for harm done by 
the institution or its employees. Britain has rejected this charitable 
immunity doctrine, and the United States has diluted it.67  
Each of these tacks provided significant autonomy for religious 
institutions. These also permitted such institutions to avoid 
accountability to the public good. Eventually, each was overtaken by 
the interrelated dynamic of the common law, the rule of law, and the 
no-harm principle. These bedrock principles were fostered in the 
United States by the views of John Locke, James Madison, Thomas 
Jefferson, and John Stuart Mill, as well as others.68  
dedication to elaborating a pragmatically oriented, empirically based working legal order that 
insures stability through steadfast adherence to core principles”); id. at 1348 (“At least under 
certain propitious circumstances, therefore, the rule of law can promote both predictability and 
fairness; this seems equally possible in an Anglo-American common law setting as in a 
continental civil law system . . . .”); see also Charles H. Koch, Jr., Envisioning a Global Legal 
Culture, 25 MICH J. INT’L L. 1, 54 (2003) (“[T]he common law judge is charged with 
applying the ‘law’ in order to render individual fairness, but is also committed to treating like 
cases alike.”). 
 64. See infra Part III. 
 65. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 66. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 67. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 68. See infra Part II.C.  
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 There are no longer the social practices, institutions, or widely 
accepted principles that at one point in time supported the notion 
that a criminal or tortious religious entity should be treated 
differently from one that is secular. The dispositive question is 
whether the entity’s conduct has led to illegal harm. Where it has, 
the courts should hold the perpetrator liable—unless the legislature 
has provided an exemption upon a determination that permitting the 
religious entity to avoid the law will not harm the public good. 
A. Historical Privileges That Permitted Clergy and Religious 
Institutions To Stand Above the Law 
One might ask why history is relevant to the calibration of 
individual liberty and the public good. Contemporary legal debate 
often divides between those advocating an originalist approach and 
those opposing it. That fault `line is not relevant here. Rather, the 
history of special privileges for religion is being recited for the 
purpose of explaining the evolution of the relationship between 
religious entities and the law. There has been an ongoing dialectic 
between religious entities, the law, and the public good for centuries, 
and it has shifted from strong privileges for religious entities toward 
the persisting application of the rule of law. This play of power has 
yielded a construct that incorporates lessons learned. As Justice 
Holmes said, “the life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
experience.”69 It is not uncommon for United States constitutional 
theory to reach only as far back as the Constitutional Convention, 
but the forces that have brought the United States to the no-harm 
principle began long before the Framers were born.  
 There were three historical privileges directly benefiting religious 
individuals and entities in Britain: sanctuary, benefit of clergy, and 
charitable immunity. Britain has since discarded all three privileges. 
Analyzing this history provides crucial background for understanding 
that church autonomy is incongruous with the centuries-long 
development of the relationship between religious institutions and 
the law. 
The United States Supreme Court has repudiated the spirit of 
these three historic principles, but they still haunt religious 
 69. HOLMES, supra note 20, at 1. 
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institution theories70 and the legal tactics of religious institutions 
themselves.71 It is important to learn and understand this history, 
because it was the background for the Framers and for the early 
formation of the law governing religious institutions and individuals 
in the United States. It is also important because it uncovers 
extended experience with church autonomy and shows how it 
became incongruous with the growth of the common law, 
republicanism, and the rule of law in Britain and then in the United 
States. 
1. The sanctuary privilege 
As early as the third century AD, secular authority recognized an 
ecclesiastical right to provide sanctuary, or protection, for any person 
threatened by “private vengeance for alleged wrongdoing.”72 
Sanctuary permitted the Church to harbor fugitives—clergy and laity 
alike—from the law. The Church, in effect, was a separate universe 
above the law. The privilege was intended to forestall blood feuds 
and the vigilantism of the times.73 Although secular government 
tried to retain rights of control over some categories of wrongdoers, 
the ecclesiastical authorities held full sway to determine whether and 
what kind of sanctuary would be made available.74 The Church 
 70. See Brady, supra note 11; Perry Dane, “Omalous” Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 
1715; Esbeck, supra note 11; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 35; see also Locke v. Davey, 124 S. 
Ct. 1307, 1309 (2004); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534–35 (1997); Employment 
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 
493 U.S. 378, 389 (1990); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961); Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879). 
 71. Religious institutions being sued or prosecuted for childhood sexual abuse have 
repeatedly asserted so-called privileges over the law, claiming that they need not provide 
internal documents, despite their relevance. The Catholic Church has asserted numerous 
privileges that purportedly prevent the state from seeing employee files in grand jury 
proceedings. See, e.g., William Lobdell & Jean Guccione, A Novel Tack by Cardinal, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2004, at A1. 
 72. Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Law Sanctuaries, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321, 
323–24 (2003). The practice of sanctuary may date back much farther. The Bible explicitly 
mentions sanctuary three times, and temples in ancient Greece afforded sanctuary to criminals. 
Id. Roman temples, on the other hand, offered only a temporary refuge before turning 
criminals over to civil authorities. Id. at 324. 
 73. NORMAN MACLAREN TRENHOLME, THE RIGHT OF SANCTUARY IN ENGLAND: A 
STUDY IN INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 47 (1903). 
 74. Id. 
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further refused to deliver anyone within its sanctuary unless promises 
were made that the wrongdoer would not be harmed.75 
Seven centuries after the practice first appeared, the Crown 
created the chartered sanctuary, a form of asylum that had its force 
by virtue of a charter from the king.76 Chartered sanctuaries provided 
greater protection than Church sanctuary, including broader 
geographic and temporal scope, and a greater range of protected 
offenses.77 The fugitives hidden in chartered sanctuaries, which could 
be quite large geographically, were governed by the Church and 
lived in a fugitive community, apart from the rest of the world.78 
Secular authorities recognized this practice well into Tudor times. 
The sanctuary privilege shielded both laity and clergy, but clergy 
were often given special dispensation.79 The church fortified the 
power of sanctuary by teaching the “fear of Divine vengeance.” 
Thus, “when the Church said that those who sought her protection 
must be treated with leniency and mercy, and their lives and persons 
spared, no state or individual was strong enough or bold enough to 
refuse to comply.”80  
As the Crown sought to enlarge its jurisdiction and attitudes 
about the proper role of the Church changed, so too did secular 
deference to the practice of sanctuary. Beginning in 1467, the 
Crown began to reduce the types and locations of offenses covered 
by sanctuary, and by 1540, chartered sanctuary was abolished.81 
Sanctuary was completely repealed in 1623 by act of Parliament 
during the reign of James I. However, the practice persisted 
unofficially with regards to service of process until the end of the 
 75. Id. at 325. 
 76. Id. at 47. 
 77. Id; see also Logan, supra note 72, at 326.  
 78. TRENHOLME, supra note 73, at 47. 
 79. Id. at 43 (noting that, during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the law forced 
clergymen to surrender to ecclesiastical courts for “spiritual offenses” and to secular authorities 
for common-law crimes). Once in secular courts, however, they would be permitted to invoke 
the benefit of clergy, which sent them to the ecclesiastical courts, where they escaped the most 
severe punishments. Id. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Logan, supra note 72, at 328. 
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seventeenth century.82 By that era, the Crown found the separate 
justice system insupportable because it made criminal punishment 
inconsistent.83 
The end of sanctuary did not signal the end of special treatment 
for the clergy, but rather only one stage in the progression from 
church autonomy through the common law to the rule of law. 
“Despite its formal demise, the spirit of sanctuary lived on in the 
practice known as ‘benefit of clergy,’ which did not offer outright 
immunity, but served, when available, to mitigate the severity of 
secular law.”84 
2. The benefit of clergy privilege and the sovereignty of established 
religion 
The triumph of the common law over Church sovereignty 
coincided with the rise of Puritanism, the interregnum, and the 
Restoration, each of which contributed in some way to reduce the 
ruling power of the Roman Catholic Church.85 By the end of the 
seventeenth century, the ecclesiastical courts retained jurisdiction 
only over discipline of clergy, certain types of sexual offenses 
committed by laypersons, and minor matters concerning worship 
services.86 The history of a second religious privilege mirrors that of 
sanctuary—they both eventually disappeared—and provides useful 
insight into the emergence of the common law, the waning of 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and the end of church autonomy.  
The second privilege was the “benefit of clergy.” This privilege 
permitted clergy to avoid capital punishment and even conviction for 
crimes by (1) mandating lesser penalties for clergy in the secular, 
royal courts and (2) permitting clergy cases to be heard in the more 
lenient ecclesiastical courts.87 The benefit of clergy principle, at least 
from the time of Henry II (1154–1189) until the era of Elizabeth I 
(1558–1603), placed clergy members above the royal law, creating 
 82. JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 491–
92 (1883). 
 83. Logan, supra note 72, at 329. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See GEORGE W. DALZELL, BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN AMERICA & RELATED MATTERS 
10–12 (1955). 
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two distinct classes of criminals—clergy and ordinary citizens. The 
clergy were quite literally a privileged class with a separate justice 
system and special punishment privileges; all other citizens were 
subject to the general laws in the secular royal courts. The benefit of 
clergy eventually lost its religious character and evolved into a rule of 
lenity for all first-time felony offenders.88  
To understand the benefit of clergy principle, one must go back 
to twelfth-century Britain. In that era, King Henry II (1154–1189) 
succeeded the lax reign of King Stephen (1135–1154), who had 
permitted the barons and the Roman Catholic Church to exercise 
overweening power.89 Henry II, who is known as the father of the 
common law, took on both the barons and the Church but 
ultimately failed to make the Church and its clergy accountable to 
the public good.90 
From 1076, when William the Conqueror established the dual 
court system, to 1576, during the reign of Elizabeth I, the royal 
courts and the ecclesiastical courts shared jurisdiction over criminal 
law.91 The question of jurisdiction brought conflict and dissension 
for centuries. Although Henry II saw the need to standardize 
criminal justice and sought to bring clergy under the jurisdiction of 
the civil courts, the scandal with Archbishop Thomas Becket derailed 
 88. Id. at 10; Phillip M. Spector, The Sentencing Rule of Lenity, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 
511, 515 (2002). 
 89. RICHARD BARBER, HENRY PLANTAGENET 30 (1967); C. WARREN HOLLISTER, THE 
MAKING OF ENGLAND: 55 B.C. TO 1399, at 149–50 (7th ed. 1996). 
 90. BARBER, supra note 89, at 106–10; HOLLISTER, supra note 89, at 162–64. 
 91. DALZELL, supra note 87, at 13; 4 EDWARD A. FREEMAN, THE HISTORY OF THE 
NORMAN CONQUEST OF ENGLAND: ITS CAUSES AND RESULTS 392 (1871); HOLLISTER, supra 
note 89, at 115. William the Conqueror divided the ecclesiastical courts from the secular 
courts, decreeing that “no bishop or archdeacon shall any longer hold pleas involving episcopal 
laws in the hundred [court],” and that instead bishops were to maintain separate courts of 
their own in which to try civil matters such as marriage, wills, debts, and criminal offenses 
committed by or upon all members of the Church. RICHARD WINSTON, THOMAS BECKET 17 
(1967) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting H.I. STUBBS, HISTORICAL 
INTRODUCTIONS TO THE ROLLS SERIES (Arthur Hassell ed., 1902)). In the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries, canon law claimed jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases arising out of 
sin and breach of faith, as well as over clerics and church property; secular law had jurisdiction 
over criminal and civil cases arising out of seisin of freehold land and breach of the king’s 
peace. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN 
LEGAL TRADITION 516 (1983). 
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his plans and led to a system of special treatment of clergy criminals 
that lasted several centuries. 
Under Stephen, the clergy became accustomed to 
unaccountability to the civil, or royal, courts.92 Henry II viewed their 
privilege of being above the law as dangerous, and in 1164, he called 
a meeting with the bishops of England to require them to agree to 
observe the customary powers of the king in the area of criminal 
law.93 Specifically, he demanded that criminal clerics be defrocked by 
the Church and handed over to the civil courts. 
Henry II was too astute a ruler not to perceive the immense evils 
arising from [the special treatment for the church], and the 
limitation which it imposed upon the royal power by emancipating 
so large a class of his subjects from obedience to the laws of the 
realm. When in 1164 he endeavored, in the Constitutions of 
Clarendon, to set bounds to the privileges of the church, he 
therefore especially attacked the benefit of clergy, and declared that 
ecclesiastics were amenable to the royal jurisdiction.94 
At first, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Becket, agreed. 
Becket’s approval signaled a victory for Henry, because the 
Archbishop of Canterbury was the most powerful prelate in Britain 
and was second only to the Pope.95 As Archbishop, Becket had the 
power to excommunicate and was the cleric who would perform 
coronations in the event of a new king.96 To Henry’s dismay, Becket 
reversed his position under pressure from other bishops.97 As a result 
 92. Peter D. Jason, The Courts Christian in Medieval England, 37 CATH. LAW. 339, 
342 n.27 (1997) (“Overall, Stephen failed to preserve the barrier against papal authority over 
the English Church. Therefore, when Henry II succeeded Stephen, he was faced with the 
challenge of overcoming the increased authority of the Church.” (citing Z.N. BROOKE, THE 
ENGLISH CHURCH AND THE PAPACY 188–89 (1968))). 
 93. Unless otherwise noted, the account of the feud between Henry II and Thomas 
Becket in the following paragraphs can be found in BARBER, supra note 89, at 110–21; 
HOLLISTER, supra note 89, at 160–64; WINSTON, supra note 91, at 166–91, 318–21.  
 94. HENRY C. LEA, STUDIES IN CHURCH HISTORY 187 (1869). 
 95. HOLLISTER, supra note 89, at 161. 
 96. WINSTON, supra note 91, at 319–20. 
 97. BARBER, supra note 89, at 110–11; HOLLISTER, supra note 89, at 133; WINSTON, 
supra note 91, at 167–68. As Archbishop of Canterbury, Becket (who had previously served as 
Henry’s royal chancellor) was the head of the English Church, responsible for the crowning of 
kings and direct relations with Rome. HOLLISTER, supra note 89, at 161–63. 
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of the disagreement between the King and the Archbishop, Henry 
halted Becket’s income and exiled him to France in 1164.98 
In June of 1170, anxious to secure his succession, Henry sought 
to have his eldest surviving son crowned. Because Becket was in 
exile, and therefore unavailable, Henry had Canterbury’s ancient 
rival, the archbishop of York, preside over young Henry’s 
coronation. Becket was enraged at the affront and, with papal 
backing, threatened to lay England under the ban of interdict.99 He 
and Henry reached a truce, which allowed Becket to return to 
England in the autumn of 1170. The Sheriff of Kent accused Becket 
of returning to unseat young Henry. Becket replied, “I have not the 
slightest intention of undoing the king’s coronation. . . . But I have 
punished those who defied God and the prerogative of the church of 
Canterbury by usurping the right to consecrate him.”100 Despite the 
truce, just before returning to England, Becket further raised 
Henry’s ire by excommunicating all the bishops who had 
participated in young Henry’s coronation. It was after this incident 
that Henry commented out of frustration to his assembled court, 
“Will no one rid me of this turbulent prelate?”101  
In response to this furious statement, four of Henry’s barons 
murdered Becket in Canterbury Cathedral on December 29, 
1170.102 Although he publicly disavowed involvement with the 
murder, Henry was subsequently overcome with remorse and agreed 
to permit the ecclesiastical courts to exercise jurisdiction over clerics 
 98. Henry ordered Becket to stand trial in the royal court for various offenses allegedly 
committed when he was Henry’s chancellor. Claiming clerical immunity from royal 
jurisdiction, Becket fled the country to appeal his case to the pope, which violated the 
prohibition of unlicensed appeals to Rome. BARBER, supra note 89, at 116–21; HOLLISTER, 
supra note 89, at 134; WINSTON, supra note 91, at 175–91. 
 99. BERMAN, supra note 91, at 262 (“Interdict was a partial or total suspension of 
public services and sacraments; it could extend to one or more persons or to a whole locality or 
kingdom.”). 
 100. 3 MATERIALS FOR THE HISTORY OF THOMAS BECKET, ARCHBISHOP OF 
CANTERBURY 119 (James Craigie Robertson ed., 1875), quoted in WINSTON, supra note 91, 
at 319–20. 
 101. BARBER, supra note 89, at 143–44; HOLLISTER, supra note 89, at 134; WINSTON, 
supra note 91, at 302–05. 
 102. HOLLISTER, supra note 89, at 134. 
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accused of crimes.103 From the aftermath of this feud, the practice 
known as benefit of clergy emerged in the common law.104 
The benefit of clergy, or privilegium clericale, was often the 
difference between life and death.105 In the king’s courts, capital 
punishment was mandated for all felonies.106 By contrast, capital 
punishment lay beyond the power of the ecclesiastical courts.107 
Hence, clergy and laypeople might commit the same illegal actions, 
but the layperson’s sentence would be death while the cleric’s 
sentence would be defrocking, incarceration in a monastery, or 
forfeiture of belongings other than land.108 
There were also procedural advantages for clergy members. 
Ecclesiastical trials of criminal matters were conducted by 
compurgation—the accused would take a formal oath that he was 
innocent of the crime and bring into court an “arbitrary” number of 
compurgators who would swear to their belief in his oath.109 
Acquittal was typical, because evidence was only adduced for the 
defense and perjury by the defendant and compurgators was 
routine.110 Additionally, the clergy were exonerated from all prior 
criminal acts upon conviction of a particular crime.111 Thus, the rape 
of a girl and the murder of her father—both perpetrated by a single 
cleric—could be reduced to a single crime and a single punishment 
of suspension from ministry for two years.112 The same crimes by any 
other citizen would have been tried as individual crimes and death 
would have been the likely sentence for either or both. 
 103. BARBER, supra note 89, at 161–65; HOLLISTER, supra note 89, at 134; WINSTON, 
supra note 91, at 375. 
 104. See 2 THE REPORTS OF JOHN SPELMAN 327 (J.H. Baker ed., 1978) (stating that the 
benefit of clergy appeared in 1170). 
 105. DALZELL, supra note 87, at 11. 
 106. Spector, supra note 88, at 515. 
 107. DALZELL, supra note 87, at 11 (stating that a “church tribunal could not enter a 
‘judgment of blood,’ i.e., a capital sentence or an attainder”). 
 108. See id. 
 109. R.H. HELMHOLZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CLASSICAL CANON LAW 158–59 (1996). 
 110. DALZELL, supra note 87, at 11; R.H. Helmholz, Crime, Compurgation and the 
Church Courts, in CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND 137 (1987) (“Too many accused 
persons successfully underwent purgation for the method to inspire confidence as a fact-finding 
device. . . . Almost every person who came before the ecclesiastical courts accused of theft, 
murder, or other secular offense, and who went on to purgation, did so successfully.”). 
 111. DALZELL, supra note 87, at 11. 
 112. See Spector, supra note 88, at 515. 
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Many laypeople, as well as Henry II, viewed this privilege for 
clergy as grossly unfair.113 This negative response to preferential 
treatment eventually moved the privilege beyond the clergy, so that 
others could receive the benefit of this doctrine. First, it was 
extended to those who were literate (when it was first instituted, 
only the clergy were), and then to laypeople in general.114 From this 
history, one can draw many interesting conclusions, but “the 
remarkable point is that the clergy should have been able to maintain 
for centuries a special privilege in crime. This is a corollary to the 
magnitude and power of the church. . . .”115 
The power of religious institutions during the British monarchy 
was also felt through the operation of what might be considered the 
“high courts” of the royal and ecclesiastical courts: the Star Chamber 
and its ecclesiastical counterpart, the High Commission, the 
beginnings of which appeared during the reign of Henry VIII and 
came to full flower under Elizabeth I. These were the “prerogative 
courts.”116 “The court of High Commission stood to the church and 
to the ordinary ecclesiastical courts somewhat in the same relation as 
the Council and Star Chamber stood to the state and the ordinary 
courts of the state, central and local.”117 Upon declaring himself the 
head of the Church in England, Henry VIII used both courts to 
enforce spiritual uniformity on the people, a tradition followed by his 
successors (whether Catholic or Protestant) until these courts were 
abolished in 1641.118 
 113. DALZELL, supra note 87, at 12 (“From the time of the first Plantagenet the 
toleration of a class of privileged criminals was persistently assailed as iniquitous.”); see also 
LEA, supra note 94, at 186–91. 
 114. Spector, supra note 88, at 515 n.22 (noting that in 1350, the privilege was 
statutorily extended to “all manner of clerks, as well secular as religious”). This statute was 
intended to extend the privilege to “inferior Orders” of the clergy rather than to laypersons. 
Id. Judges nonetheless interpreted “secular clerks” to include all literate males. Id. at 515 
(citing 2 SIR WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 338 (2d ed. 
1724)). 
 115. DALZELL, supra note 87, at 13. 
 116. Frank Riebli, Note, The Spectre of Star Chamber: The Role of an Ancient English 
Tribunal in the Supreme Court’s Self-Incrimination Jurisprudence, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
807, 826 (2002). 
 117. 1 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 608 (A.L. Goodhart & 
H.G. Hanbury eds., 7th ed. 1956). 
 118. Id. at 605–11. 
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By 1576, under Elizabeth I, the benefit of clergy privilege had 
been extended beyond clergy to those who were literate (the original 
logic being that only the clergy were literate). Therefore, the benefit 
of clergy was not only a means for the clergy to move their trials to 
the friendlier ecclesiastical courts, but it also became a tool for 
laypeople to reduce the likely sentence for a crime, even though they 
were being tried in secular courts.119 It was assumed that a felony was 
“clergyable,” i.e., capable of preventing capital punishment, unless 
Parliament explicitly stated otherwise.120 Eventually, during the latter 
half of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth, 
the benefit was inapplicable to murder, rape, abduction, thefts of the 
person exceeding a shilling, burglary, highway robbery, stealing 
horses, and stealing from churches.121 
Also in 1576, Parliament abolished the ecclesiastical courts’ 
jurisdiction over crimes committed by clergy.122 At the same time, 
the “benefit of clergy” became a gambit to be invoked at sentencing 
for lay and clergy alike—that is, it was not a guarantee of a particular 
court, with special procedural rules, for clergy.123 Parliament 
removed the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts because it 
perceived that the Church had taken over a large portion of its 
criminal jurisdiction.124 The Crown was appalled at the level of 
perjury and corruption in the ecclesiastical courts: 
This scandalous prostitution of oaths, and the forms of justice, in 
the almost constant acquittal of felonious clerks by purgation, was 
the occasion, that, upon very heinous and notorious circumstances 
of guilt, the temporal courts would not trust the ordinary with the 
trial of the offender . . . . As, therefore, these mock trials took their 
rise from factious and popish tenets, tending to exempt one part of 
the nation from the general municipal law; it became high time, 
 119. DALZELL, supra note 87, at 24. 
 120. John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the 
Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 40 (1983). 
 121. Id. at 38–39. 
 122. DALZELL, supra note 87, at 24 (discussing 18 Eliz., ch. 7, §§ 2–3 (1576)). 
 123. Langbein, supra note 120, at 38 n.147 (citing 18 Eliz., ch. 7, §§ 2–3 (1576), 
discussed in 5 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 368 (Sir 
George Tucker ed., 1803)); STEPHEN, supra note 82, at 462. 
 124. Spector, supra note 88, at 516. 
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when the reformation was thoroughly established, to abolish so 
vain and impious a ceremony.125 
As a result, Blackstone writes, the 1576 statute abolished the 
practice of purgation (and with it, the ecclesiastical courts’ 
jurisdiction over clergy members who committed crimes) by 
directing that an offender who pled benefit of clergy “shall not to be 
delivered to the [ecclesiastic courts], as formerly,” but instead was to 
be burned on the hand to show that he had used the privilege for a 
first-time felony (a practice that became ceremonial in some cases) 
and, at the judge’s discretion, sentenced to up to a year in prison.126 
The privilege was not available in later trials of the same individual.127 
The 1576 statute served two purposes: (1) Parliament did away with 
the corrupt practice of trial by compurgation, and (2) it effectively 
enlarged the crown’s criminal jurisdiction at the expense of the 
ecclesiastical courts. The loss of ecclesiastical jurisdiction over crimes 
committed by clergy was significant, but it was not nearly as divisive 
in its era as Henry II’s proposals in his era had been. One can detect 
in the British society a gradually developing assumption that the 
same crime deserved the same punishment, regardless of the actor. 
The Church and the Crown continually came into conflict 
throughout the medieval period over questions of jurisdiction.128 In 
the thirteenth century, the gap between them widened when 
common lawyers replaced ecclesiastics on the benches of the 
common-law courts.129 Although the rival courts were separate 
systems of law, differing in many of their rules and deriving their 
force from different sovereigns,130 they were based on the same 
philosophical foundation—“the will of God expressed through 
 125. BLACKSTONE, supra note 123, at 368–69. 
 126. Id. at 369. 
 127. Id. at 372. 
 128. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 117, at 584 (“As the state grew into conscious life it was 
inevitable that occasions for disputes between the temporal and spiritual powers should 
arise.”). 
 129. Id. (noting that, “from that time onwards, the professional jealousy of the common 
lawyers led them to restrict the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts whenever it was possible 
to restrict it”). 
 130. Id. at 587. 
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authority,” whether ecclesiastical or royal.131 All this changed with 
the Reformation—the attack on the authority of the Church was in 
effect an attack on the whole medieval system of law.132 Religion was 
no longer universally considered the basis of civil government, and 
the premises of the common law gained ascendancy over 
ecclesiastical law.133 
It became clear that a “shift[] in the balance of power” to secular 
authority at the expense of the ecclesiastical “had to be carried out in 
the context of legal competition and compromise.”134 The 
ecclesiastical courts continued to exercise jurisdiction over some 
matters that had been in their purview since the medieval period, 
such as tithing, probate, marriage, defamation, and cases involving 
“mortal sins” such as fornication and adultery.135 Ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction over most matters, however, had already begun to 
decline at the outset of the Reformation, reflecting a “basic shift in 
attitude towards the proper role of the Church in men’s lives.”136 
 131. THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 42 
(1929). 
 132. Id. (noting that, by the time of Edward VI (1547–1553), the Reformation was used 
as a political weapon against Rome, and that after the brief reign of Catholic Mary (1554–
1558), Elizabeth made the Reformation “the permanent basis of English political and religious 
life”). 
 133. Id. 
 134. BERMAN, supra note 91, at 268. 
 135. Id. at 266–67. 
 136. HELMHOLZ, supra note 109, at 320–21; see also id. at 316–17 (noting that 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction over testamentary debt and probate began a slow decline in the mid-
sixteenth century); SELECT CASES ON DEFAMATION TO 1600, at xxxvii–xli (R.H. Helmholz 
ed., Selden Society No. 101, 1985) (noting that royal courts began to prohibit the church 
courts from hearing defamation cases involving secular crimes and began to hear such cases on 
their own in the sixteenth century); Edward P. Steegmann, Note, Of History and Due Process, 
63 IND. L.J. 369, 385 (1988) (explaining that sodomy was made a secular offense by statute in 
1533 (citing STEPHEN, supra note 82, ch. 25)); Jeremy D. Weinstein, Note, Adultery, Law, 
and the State: A History, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 195, 225 (1986) (noting that Puritans of the 
Commonwealth made adultery a capital offense in 1650, although this was nullified in 1660 
with the Restoration (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 123, at 64–65)). On the other hand, the 
Church retained jurisdiction over other matters well beyond the Reformation. See, e.g., R.H. 
HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 3 (1974) (explaining that 
jurisdiction over marriage and marital disputes was not withdrawn from the Church until 
1857); HELMHOLZ, supra note 109, at 210 (noting that jurisdiction over bastardy litigation 
was not withdrawn until the nineteenth century). 
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The increasing entrenchment of the common law,137 the Roman 
Catholic Church’s loss of moral authority during the Reformation,138 
and the subsequent growth of Protestantism with its emphasis on 
accountability139 undermined whatever argument the Church once 
had for sovereignty or to have its clergy immune from the criminal 
law. By 1641, one year after the Puritans gained control of 
Parliament, the jurisdiction of the prerogative courts—Star Chamber 
and the High Commission—was repealed, because “so large a 
prerogative,” manifested in the courts’ inquisitorial form and their 
arbitrary procedures, was “no longer compatible with liberty.”140 
Additionally, in a dramatic move forward for the common law, the 
ecclesiastical courts were deprived of all criminal jurisdiction; the 
entirety of which was placed in common law courts.141 
The rejection of the prerogative courts, whose abuses were 
attributed to the monarchs (who governed both the state and 
established church), was an early step toward the overthrow of the 
monarchy in 1649.142 
 137. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 131, at 43–44, 46. See generally HELMHOLZ, supra 
note 109, at 2 (discussing approaches to the relationship between the two systems during the 
rise of the common law). 
 138. See WILL DURANT, THE REFORMATION: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION 
FROM WYCLIF TO CALVIN 1300–1564, at 584 (1957) [hereinafter DURANT, THE 
REFORMATION] (referring to “[t]he collapse of the spiritual and moral authority of the 
priesthood”); HOLDSWORTH, supra note 117, at 588 (“The wealth and corruption of the 
church, and more particularly the abuses of the ecclesiastical courts, were exciting extreme 
unpopularity.”); FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION 
IN AMERICA 34–35 (Thomas LeBien ed., 2003) (“Whether or not the Church of England . . . 
was in as deplorable condition as its critics made out is beside the point; the fact is, widespread 
opinion that it was corrupt constituted the greater reality that shaped events.”).  
 139. Of the Reformers, John Calvin in particular addressed the faults of the sixteenth-
century Catholic Church as a problem in the structure of the church, with his primary concern 
being the lack of accountability of the clergy to the members or the higher good. It was his 
view that the Church had deviated from the ancient church’s structures of accountability. See, 
e.g., 2 JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, bk. IV, ch. IV, §§ 1–2, at 
1068–70 (describing the ancient practice of electing bishops and noting their accountability to 
“the assembly of his brethren”); id. at bk. IV, ch. VII, § 21, at 1141 (criticizing the 
contemporary pope for ruling in a “tyrannical fashion” and considering “his own whim as 
law,” and opining that such “is utterly abhorrent not only to a sense of piety but also of 
humanity”). 
 140. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 117, at 597. 
 141. BERMAN, supra note 91, at 113; HOLDSWORTH, supra note 117, at 61. 
 142. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 123, at 370; PLUCKNETT, supra note 131, at 53–54. 
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In England, the benefit of clergy eventually became a tool for all 
first-time offenders to avoid the death penalty.143 In the eighteenth 
century, the benefit of clergy was gradually replaced by the 
“transportation” of convicts from England to the American and 
Australian colonies, and was ultimately abolished in the nineteenth 
century.144 In the American colonies, the benefit of clergy never 
functioned as a special privilege for clergy. The states never 
recognized ecclesiastical courts for clergy that substituted for secular 
courts in criminal matters. Rather, clergy members were subject to 
the law of the secular courts as were all citizens.145 The “benefit of 
clergy,” therefore, never conferred any special benefit on clergy qua 
clergy in the colonies or the states. Instead, from the outset, it was 
merely a tool for juries and judges to avoid applying the death 
penalty to first-time felonies.146 
This history is crucial for understanding the treatment of 
religious institutions under the First Amendment. Were there 
competing ecclesiastical courts for bringing clergy criminals to justice 
in the United States, there would be a stronger argument for the 
civil courts to abstain from jurisdiction over claims relating to the 
crimes of clergy (and their religious institutions). Although the 
justice meted out to clergy in England was lopsided in favor of 
religion, at least the possibility of trying a member of the clergy in 
the ecclesiastical courts existed for crimes committed until 1576. The 
only forum available for vindication of the state and federal laws in 
the United States, by comparison, has always been the civil courts.147 
 143. BLACKSTONE, supra note 123, at 370. 
 144. DALZELL, supra note 87, at 49. 
 145. EDMUND S. MORGAN, ROGER WILLIAMS: THE CHURCH AND THE STATE 67 
(1967). Because there were no high officials of the Anglican Church in the New World, there 
were no ecclesiastical courts. Matters still subject to ecclesiastical jurisdiction in England—
marriage, divorce, and probate—became purely civil matters in the colonies. Id. 
 146. Langbein, supra note 120, at 38. 
 147. See MORGAN, supra note 145, at 67. The exceptions to this rule were the attempts 
to establish ecclesiastical courts in colonial South Carolina. Colonists established an 
ecclesiastical court of twenty laymen to remove ministers “for cause.” The English disapproved 
of this aberration because it violated the Episcopal governing structure of the Church of 
England. They then requested that a bishop of the Church of England be installed in the 
colonies, which never happened. See SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN 
AMERICA: A HISTORY 416–18 (Burt Franklin ed., 1970) (1902); Michael W. McConnell, 
Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 2105, 2142 (2003). 
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Thus, a claim of clergy benefit—or clergy autonomy—lacks support 
in the United States’ legal history. 
United States history suggests that not only is there no basis for 
clergy autonomy, but religious institutions are subject to the law in 
civil courts as well. In England, clergy benefited from special 
tribunals, while religious institutions were not held to account under 
the rubric of secular law, because the Church was a separate 
sovereign whose jurisdiction overlapped with that of the Crown.148 
The decision in the United States, expressed in the Establishment 
Clause, to forbid religious institutions from holding sovereign power 
was a radical departure from British history, where to this day there is 
a state-established church. The elimination of religious sovereign 
power by definition made religious institutions private and therefore 
on more equal footing with other private entities.  
The primary assumption at the Constitutional Convention—and 
it is the most important principle that has contributed to the 
Constitution’s success—was that every individual and every 
institution holding power was likely to abuse that power and 
therefore must be checked.149 This principle led the Framers to 
structure the government so that each level and each branch would 
check the others.150 With respect to religion, the First Amendment’s 
 148. See BERMAN, supra note 91, at 269 (“Underlying the competition of ecclesiastical 
and royal courts from the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries was the limitation on the 
jurisdiction on each: neither pope nor king could command the total allegiance of any 
subject.”); HELMHOLZ, supra note 109, at 124–26 (characterizing the Becket controversy as a 
battle over jurisdiction, and noting that trouble arose in “areas of law and life where both 
Church and State made a claim”); see also BERMAN, supra note 91, at 553 (arguing that a 
defining feature of Western society is the emergence of “the church in the form of a state” in 
the late eleventh century). 
 149. See generally Marci A. Hamilton, The Calvinist Paradox of Distrust and Hope at the 
Constitutional Convention, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4. 
 150. For example, the dual sovereignty of federalism was intended to divide power 
between the federal government and the states, with each checking the other. See THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison) (“The federal and State governments are in fact but 
different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for 
different purposes.”); id. (noting that federal and state governments each possess a different 
“disposition and faculty” with which to “resist and frustrate the measures of the other”). 
Similarly, the three federal branches were assigned discrete powers and the power to check the 
other branches. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (“[T]he preservation of liberty 
requires . . . that the three great departments of power should be separate and distinct.”); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“[T]he defect must be supplied, by so contriving the 
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Establishment Clause made it clear that religious institutions would 
not be cosovereigns by prohibiting them from holding governing 
power.151 The question then was how religious institutions were to 
be checked; it would have been inconceivable to think that no check 
was necessary, either from the Framers’ world view or the dominant 
Protestant world view. While religious institutions would not be 
directly checked by the structures of the Constitution, the 
Establishment Clause relegated them to the private sphere, where 
they would be checked like other private entities—by the rule of law. 
Thus, the end, perhaps even the ineluctable, result of the 
privatization of religion in the United States is the Supreme Court’s 
current doctrine that religious institutions are properly subject to 
“neutral principles of law.”152 
The end of benefit of clergy shifted power away from 
ecclesiastical courts to civil courts and led to a corresponding decline 
in the sovereign authority of the established church in Britain.153 The 
structural mechanisms that had protected religious individuals and 
institutions from criminal liability in Britain no longer protected 
them, as the common law gained ascendancy. That is the milieu 
from which the colonies and then the states drew their own church-
state arrangements. The seventeenth-century settlers in what would 
become the United States were part of a generation ruled by Queen 
Elizabeth, during whose reign the ecclesiastical courts were 
definitively removed from criminal jurisdiction. Neither the clergy’s 
privileges nor the ecclesiastical courts made it across the Atlantic. At 
the time the United States was established, both the privileges and 
the ecclesiastical courts had given way in Britain to a system that 
interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual 
relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places.”). 
 151. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1983) [hereinafter LEVY, 
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE]. 
 152. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602–03 (1979); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971); Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 
(1879). 
 153. In 1576, the ecclesiastical courts were relieved of their jurisdiction over clergy who 
committed crimes. DALZELL, supra note 87, at 24 (discussing 18 Eliz., ch. 7, §§ 2–3 (1576)). 
In 1641, the Puritan-dominated Long Parliament abolished all criminal jurisdiction of the 
ecclesiastical courts. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 117, at 611. 
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permitted the government to bring clergy under civil court 
authority154 and religious institutions to account for wrong doing.155 
Thus, the current attempts by religious organizations to avoid 
criminal liability by invoking alleged privileges have their roots in 
history, but they have long lost their moral or legal underpinnings.156 
3. Charitable immunity 
After religious institutions lost their immunity to civil lawsuits, 
the British courts, followed by the American courts, experimented 
with protecting the coffers of charitable institutions subject to 
liability. Charitable immunity was a rule that protected the financial 
holdings of charitable organizations from actions in tort. Unlike 
sanctuary and the benefit of clergy, it was not a privilege limited to 
churches or clergy. Rather, it was intended to shield volunteer or 
charitable associations in general.157 The doctrine of charitable 
immunity protected charitable organizations from being sued in tort, 
 154. See, e.g., Forbes v. Eden, 5 Macph. (H. L.) 36, L.R., 1 H.L. Sc. 568 (1867); 
Craigdallie v. Aikman, 1 Dow 1, 3 Eng. Rep. 601 (1813). 
 155. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 156. In many jurisdictions, the Catholic Church has attempted to resist grand jury 
subpoenas for documents on the grounds of a First Amendment “privilege.” See William 
Lobdell & Larry B. Stammer, Mahony Criticized by National Review Panel, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 
28, 2004, at A1; see also James F. McCarty, Bishop Pilla Walks Tightrope in Priest Sex Abuse 
Scandal, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, May 5, 2002, at A1 (describing church lawyers’ tactics 
to avoid grand jury subpoenas); Peter Shinkle & Hannah Bergman, Diocesan Cooperation 
Varies Across Country, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jun. 21, 2003, at 12 (noting that Los 
Angeles and Metuchen, N.J., bishops are refusing to cooperate, while a St. Louis bishop and 
new Boston bishop are cooperating). In another jurisdiction though, the church fully 
cooperated without raising such defenses. “Specific to the Facts” in N.H. Crisis in the 
Church/Statement, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 11, 2002, at A32 (reporting the settlement of the 
New Hampshire Diocese sexual abuse claims and the bishop’s statement that, “[t]he Diocese 
of Manchester has reached a legally binding mutual agreement with the Office of the Attorney 
General of New Hampshire which involves acknowledgment by the diocese that the state has 
evidence likely to sustain a criminal conviction against the diocese for a failure in its duty to 
care for young people”). 
 157. See Bradley Canon & Dean Jaros, The Impact of Changes in Judicial Doctrine: The 
Abrogation of Charitable Immunity, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 969, 971–72 (1979). Charitable 
organizations are those that serve the public, not just their members. See Charles Robert 
Tremper, Compensation for Harm from Charitable Activity, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 408–
09 (1991). 
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which meant that victims could not bring successful tort claims 
against the organization or its employees.158 
Charitable immunity gave way to the dynamic force of the rule of 
law, which demands similar accountability for people wrongfully 
acting in the same way and rendering the same harm. The concept of 
“ordered liberty” and the principle of no-harm opened the door to 
those who had been harmed to sue religious institutions in tort.159 
The charitable immunity rule lasted for a very short period in Britain 
and has fallen out of favor in the United States, though it has been 
revived to a limited extent in the growth of limits on liability for 
charitable institutions.160 This section examines the transformation. 
In England, the doctrine of charitable immunity did not involve 
religious institutions specifically, but rather only shielded those 
organizations that provided aid to the poor.161 In contrast, in the 
United States, the definition of charitable organization eventually 
 158. See Canon & Jaros, supra note 157, at 971; Tremper, supra note 157, at 401–02. 
 159. See, e.g., Forbes v. Eden, L.R. 1 Sc. 568 (1867) (“Per Lord Colonsay: A Court of 
Law will not interfere with the rules of a voluntary association, unless to protect some civil right 
or interest which is said to be infringed by their operation.” (emphasis added)); Craigdallie v. 
Aikman, 1 Dow 1, 3 Eng. Rep. 601 (H. L. 1813) (Scot.). 
 160. Prior to congressional action, any protection was provided by state law. Most states 
abandoned the doctrine of charitable immunity by the mid 1980s, only to see it revived in a 
limited fashion in some states after a perceived crisis in liability insurance for nonprofit 
organizations. Tremper, supra note 157, at 402 (noting that almost all states have abolished or 
constricted the doctrine of charitable immunity). “The common law doctrine of charitable 
immunity exists—to some degree—in nine states: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Maine, 
Maryland, New Jersey, Virginia, Utah and Wyoming.” NONPROFIT RISK MANAGEMENT 
CENTER, STATE LIABILITY LAWS FOR CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS AND VOLUNTEERS 8 
(2001). The Volunteer Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501–05, which was passed in 1997, 
provides minimum levels of protection for churches and preempts any state law unless the state 
law provides greater protection. Id. at 5. The states that limit liability by capping damages are 
Colorado, Massachusetts, and South Carolina. Id. at 9. All other states have abolished 
charitable immunity by case law but have resurrected some immunity or caps by state volunteer 
protection acts. See id. at 14–118 (listing all states, applicability of charitable immunity, case 
law supporting the extension of abolishment of the doctrine, and the scope of all volunteer 
protection statutes); see also George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, 337 Ark. 206, 211 (1999) 
(giving narrow construction to protect “[t]he essence of the doctrine . . . that agencies, trusts, 
etc., created and maintained exclusively for charity may not have their assets diminished by 
execution in favor of one injured by acts of persons charged with duties under the agency or 
trust”). 
 161. See infra notes 173–74 and accompanying text (discussing Feoffees of Heriot’s 
Hosp. v. Ross, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846)); see also Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 
810, 815–17 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (discussing the history of the charitable immunity doctrine and 
its application to charitable corporations).  
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reached beyond the traditional nonprofit groups that served the poor 
to include hospitals, schools, and churches.162 At its height, the 
immunity provided complete protection against any damage awards 
and therefore made charitable organizations’ coffers autonomous of 
any countervailing social responsibility.163 In the minority of U.S. 
jurisdictions, immunity extended only to certain persons (e.g., actual 
recipients of charity) or certain sources of the organizations’ income 
(trust funds and donations).164 
Charitable immunity appears to have been based on a variety of 
justifications. The doctrine, originally developed in England in 1846, 
was based on a trust theory “that the funds of the charity are not to 
be diverted from the purposes intended by their donors and applied 
to the payment of liabilities in tort.”165 Another theory offered was 
that since charities do not gain or benefit from the services they 
offer, they could not be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior for works done on their behalf.166 A third justification was 
that the recipients of charity assume the risk of negligence when they 
accept the benefit, thereby waiving their right to sue.167 It also has 
been put forward that the actions of charitable organizations are 
analogous to municipalities, and, therefore, charities deserve the 
protection that governmental immunity offers.168 Finally, public 
policy—fueled by a fear that people and institutions working to 
improve society would no longer contribute if they were liable for 
actions associated with that work—justified it.169 
The public policy argument was especially forceful in late 
nineteenth-century America. When public charities first emerged in 
the United States, they were foundering institutions run only on an 
experimental basis.170 Any substantial judgment against them would 
 162. Canon & Jaros, supra note 157, at 971. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E (1979); see also McDonald v. 
Massachusetts, 120 Mass. 432, 434–35 (1876). 
 166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E (1979). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Benjamin S. Birnbaum, Comment, Cashman v. Merident Hospital, 169 Atl. 915 
(Conn.), 14 B.U. L. REV. 477, 478 (1934). 
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have led to their demise, or, at the very least, it would have 
discouraged contributions.171 In an effort to foster their growth and 
thus benefit the public, most state courts adopted the policy of 
shielding charities from tort liability.172  
The now largely disfavored doctrine entered the common law in 
1846 as dictum in the House of Lords’ decision in Feoffees of Heriot’s 
Hospital v. Ross: “To give damages out of a trust fund would not be 
to apply it to those objects whom the author of the fund had in view, 
but would be to divert it to a completely different purpose.”173 The 
case was an action for damages for wrongful exclusion from the 
benefits of the charity, not for personal injury inflicted in its 
operation.174 Thirty years later, Massachusetts was the first state to 
adopt the doctrine of charitable immunity in McDonald v. 
Massachusetts General Hospital,175 with many other state courts 
following suit.176 By 1900, seven state supreme courts had followed 
Massachusetts’ lead, with another thirty-three joining the movement 
by 1938.177 Ironically, by the time the doctrine was entrenched in the 
American courts, it was no longer good law in England.178 By 1871, 
after only twenty-five years experience with the doctrine, the English 
courts rejected it on the ground that it made no sense to hold 
charities blameless for the harm they caused.179 As a 1909 case 
characterized the doctrine, “[i]t is now well settled that a public 
body is liable for the negligence of its servants in the same way as 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Feoffees of Heriot’s Hosp. v. Ross, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846). 
 174. Id. 
 175. 120 Mass. 432 (1876), overruled in part by Colby v. Carney Hosp., 254 N.E.2d 
407, 408 (Mass. 1969), stating: 
In the past on many occasions we have declined to renounce the defence of 
charitable immunity set forth in McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. . . . . Now it 
appears that only three or four States still adhere to the doctrine . . . . Accordingly, 
we take this occasion to give adequate warning that the next time we are squarely 
confronted by a legal question respecting the charitable immunity doctrine it is our 
intention to abolish it. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 176. Canon & Jaros, supra note 157, at 971. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id.; see also Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury, L.R. 6 Q.B. 214 (1871); Mersey 
Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, L.R. 1 H.L. 93 (1866). 
 179. See Foreman, L.R. 6 Q.B. 214. 
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private individuals would be liable under similar circumstances  
. . . .”180 
By the early twentieth century, American scholars considered 
charitable immunity to be a faulty doctrine based on a weak 
foundation.181 In Georgetown College v. Hughes, one of the first 
American cases rejecting charitable immunity, the court 
characterized concept as an “anomaly,” stating that “[t]he doctrine 
of immunity of charitable corporations found its way into the law . . . 
through misconception or misapplication of previously established 
principles.”182 As one defender of limited liability for charitable 
organizations states, the “traditional rationales for denying all tort 
recovery against charitable organizations cannot withstand close 
scrutiny.”183 The reasoning is obvious: when the law is intended to 
redress harm, and charitable institutions are intended to assist those 
in need, permitting them to avoid liability for the harm they cause is 
perverse. As with sanctuary, and especially the benefit of clergy, the 
driving logic of the common law and the rule of law could not be 
squared with special dispensation for charitable organizations when 
they engendered harm. 
Some vestiges of the doctrine remain, however.184 While it has 
been thought appropriate to hold such organizations accountable for 
 180. Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew’s Hosp., 2 K.B. 820, 825 (1909). 
 181. Tremper, supra note 157, at 422 n.107 (describing rejected theories behind 
charitable immunity). 
 182. 130 F.2d 810, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1942). 
 183. Tremper, supra note 157, at 422. The doctrine of charitable immunity established 
by common law still exists, to varying degrees, in nine states: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, 
Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. NONPROFIT RISK 
MANAGEMENT CENTER, supra note 160, at 8. In the face of the clergy sexual abuse cases, 
there is a movement to repeal the doctrine of charitable immunity. For example, a New Jersey 
senate committee has approved S540, an amendment to the state’s charitable immunity statute 
that would bar immunity for charitable organizations in damage suits alleging negligent hiring 
or supervision of an employee that resulted in sexual abuse of a minor. See Valerie L. Brown et 
al., 2004 Capitol Report, N.J. LAW, Apr. 5, 2004, at 708. 
 184. George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, 337 Ark. 206, 211 (1999) (giving narrow 
construction to protect “[t]he essence of the doctrine that agencies, trusts, etc., created and 
maintained exclusively for charity may not have their assets diminished by execution in favor of 
one injured by acts of persons charged with duties under the agency or trust”); see also Ryan v. 
Holy Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 175 N.J. 333, 340–42 (2003) (discussing the 
language and history of New Jersey’s charitable immunity act and the fact that it is broadly 
construed). New Jersey is currently considering a bill modifying its charitable immunity law. A 
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the actions of their employees, the institutions’ liability for 
volunteers has been contested.185 A minority of states, in addition, 
have imposed monetary caps on damage awards against charitable 
organizations.186 
Like the benefit of clergy and sanctuary, charitable immunity 
largely gave way to the rule of law and its fundamental 
presupposition that all citizens are equal under the law. As in Britain, 
the United States nullified charitable immunity by the larger legal 
system within which religious and charitable organizations, their 
clergy, and their employees are accountable to those they harm. 
bill to that effect has passed in the state senate and is pending in the state’s general assembly. 
See S540, 2004 Leg., 211th Sess. (N.J. 2004), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2004). In a step backward in the progression against charitable immunity, and 
in response to Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 331 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 511 
U.S. 1137 (1994) (holding that a church has a fiduciary duty to victims of its clergy), the 
Colorado legislature considered in 1999 whether to give churches financial immunity in cases 
involving misconduct by their clergy. H.B. 1290, 62d Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 
1999). The bill was narrowly defeated.  
 185. In 1997, Congress enacted the Volunteer Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501–05 
(2000), which immunizes volunteers from tort liability in certain, limited circumstances. The 
majority of state statutes follow this approach, with the VPA preempting those state laws that 
protect volunteers more narrowly. 42 U.S.C. § 14502. Representative Porter (R., Ill.) stated 
on the floor of the House of Representatives that: 
[T]here are 124 separate charitable organizations that support this legislation very 
strongly. They range from the American Association of University Women to the 
American Heart Association, to the American Red Cross, to the American 
Symphony Orchestra League, to B’nai Brith International, the Girl Scout Council 
USA, the National Association of Retired Federal Employees, the National Easter 
Seal Society, the Salvation Army, Save the Children, United Way, the YMCA. Any 
national organization that one can think of probably is a strong supporter of this 
legislation. 
143 CONG. REC. H3098 (daily ed. May 21, 1997) (statement of Rep. Porter). Britain has not 
followed the United States’ lead on volunteer immunity. See Tash Shifrin, Volunteer Bill ‘Could 
Be Deterrent,’ GUARDIAN, Mar. 5, 2004, available at http://society.guardian.co.uk/ 
print/0,3858,4873706-106647,00.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2004) (reporting that the chief 
executive of Volunteering England said, “We have serious concerns that a bill intended to 
support and encourage volunteering could have exactly the opposite effect”). 
 186. Those states are Colorado, Massachusetts, and South Carolina. NONPROFIT RISK 
MANAGEMENT CENTER, supra note 160, at 9; see also Martin v. Kelley, No. 02-684, 2004 
Mass. Super. Ct. LEXIS 277, at *8–9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2004) (explaining the tort 
damages cap of $20,000 imposed on charitable organizations by the Massachusetts legislature 
in 1971).  
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B. The Protestant Mindset and the History of Abuses of Power by 
Religious Institutions Preceding and Informing the First Amendment 
Were all religious institutions invariably beneficial to the public, 
this Article would not need to be written. The rule would be plain: 
religious institutions need not be deterred from tortious or criminal 
behavior, and therefore they are immune from suit. While many 
religious institutions supply important benefits to society, the notion 
that they are invariably beneficial and therefore need not be subject 
to society’s general constraints on behavior cannot be supported 
either by history or experience. 
No one was more aware of the capacity of religious institutions 
to harm the public good than the framing generation, many 
members of which had escaped England and the entrenched 
religious authorities that had persecuted particular faiths with the aid 
and acquiescence of the monarchy.187 Only decades before the first 
emigrants started across the Atlantic, the Reformation initiated the 
pitched struggle for sovereign power between the Catholic Church 
and the Protestant churches.188 Thus, “[w]hen English settlers first 
sailed for America in 1584, they carried with them a faith worked 
out over fifty years of religious turbulence.”189 This turbulence 
continued well into the next century; religious persecution finally 
abated when the Puritans rose to power and disbanded the Star 
Chamber and the High Commission in 1641.190  
 187. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE 
PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 209–10, 215–16 (2003) 
[hereinafter BERMAN, PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS]. Between 1630 and 1640, an estimated 
twenty thousand religious dissenters fled to the Massachusetts Bay Colony, and a similar 
number emigrated to the Netherlands. Id. at 216. 
 188. The Reformation began on October 31, 1517, with Martin Luther’s protest at 
Wittenberg. It ended at the close of the Thirty Years War in 1648. THE COLUMBIA 
ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2001), available at http://www.bartleby.com/65/re/ 
Reformat.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
 189. LAMBERT, supra note 138, at 38–39. Early attempts at colonization were 
unsuccessful—settlements founded in Virginia between 1585 and 1587, and again in 1602, 
were either abandoned or destroyed. See EDWARD P. CHEYNEY, A SHORT HISTORY OF 
ENGLAND 354–55 (1919). Jamestown, Virginia, founded in 1607, was the first permanent 
English settlement in America. Id. at 403. 
 190. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 117, at 611. 
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During the Tudor and Stuart years, 1485–1714,191 which 
encompasses the years immediately preceding and during the 
colonization of America, the Crown engaged in a systematic 
suppression of religious dissent and persecution of those whose 
beliefs differed from the established church. For example, in 1526, 
Henry VIII divided his King’s Council into two branches: a privy 
council to consider domestic and foreign policy issues, which came 
to be known as the Star Chamber, and the court of High 
Commission, which was to address ecclesiastical issues. When Henry 
VIII officially became the head of the Church eight years later in 
1534,192 he was able to use both commissions, or prerogative courts, 
to exercise control over religious belief and practice. The unification 
of church and state made “any deviation from the new religious 
order a threat to royal supremacy.”193 Thus, heresy and treason 
became indistinguishable as the Star Chamber, in cases involving 
“sedition” or “subversion,” and the High Commission, in cases 
involving “heresy,” worked in tandem to rid Britain of religious 
dissenters. “Those who continued to support the authority of the 
pope, Henry VIII sent to the executioner’s chopping block; those 
who preached new doctrines he sent to the fires at Smithfield.”194 
Henry VIII’s successors carried on his practices. His son, Edward VI, 
was only ten when he ascended to the throne on Henry’s death in 
1547, but the Dukes of Somerset and Northumberland ruled in his 
name, both promoting Protestantism as the established and sole 
religion of the realm.195 The Catholic Queen Mary (1553–1558) 
 191. See CHEYNEY, supra note 189, at 383–84. 
 192. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 117, at 591–92.  
The Act of Supremacy [26 Henry VIII. C.I.] recognized the king as “the only 
Supreme Head in earth of the Church of England,” having full power to correct all 
“errors, heresies, abuses, offences, contempts, and enormities,” which by any 
manner of spiritual authority ought to be reformed; and the form of oath taken 
under the provisions of this Act denied to the Pope any other authority than that of 
Bishop of Rome.  
Id. The ecclesiastical authorities lost all power save that granted by the king, and ecclesiastical 
judges no longer needed to be clerics—a move that displaced Rome’s canon law. Id. at 592.  
 193. Riebli, supra note 116, at 826 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 96 (1986)). 
 194. Id. 
 195. See DURANT, THE REFORMATION, supra note 138, at 579 (noting that Somerset 
“favored a Protestant policy”); id. at 581, 584 (noting that in 1550, under Warwick who was 
made Duke of Northumberland in 1551, “[t]he protectorate was now definitely Protestant”); 
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ruled in a country predominated by Protestants,196 whom she 
believed invited divine retribution on her reign for their heresy.197 
She atoned for this sin by burning hundreds of Protestants at the 
stake, including Bishops Cranmer, Ridley, and Latimer, during her 
short reign.198 
Protestant Elizabeth I (1558–1603) gained control of a country 
divided by religion. To reunite the country, she ruthlessly suppressed 
Catholicism (she was excommunicated by the pope in 1570)199 
through her enforcement of the Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity, 
which she employed to institute the High Commission, and through 
her use of the Tower of London to execute heretics.200 After 
centuries of sovereign control in Britain, the Catholic Church found 
itself in the 1570s instructing Catholics to avoid Anglican worship 
services and to attend their own “despite the penalties for doing 
so.”201 James I (1603–1625) and Charles I (1625–1649) avidly 
suppressed religious opposition. Only five years before the end of 
James I’s reign, in 1620, the Mayflower pilgrims sailed for 
America.202 Throughout his reign, Charles I aggressively suppressed 
the Puritans.203 Abuses by the Star Chamber and the High 
Commission were legion, and thousands of British citizens left for 
America (and the Netherlands), bringing with them certain 
knowledge of the consequences of a government dominated by a 
single religion.204 After Charles I refused to convene Parliament from 
1629 until 1640, in part because of his fear of the Puritans’ growing 
id. (“Religious persecution, so long of heretics by Catholics, was now in England, as in 
Switzerland and Lutheran Germany, of heretics and Catholics by Protestants.”).  
 196. Although “numerically a minority,” the Protestants were “financially powerful,” and 
nearly every influential family held property taken from the Catholic Church. Id. at 590. But 
see id. at 588 (noting that London, however, was a “half-Protestant city”).  
 197. See id. at 595 (“To her simple faith these heresies seemed mortal crimes, far worse 
than treason.”). 
 198. Id. at 597–98 (“[Cranmer’s] death marked the zenith of the persecution. Some 300 
persons died in its course, 273 of them in the last four years of her reign.”). 
 199. ROBERT E. RODES, JR., LAW AND MODERNIZATION IN THE CHURCH OF 
ENGLAND: CHARLES II TO THE WELFARE STATE 81 (1991). 
 200. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 117. 
 201. RODES, supra note 199, at 81. 
 202. 7 THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY 13 (W. Ward et al. eds., 1934). 
 203. Riebli, supra note 116, at 826. 
 204. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.  
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power, the Puritans seized power and soon thereafter abolished the 
prerogative courts and their abusive practices.205 
In 1662, during the Restoration, Anglicans and Presbyterians 
attempted to form a national church, but their effort failed and 
Presbyterian ministers were expelled.206 Parliament passed a new Act 
of Uniformity, and Presbyterian ministers who refused to conform 
were expelled from their congregations.207 Dissenting Protestant 
worship became legal in 1689, but the dissenters were not allowed 
to hold property to construct churches unless they were subject to 
the oversight of the Court of Chancery.208 Not until 1791 were the 
Catholics given parity with other Protestant dissenters.209 The 
inability of the established Anglican Church to answer to the public 
good when dealing with issues involving taxation, tithing, local 
government, marriage, education, and charity led to the state’s 
assumption of jurisdiction over those issues.210 Thus, the public good 
was the measuring stick that finally transformed Britain from a 
country with only one recognized religion into one of religious 
liberty. “English pluralism was the result of a gradual wearing away 
of a unitary system through concessions made because it seemed 
right to make them.”211 
The United States, of course, did not begin as a fully pluralistic 
and tolerant society either. The early colonies and then some of the 
states, with the notable exception of Pennsylvania, had established 
churches with corresponding privileges for members and disabilities 
for dissenters, though there was no Tower of London or Star 
Chamber and High Commission to force the established church’s 
beliefs on others. The establishments, such as they were, gave way 
not long after the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were ratified.212  
 205. BERMAN, PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS, supra note 187, at 104. 
 206. See RODES, supra note 199, at 87. 
 207.  Id. The original Act of Uniformity, passed by Elizabeth’s Parliament in 1571, 
required that all Church of England prayers, services, and rites conform to the Book of 
Common Prayer. See LAMBERT, supra note 138, at 40. 
 208. RODES, supra note 199, at 88–89. 
 209. Id. at 93. 
 210. See id. at 147. By excluding religious dissenters from these matters and therefore 
depriving them of a full place in the national life, the Anglican Church was unable to maintain 
a harmonious combination of religious connection and public concern. Id. 
 211. Id. at 147. 
 212. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, supra note 151, at 25–26, 110–19. 
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The Establishment Clause is testimony to the founding 
generation’s rational fear of overweening religious power and of the 
mischief that religious institutions can foster, particularly when they 
hpld sovereign power. It cannot be, as Carl Esbeck argues, a rule 
solely intended to protect religious entities.213 Neither the history 
leading up to the founding of America nor the Protestant cast of 
governance theories at the time of the framing supports his 
conclusion. Indeed, they argue against it. 
The dominant mindset of the early Americans was Protestant,214 
and among Protestants, Calvinism predominated.215 At its most 
fundamental level, all Protestantism incorporates the view that 
religious individuals and institutions have the capacity to stray from a 
holy path onto an evil one.216 For Protestants, individuals are locked 
 213. Esbeck, supra note 11, at 1576–77. 
 214. See Hamilton, Direct Democracy, supra note 1, at 394 n.22; see also BERNARD 
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 246–50 (1967) 
(discussing the predominant religions in the colonies before the Revolutionary War); ALICE M. 
BALDWIN, THE NEW ENGLAND CLERGY AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22–31 (2d ed. 
1965) (detailing the social impact of the works of New England clergy before 1763); FRANCIS 
J. BREMER, SHAPING NEW ENGLAND: PURITAN CLERGYMEN IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
ENGLAND AND NEW ENGLAND 82–88 (1994) (noting the influence of the clergy on education 
and government in seventeenth-century New England); GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION: A HISTORY 129–35 (2002) (detailing the impact of Protestant ministers at the 
forefront of the Revolutionary movement); James T. McHugh, A Liberal Theocracy: Philosophy, 
Theology, and Utah Constitutional Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1515, 1520 n.16 (1997) (citing 
BALDWIN, supra, at 22–31). 
 215. See Donald S. Lutz, Religious Dimensions in the Development of American 
Constitutionalism, 39 EMORY L.J. 21 (1990). Professor Lutz argued: 
Much of what we now consider mainstream Protestantism in America shared a 
dissenting, Calvinist base. Except for the southern tidewater region—which was 
initially dominated by the Church of England—and a large Catholic minority in 
Maryland, New England, most of the central colonies (including the Dutch, 
Swedish, and German settlers), and the piedmont region of the South were 
dominated by essentially Calvinistic sects. This fact is essential when trying to 
explain the surprising similarity to be found in state constitutions and colonial 
documents written throughout America. The Calvinist assumptions and 
commitments were strongest in New England and weakest in the South, but they 
had their effect in all parts of the country. 
Id. at 23–24. 
 216. The Reformation was instituted by Martin Luther and John Calvin because they 
believed that the Roman Catholic Church had turned away from all that is holy and become 
infested with evil. See, e.g., 2 CALVIN, supra note 138, at 1141, 1144, 1147 (referring to 
“corruption of the present-day papacy”; “kingdom of Antichrist”; and “moral abandonment of 
the popes”). They were Church insiders who initially acted in order to reform the Church 
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into original sin. According to John Calvin, who along with Martin 
Luther sparked the Reformation and Protestantism, there was never 
a moment in history when humans could be trusted blindly to be or 
do good: 
[L]et us hold this as an undoubted truth which no siege engines 
can shake: the mind of man has been so completely estranged from 
God’s righteousness that it conceives, desires, and undertakes, only 
that which is impious, perverted, foul, impure, and infamous. The 
heart is so steeped in the poison of sin, that it can breathe out 
nothing but a loathsome stench. But if some men occasionally 
make a show of good, their minds nevertheless ever remain 
enveloped in hypocrisy and deceitful craft, and their hearts bound 
by inner perversity.217 
Thus, Calvin counseled in favor of a diligent surveillance of one’s 
own actions and the actions of others; he also endorsed the value of 
the law (both biblical and secular) to guide human behavior away 
from its propensity to do wrong.218 Granted, no man could ever live 
up to all of the law’s demands, but it was necessary as a checking 
measure nonetheless. Calvin’s view of human nature was powerfully 
transmitted to a significant number of Framers—for example, James 
Madison and Reverend John Witherspoon, who was president of the 
College of New Jersey, the leading Presbyterian college at the time 
and now Princeton University.219 
itself, but the Church proved incapable of sufficiently rapid change to avoid having many of its 
members leave the Church to follow Luther, Calvin, or other reformation leaders into new 
churches. The instinct to schism, in response to the perceptions of corruption, has never left 
the Protestant movement, resulting in the thousands of modern-day sects that continue to 
divide. See generally STEVE BRUCE, A HOUSE DIVIDED: PROTESTANTISM, SCHISM, AND 
SECULARIZATION (1990). 
 217. 1 CALVIN, supra note 139, at 340. 
 218. Calvin wrote that the “principal use” of the law was to help believers know the will 
of God and to incite them to obedience: 
[The law] is the best instrument for enabling them daily to learn with greater truth 
and certainty what the will of the Lord is. . . . Then, because we need not doctrine 
merely, but exhortation also, the servant of God will derive this further advantage 
from the Law: by frequently meditating upon it, he will be excited to obedience, 
and confirmed in it, and so drawn away form the slippery paths of sin. 
Id. at 360–61; see also id. (“Even the believers have need of the law.”). The depravity of 
humans, however, never made obedience to the law alone sufficient to ensure redemption. Id. 
at 351–52. 
 219. See Hamilton, Why the People Do Not Rule, supra note 1; see also Hamilton, Direct 
Democracy, supra note 1, at 428–29. 
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Protestantism equally discounted the likelihood that a religious 
institution could be trusted on its own to serve the public good. 
“[Protestantism] is essentially an attempt to check the tendency to 
corruption and degradation which attacks every institutional 
religion.”220 The early Protestants, after all, were the Catholic 
dissenters who eventually rejected the sixteenth-century Roman 
Catholic Church for its malignant ways.221 The belief that the 
Catholic Church had led the Christian Church down evil paths was a 
fervently held belief at the time of the framing as well, with John 
Adams identifying the “worst tyranny ever invented” as “the Romish 
superstition.”222 
The attitude of the vast majority of the framing generation on 
this subject was little different from Calvin’s description of the 
sixteenth-century Roman Church’s hubris and unaccountability: 
Because of the primacy of the Roman Church, they say, no one has 
the right to review the judgments of this See. Likewise: as judge it 
will be judged neither by emperor, nor by kings, nor by all the 
clergy, nor by the people. This is the very height of imperiousness 
for one man to set himself up as judge of all, and suffer himself to 
obey the judgment of none. But what if he exercise tyranny over 
God’s people? If he scatter and lay waste Christ’s Kingdom? If he 
throw the whole church into confusion? If he turn the pastoral 
 220. WILLIAM RALPH INGE, PROTESTANTISM 3–5 (1927); see also 1 EMILE G. LEONARD, 
A HISTORY OF PROTESTANTISM: THE REFORMATION 316 (H.H. Rowley ed., Joyce M.H. 
Reid trans., 1965) (noting that Farel agreed with Luther in condemning institutionalism, 
saying: “sects, organizations and institutions are born of the flesh”). Wylie explained this 
theory of Protestantism: 
[Protestants] replaced the authority of the Infallability with the authority of the 
Word of God. The long and dismal obscuration of centuries they dispelled, that the 
twin stars of liberty and knowledge might shine forth . . . and human society . . . 
might, after its halt of a thousand years, resume its march towards its high goal. 
1 J.A. WYLIE, THE HISTORY OF PROTESTANTISM 2 (1870). 
 221. See DURANT, THE REFORMATION, supra note 138, at 329–33. On the eve of the 
Reformation in Germany, the Catholic Church was rife with abuses. There had been a 
breakdown of monastic discipline and clerical celibacy; greedy ecclesiastical authorities 
increased clerical rents, incomes, and taxes. The higher ecclesiastical orders brazenly displayed 
their wealth, to the chagrin of the people, “mercenary abuse of sacred things” was common, 
and hush money was often sent to Rome. 
 222. See CHARLES P. HANSON, NECESSARY VIRTUE: THE PRAGMATIC ORIGINS OF 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN NEW ENGLAND 11 (1998). See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, THE 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2003). 
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office into robbery? Nay, though he be utterly wicked, he denies he 
is bound to give an accounting.223 
The solution for the wayward path of the Catholic Church, at least 
according to Calvin, was proper government, a need the early 
colonial Presbyterians (and Calvinists), identified both in the society 
and the Church: 
Man’s depraved apostate Condition renders Government needful. 
Needful both in the State and the Church. In the former without 
Government Anarchy wou’d soon take place with all its wild and 
dire Effects and Men wou’d be like the Fishes of the Sea where the 
greater devour the less. Nor is Govern[ment] in the Church less 
needful than in the State and this for the same Reason.224 
While drafting the Constitution, Madison—and the Framers in 
general—had the despotic practices of the Catholic Inquisitors 
stamped on their political consciousness, a fact proven by Madison’s 
direct reference to the Inquisition in his Memorial and 
Remonstrance,225 in which he argued against state payment of certain 
Christian educators as follows: 
Because the proposed establishment is a departure from the 
generous policy, which, offering an Asylum to the persecuted and 
oppressed of every Nation and Religion, promised a lustre to our 
country, and an accession to the number of its citizens. What a 
melancholy mark is the Bill of sudden degeneracy? Instead of 
holding forth an Asylum to the persecuted, it is itself a signal of 
persecution. It degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those 
whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative 
authority. Distant as it may be in its present form from the 
Inquisition, it differs from it only in degree. The one is the first 
step, the other the last in the career of intolerance. The 
magnanimous sufferer under this cruel scourge in foreign Regions, 
must view the Bill as a Beacon on our Coast, warning him to seek 
 223. 2 CALVIN, supra note 139, at bk. IV, ch. VII, § 19.  
 224. Leonard J. Kramer, Presbyterians Approach the American Revolution, 31 J. 
PRESBYTERIAN HIST. SOC. 72 (1953) (quoting minutes of the Synod of New England, 1776–
82). 
 225. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 
301–02 (William T. Hutchinson et al. eds., 1962) [hereinafter Madison, Memorial]. 
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some other haven, where liberty and philanthrophy in their due 
extent, may offer a more certain respose from his Troubles.226 
There can be no question that the excesses of the Inquisition (1184–
1834), the later Spanish Inquisition (1474–1834), the public 
executions of those whose faith differed from the Crown in England 
(1531–1689), and the excesses generated by the unity of power 
between the monarchies and organized religion were part of the 
calculus that the framing generation used to calibrate the need for 
government, the reach of any religious institution’s power, and the 
need to make religious institutions accountable to the public good. 
Nor can there be question that they believed in placing legal 
limitations on the religious institutions, because they believed at a 
visceral level that religious institutions were not worthy of blind 
trust. 
Indeed, Madison’s mentor, the Reverend John Witherspoon, 
explained the history of the United States in the context of the 
Inquisition: 
[A]t the time of the Reformation when religion began to revive, 
nothing contributed more to facilitate its reception and increase its 
progress than the violence of its persecutors. Their cruelty and the 
patience of the sufferers naturally disposed men to examine and 
weigh the cause to which they adhered with so much constancy 
and resolution. At the same time also, when they were persecuted 
in one city, they fled to another and carried the discoveries of 
Popish fraud to every part of the world. It was by some of those 
who were persecuted in Germany that the light of the Reformation 
was brought so early into Britain. 
[T]he violent persecution which many eminent Christians met with 
in England from their brethren, who called themselves Protestants, 
drove them in great numbers to a distant part of the New World 
where the light of the gospel and true religion were unknown.227 
This historical background informed the framing generation of 
the qualities of religious organizations under the reign of Pope 
 226. Id. at 302. 
 227. THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN WITHERSPOON 135–36 (Thomas Miller ed., 
1990). Witherspoon, whose stamp on the Constitution is visible, was also mentor to a number 
of other Framers. See generally Hamilton, Why the People Do Not Rule, supra note 1. 
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Gregory IX (1227–1241). At that time, and in response to the 
spread of “heretic” beliefs, Roman Catholic bishops conducted 
medieval “inquisitions” designed to rid France, Germany, and Italy 
of non-Catholics.228 Investigation of heresy was the duty of the 
bishops.229 The Inquisition, by then known as the Holy Office, is 
perhaps best known for convicting Galileo at trial in 1633 for his 
“dangerous” scientific beliefs.230 Most Inquisition trials resulted in a 
guilty verdict, and those convicted faced a myriad of horrific 
punishments, including fines, imprisonment, and death.231 
The Spanish Inquisition was independent of the medieval 
Inquisition but was also part of that history the framing generation 
would have known and used to judge contemporary ideas. The 
purpose of the Spanish Inquisition was to discover and punish 
converted Jews (and later Muslims) who were insincere.232 It was 
established in 1478 by King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella with the 
reluctant approval of Pope Sixtus IV.233 The institution was entirely 
controlled by the Spanish kings; the Pope’s only check on the 
Inquisition was in appointing the nominees.234 In 1483, the Crown 
created a new royal council of the Supreme and General Inquisition 
to expand its operation throughout Spain. The notorious Tomas de 
Torquemada was named Inquisitor General—the head of the 
council—and was responsible for creating branches of the Inquisition 
in various cities by establishing local tribunals.235 The Spanish 
Inquisition was not finally abolished until 1834, nearly sixty years 
after the Declaration of Independence was signed.236 
 228. WILL DURANT, THE AGE OF FAITH: A HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL CIVILIZATION—
CHRISTIAN, ISLAMIC, AND JUDAIC—FROM CONSTANTINE TO DANTE: A.D. 325–1300, at 779 
(1950) [hereinafter DURANT, THE AGE OF FAITH]. 
 229. Id. 
 230. WADE ROWLAND, GALILEO’S MISTAKE: A NEW LOOK AT THE EPIC 
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN GALILEO AND THE CHURCH 249–50, 255–56 (2003). 
 231. See DURANT, THE AGE OF FAITH, supra note 228, at 782. 
 232. Id. at 208–09. 
 233. 2 THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY 650 (W. Ward et al. eds., 1934). 
 234. See DURANT, THE AGE OF FAITH, supra note 228, at 209. 
 235. See JOHN EDWARD LONGHURST, THE AGE OF TORQUEMADA 77 (1964).  
 236. See 4 HENRY CHARLES LEA, A HISTORY OF THE INQUISITION OF SPAIN 467–68 
(1907) (noting that the Spanish Inquisition ended in 1834); 7 THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN 
HISTORY, supra note 233, at 208–09 (noting that the Declaration of Independence was signed 
in 1776). 
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The first permanently established English settlement in the 
United States, in Jamestown, Virginia, was established in 1607, a 
mere four years after the end of Queen Elizabeth’s reign. Only fifty 
years before, the Tower of London was employed by Catholic 
Queen Mary (1553–1558) to imprison and execute Protestants, after 
she revived the heresy laws at the end of 1554.237 The first Protestant 
martyr was publicly burned in 1555.238 Between 250 and 300 were 
burned alive, while hundreds more were imprisoned.239 Queen 
Mary’s successor, Protestant Queen Elizabeth I (1558–1603) 
attempted to ward off Catholic Europe and those who refused to 
attend Church of England services by incarcerating bishops, 
archbishops, and others for years.240 “There were as many executions 
of Catholics under Elizabeth as there were Protestants under Mary, 
though over a reign nine times as long.”241 James I (1603–1625) 
continued to use the Tower as a prison, as the Tudors had done.242 
In 1643, Parliamentarians seized control of the Tower during the 
Civil War in 1643. Throughout the Restoration, the Tower’s 
function as a state prison declined and it became a military 
headquarters and munitions storehouse. The last execution was in 
1747,243 long after the first wave of emigrants left for the New World 
in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.244 The Bloody 
Tower, as it is often called, is a London monument to the British 
history of religious dominance and intolerance. It was 
unquestionably stamped on the mindset of any British subject at the 
 237. 7 THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, supra note 233, at 532–33. 
 238. Id. at 533. 
 239. DURANT, THE AGE OF FAITH, supra note 228, at 596–99; see also CHEYNEY, supra 
note 189, at 325. The official Web site of the British monarchy places the figure at around 300 
executed in three years. History of the Monarchy, at http://www.royal.gov.uk/output/ 
Page45.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
 240. 7 THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, supra note 233, at 586. 
 241. See JOHN COFFEY, PERSECUTION AND TOLERATION IN PROTESTANT ENGLAND: 
1558–1689, at 169–70 (2000). 
 242. See RUSSELL CHAMBERLIN, THE TOWER OF LONDON 68–71 (1989). 
 243. Id. at 78. 
 244. See supra note 187 and accompanying text; see also CHAMBERLIN, supra note 242, at 
78; CHEYNEY, supra note 189, at 403. Jamestown, founded in 1607 in Virginia, was the first 
permanent English settlement in America. Earlier attempts at colonization were unsuccessful—
settlements founded in Newfoundland in 1583, in Virginia between 1585 and 1587, and again 
in Virginia in 1602 were either abandoned or destroyed. Id. at 354–55. 
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time, and scores of those subjects emigrated to the New World. The 
founding generation and the Framers thought about organized 
religion in this British context and did not have to leap to reach the 
conclusions that granting governing power to religion was 
dangerous and that religious individuals and entities needed to be 
curbed. 
C. John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison,  
and John Stuart Mill on the No-Harm Rule 
There is nearly universal agreement that the no-harm rule 
undergirds and justifies criminal law, tort law, and regulatory laws (at 
least those that prohibit harm to others).245 The no-harm rule was a 
notion articulated by John Locke in the seventeenth century, widely 
shared by the framing generation in the eighteenth century, and 
entrenched in modern philosophy and law by the influential John 
Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century.246 It was further elaborated in 
the twentieth century by H.L.A. Hart and Joel Feinberg.247  
John Locke believed in a robust right of conscience, or belief.248 
He then argued that “God is the true proprietor” and therefore 
human beings could not “belong to one another.”249 From this 
 245. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 60, at 370–71.  
 246. See M.N.S. SELLERS, AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM: ROMAN IDEOLOGY IN THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 133–41 (1994); SELLERS, SACRED FIRE, supra note 1, at 
101–02. 
 247. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING 
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 50–54 (1998); JOEL FEINBERG, THE 
MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW (1984); H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 4–5 
(1962); see also JOEL FEINBERG, 1 THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW 214 (1988); Joel 
Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING (1970).  
 248. Locke described his thoughts on liberty in this letter: 
[L]iberty of conscience is every man’s natural right, equally belonging to dissenters 
as to themselves; and . . . nobody ought to be compelled in matters of religion 
either by law or force. The establishment of this one thing would take away all 
ground of complaints and tumults upon account of conscience . . . . 
JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (William Popple trans., 1689), available 
at http://www.constitution.org/jl/tolerati.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
 249. LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 45 (“If human beings belong to God, they 
cannot belong to one another, or even to themselves. Since God is the true proprietor, no one 
else has the right to damage or destroy his property.”). Russell L. Caplan offers helpful 
commentary on Locke’s ideas: 
Under [Locke’s] theory, individuals are born into a “state of nature,” that is, 
without organized government, and agree out of “strong Obligations of Necessity, 
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precept Locke derived a general “no-harm” principle. Individuals 
were not to “take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the 
preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of 
another.”250 For Locke, then, individuals joining together in society 
had a general liberty of conscience, or belief, but the state 
legitimately restrained those actions that harmed others. 
Locke’s no-harm principle was taken as commonplace during the 
framing era. Thomas Jefferson famously explained, “the legitimate 
powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to 
others. But it does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are 
twenty gods, or no God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my 
leg.”251 Freedom of belief and “free argument and debate” were 
essential human rights, but, when those “principles break out into 
overt acts against peace and good order,” it is the “rightful 
purpose[] of civil government, for its officers to interfere.”252 He 
articulated the same principle when he wrote to James Madison in 
1788 to outline the rights he thought necessary to include in a bill of 
rights. On the one hand, he backed a bill of rights, but he was also 
conscious that rights had the capacity to “do evil.” Thus, he 
explained what the “freedom of religion” in the bill of rights would 
(and would not) accomplish: “The declaration that religious faith 
Convenience, and Inclination” to live in political communities. In so contracting, 
individuals must give up some of their natural rights so that the rest of those rights 
may be more effectively secured. The sole legitimate purpose of government, 
therefore, is the good of the contracting parties—the public. Accordingly, 
government has a right only to act for the benefit of the governed, to protect its 
citizens from rebellion within and invasion without. 
Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REV. 
223, 230 (1983). 
 250. LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 45, at 164; see also Caplan, supra note 249, at 
230. 
 251. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 
123 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). 
 252. Thomas Jefferson, An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, 1785, in 12 STATUTES 
AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 84, 85 (photo. reprint 
1969) (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond 1823). On the absolute right to believe, see also 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to Benjamin Rush (Apr. 21, 1803), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 381 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1905) (referring to “the common right of 
independent opinion, by answering questions of faith, which the laws have left between god 
and himself”). 
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shall be unpunished, does not give impunity to criminal acts dictated 
by religious error.”253 
Many in the framing era were distrustful of religious 
organizations and clerics.254 Deists at the time, like Jefferson, 
believed in Christ but were unwilling to align themselves with any 
particular organized religion, because in their eyes most organized 
religions were a corruption of Christianity.255 Thus, he declared: “To 
the corruptions of Christianity I am indeed opposed; but not to the 
genuine precepts of Jesus himself.”256 Among Christians other than 
Deists, anticlericalism also was an entrenched viewpoint.257 
 James Madison—drafter of the First Amendment—equally 
recognized the right to complete freedom of belief: “Religious 
bondage shackles and debilitates the mind and unfits it for every 
noble enterprise every expanded prospect.”258 He admired the 
tolerance of religious beliefs in Pennsylvania, which exhibited a 
“liberal catholic and equitable way of thinking as to the rights of 
Conscience,”259 but discussions of “conscience” were discussions 
about belief, and not conduct.260 His mentor, the Reverend John 
Witherspoon, articulated the principle of no-harm in his Lectures on 
Moral Philosophy as follows: “[A]nother object of civil laws is, 
limiting citizens in the exercise of their rights, so that they may not 
be injurious to one another, but that the public good may be 
promoted.”261  
 253. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to James Madison (Jul. 31, 1788), in THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 440 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1950). 
 254. See supra notes 187–244 and accompanying text (discussing Protestant mindset). 
 255. KERRY S. WALTERS, THE AMERICAN DEISTS: VOICES OF REASON AND DISSENT IN 
THE EARLY REPUBLIC 106–40 (1992). Jefferson, of course, was not solitary in his beliefs. 
Deists dominated the colleges during the latter eighteenth century. Id. 
 256. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 253, at 380. 
 257. See generally HAMBURGER, supra note 222. 
 258. ADRIENNE KOCH, MADISON’S “ADVICE TO MY COUNTRY” 15 (1966) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting James Madison). 
 259. Letter from James Madison, to William Bradford (Apr. 1, 1774), in 1 THE PAPERS 
OF JAMES MADISON 112 (William T. Hutchinson et al. ed., 1962). 
 260. See Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A 
Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 893 (1995) 
(“For virtually all groups [at the founding], conscience was seen as a distinctly rational process; 
it involved the exercise of human reason, judgment, and understanding. Because of its 
involvement with human rational processes, conscience involved elements of free will, choice, 
and (ultimately) human responsibility.”).  
 261. John Witherspoon, Lectures on Moral Philosophy, Eloquence and Divinity, in 7 THE 
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In the Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison expressed 
apprehension about the impact of religious institutions on society:  
What influence in fact have ecclesiastical establishments had on 
Civil Society? In some instances they have been seen to erect a 
spiritual tyranny on the ruins of the Civil authority; in many 
instances they have been seen upholding the thrones of political 
tyranny: in no instance have they been seen the guardians of the 
liberties of the people. Rulers who wished to subvert the public 
liberty, may have found an established Clergy convenient 
auxiliaries.262  
These concerns dogged him through his distinguished career in 
public service. At the end of his presidency, he worried publicly that 
“[t]he danger of silent accumulations & encroachments by 
Ecclesiastical Bodies have not sufficiently engaged attention in the 
U.S.”263  
James Madison was particularly harsh regarding the potential 
abuses of power by both religious institutions and especially the 
clergy. When backed by state authority, he declared, the clergy “tend 
to great ignorance and corruption, all of which facilitate the 
execution of mischievous projects.”264 He castigated the state of 
liberty at the time: “Poverty and luxury prevail among all sorts: 
pride, ignorance, and knavery among the priesthood, and vice and 
wickedness among the laity. . . . That diabolical, Hell-conceived 
principle of persecution rages among some, and to their eternal 
infamy, the clergy can furnish their quota of imps for such 
business.”265 
Jefferson and Madison envisioned the potential for great harm to 
the public good when a religious organization abuses power.266 
WORKS OF JOHN WITHERSPOON 148 (1815).  
 262. Madison, Memorial, supra note 225, at 301–02. 
 263. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, supra note 151, at 121 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting MADISON’S DETACHED MEMORANDA 554 (Elizabeth Fleet ed., 
1946)). 
 264. Letter from James Madison, supra note 259, at 105. 
 265. Id. at 106. 
 266. See, e.g., Madison, Memorial, supra note 225, at 298–304. Madison wrote:  
Because experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of 
maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation. 
During almost fifteen centuries has the legal establishment of Christianity been on 
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Thus, neither they nor their fellow citizens ever contemplated 
absolute liberty for religious organizations. Indeed, absolute liberty 
(religious or otherwise) was anarchy and called licentiousness. The 
early Americans’ notions were reasonable in light of their knowledge 
of the excesses of religious dominance in Europe, including the 
Inquisition, the Spanish Inquisition, the clash of power between the 
Catholic and Protestant churches immediately preceding the 
founding of the New World colonies, and the years of bloody 
executions at the Tower of London. 
As I have documented in a previous article, the dominant view at 
the time of the framing was to apply the rule of law to the actions of 
religious individuals and institutions.267 In other words, the no-harm 
principle was widely accepted, even among religious believers. The 
arguments some have made for a mandatory constitutional right to 
avoid the application of the law to religious conduct, or for the 
application of strict scrutiny to neutral, generally applicable laws that 
substantially burden religious entities268 simply cannot be 
supported.269 Church autonomy—in the sense of an independent 
trial. What have been its fruits? More or less in all places, pride and indolence in the 
Clergy, ignorance and servility in the laity, in both, superstition, bigotry and 
persecution. 
Id. Similarly, Thomas Jefferson wrote: 
Had not the Roman government permitted free inquiry, Christianity could never 
have been introduced. Had not free inquiry been indulged at the era of the 
Reformation, the corruptions of Christianity could not have been purged away. If it 
be restrained now, the present corruptions will be protected, and new ones 
encouraged. 
 Jefferson, supra note 251, at 221–22. 
 267. See generally Hamilton, supra note 12. 
 268. Laycock, supra note 50, at 1416–17; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise 
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1128 (1990); McConnell, 
supra note 13, at 1415 (“[C]onstitutionally compelled exemptions were within the 
contemplation of the framers and ratifiers as a possible interpretation of the free exercise 
clause.”); see also Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against 
Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991); Michael W. 
McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3 (2000). 
 269.  See generally Frederick M. Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable 
Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 555, 574 (1998) 
(“[T]he historical moment for exemptions has come and gone. There no longer exists a 
plausible explanation of why religious believers—and only believers—are constitutionally 
entitled to be excused from complying with otherwise legitimate laws that burden practices 
 . . . .”); Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical 
Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 917 (1992); Hamilton, supra note 12; William P. 
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power to act outside the law—was not part of the Framers’ intent, 
the framing generation’s understanding, or the vast majority—and 
the best—of the Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence.270 
As Justice Scalia explained in Boerne, the most plausible reading 
of early free exercise enactments permitted the application of laws 
protecting the public good to religious institutions: 
Religious exercise shall be permitted so long as it does not violate 
general laws governing conduct. The “provisos” in the enactments 
negate a license to act in a manner “unfaithfull to the Lord 
Proprietary” (Maryland Act Concerning Religion of 1649), or 
“behav[e]” in other than a “peaceabl[e] and quie[t]” manner 
(Rhode Island Charter of 1663), or “disturb the public peace” 
(New Hampshire Constitution), or interfere with the “peace [and] 
safety of th[e] State” (New York, Maryland, and Georgia 
Constitutions), or “demea[n]” oneself in other than a “peaceable 
and orderly manner” (Northwest Ordinance of 1787). At the time 
these provisos were enacted, keeping “peace” and “order” seems to 
have meant, precisely, obeying the laws.271 
In fact, “[e]very breach of a law is against the peace.”272 
However, the no-harm principle was not only advocated in the 
framing era, but rather has continued to be persistent in American 
political thought. The most influential philosopher of the nineteenth 
century in the English-speaking world was John Stuart Mill, who 
further developed the principle of no-harm. He set forth the 
Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 357, 411–12 (1990); Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religious-Based 
Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 591, 624 (1989) (rejecting 
constitutionally compelled exemptions, but not legislative exemptions); see also Gedicks, supra 
note 61, at 950–51 (“[I]n the long run, no effective defense is possible [for judicially 
mandated exemptions]. To the extent that a residuum of religious exemptions persists under 
state law . . . , I say enjoy them while they last.” (footnote omitted)). 
 270. The Warren Court’s distortion of the Free Exercise Clause from a principle of no-
harm to a virtually unfettered individual right was contrary to the intent of the First 
Amendment and fundamental common sense. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 423 
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Those situations in which the Constitution may require 
special treatment on account of religion are, in my view, few and far between, and this view is 
amply supported by the course of constitutional litigation in this area.”). 
 271. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 539 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(citations omitted). 
 272. Queen v. Lane, 87 Eng. Rep. 884, 885 (Q.B. 1704). 
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following maxims, which came to be known collectively as the Harm 
Principle: 
[F]irst, that the individual is not accountable to society for his 
actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but 
himself. . . . Secondly, that for such actions as are prejudicial to the 
interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be 
subjected either to social or to legal punishments, if society is of 
opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection.273  
Mill thereby refined the Lockean principle. It is a firm rejection of 
individual (or institutional) autonomy from the laws that protect 
others. 
 Mill also advocated absolute dominion over one’s mind,274 which 
entailed tolerance of conflicting beliefs: “If all mankind minus one, 
were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary 
opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one 
person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing 
mankind.”275 The universe of actions was divided into two 
categories: those that will not harm others and those that will. While 
the former category should not be regulated, the latter category 
should be.  
  Where the legislature outlawed actions that harmed no one, 
Mill’s moral philosophy demanded liberty and would have voided 
the law. But where the legislature outlawed actions that did harm 
others, the law was valid.  
 In the 1960s, H.L.A. Hart elaborated upon Mill’s views. Hart 
also believed that the line to be drawn between legitimate laws and 
illegitimate laws rested on the Harm Principle.276 Joel Feinberg 
further developed this theory.277 By the latter half of the twentieth 
century, the no-harm rule was widely accepted as the best way to 
 273. MILL, supra note 46, at 114. 
 274. Id. at 11. 
 275. Id. at 18.  
 276. Hart believed that “[r]ecognition of individual liberty as a value involves, as a 
minimum, acceptance of the principle that the individual may do what he wants, even if others 
are distressed when the learn what it is that he does—unless, of course, there are other good 
grounds for forbidding it.” HART, supra note 247. 
 277. See generally Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND 
DESERVING (1970); JOEL FEINBERG, 1 THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW 214 (1988).   
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explain the legitimacy of criminal, tort, and regulatory laws. It 
remains the dominant approach.278  
 The no-harm reasoning as it developed over the centuries brings 
the Supreme Court’s Religion Clause jurisprudence into better 
focus. Reynolds v. United States was decided soon after Mill’s 
passing.279 The Reynolds decision reflects two of the crucial elements 
of Mill’s reasoning. First, Reynolds explicitly recognized the absolute 
right to believe.280 Second, it granted the legislature the power to 
make religious conduct illegal, at least where the religious conduct 
harmed others.281 There was no question in the Court’s reasoning 
that the federal antipolygamy statute prevented and punished a 
severe societal harm.282  
 Mill’s third category—that it is immoral to regulate actions that 
hurt no one else—is not a doctrinal factor in the Supreme Court’s 
religion-clause doctrine, but is implicit in its political theory. The 
Court in Employment Division v. Smith saw a natural limitation on 
the enactment of laws burdening religious conduct in United States’ 
values:  
Values that are protected against government interference through 
enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from 
the political process. Just as a society that believes in the negative 
protection accorded to the press by the First Amendment is likely 
to enact laws that affirmatively foster the dissemination of the 
printed word, so also a society that believes in the negative 
protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be 
solicitous of that value in its legislation as well.283  
 278. See Epstein, supra note 60, at 370–71. 
 279. Mill died in 1873. THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2001), available at 
http://www.bartleby.com/65/mi/Mill-JS.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). Reynolds was 
decided in 1879. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).  
 280. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (determining what the Free Exercise Clause guaranteed, 
the Court said, “Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left 
free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order”). 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 164–66. 
 283. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
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III. PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES IN SUPPORT OF 
THE NO-HARM RULE AND AGAINST CHURCH AUTONOMY 
Even though history supports the general application of the no-
harm principle to religious institutions, various theories might be 
advanced to justify church autonomy. But an examination of each of 
these theories leads to the conclusion that the no-harm rule is more 
grounded and better supported in these theories than the less 
nuanced notion of church autonomy. Scholars have argued the 
existence of church autonomy based on various theories, including 
utilitarianism, deterrence, Catholic thought, and Protestant thought, 
among others. However, each of these philosophical/theological 
theories supports the application of the no-harm rule to all 
individuals in society, including religious institutions and clergy.  
One of the missing voices in the discussions concerning the 
regulation of religious institutions in this conference is a 
philosophical or theological defense of church autonomy. The 
defenders of church autonomy tend to assume without explanation 
that “church autonomy” is a good thing, without delving into a 
more nuanced defense. As opposed to a notion of church autonomy, 
the no-harm rule has a lengthy and distinguished philosophical 
pedigree, as discussed above, and can be justified on both a 
utilitarian and deontological basis.  
Utilitarianism is a branch of consequentialist philosophy284 by 
which one judges the rightness of an action according to whether the 
action leads to the greatest public good.285 Utilitarianism has been 
broken down into act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. Act 
utilitarianism analyzes the consequences of each individual act in 
light of the larger good, weighs those consequences, and then 
determines the utility of individual actions.286 Rule utilitarianism, in 
 284. I am indebted to Mark Tushnet for suggesting this line of inquiry. 
 285. See Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 
reprinted in A BENTHAM READER 78 (Mary Peter Mack ed., 1969); see also Leo Katz, Root of 
Formalism: Form and Substance in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 566, 567 (1999). 
 286. “The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest 
Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote 
happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.” John Stuart Mill, On 
Utilitarianism, reprinted in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 189, 194 (Max Lerner 
ed., 1961); see also Definition of Act-Utilitarianism, at http://www.utilitarianism.com/ 
actutil.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).  
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contrast, focuses on particular rules and asks which rule, if always 
followed, would produce the greatest good.287 In fact, for purposes 
of legal analysis, these two approaches are virtually identical, and 
therefore I will use the generic term “utilitarianism” to analyze 
religious institutions. In either case, ethical choices are made in light 
of their consequences. Ultimately, church autonomy cannot be 
defended on utilitarian grounds. 
Deontology, or libertarianism, asks a separate question: whether 
a choice is intrinsically good.288 For the deontologists, the correct 
action is not linked inextricably to the question of the public good. 
Rather, the moral question turns on individual rights and whether 
the moral choice is good in itself, without reference to a general 
outcome. Robert Nozick prescribes a libertarian theory that attempts 
to move beyond anarchy to utopia by identifying “side constraints” 
on individual action, which are constraints defined by harm done to 
another individual.289 Thus, the deontologist asks what would be the 
best action taken by the church,290 not whether the church’s action is 
good for society. Nozick includes in the calculation of what is the 
best action some consideration of “side constraints,” a telling and 
necessary caveat for those libertarians who must live in society (which 
is all of them). Even under a deontological theory, church autonomy 
cannot be justified in many circumstances because the intrinsic value 
of the civil right, for example the protection of children from 
physical abuse, weighs more heavily in the balance than the intrinsic 
value of an autonomous religious institution. The rule that forbids 
harm to others—even at the expense of some autonomy for religious 
institutions—is favored over autonomy under both philosophical 
approaches. 
 287. See MILL, supra note 46, at 194; JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF 
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 88–125 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1999) (1832); see also 
Definition of Rule-Utilitarianism, at http://www.utilitarianism.com/ruleutil.htm (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2004). 
 288. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 33–35 (1974). 
 289. Id. at 32. 
 290. See Brady, supra note 11; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 35. Paul Ramsey defends a 
deontological approach to Christian ethics in his book Basic Christian Ethics, 235–45 (1977). 
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A. Utilitarianism Supports the No-Harm Rule and  
Does Not Support Church Autonomy 
The Supreme Court has operated primarily out of a utilitarian 
framework in its religious institution cases. Following the guiding 
principle of no-harm, the Court has permitted religious institutions 
the broadest rights when the likelihood of involuntary harm to 
others is at its least—in the belief cases.291 But the Court also has 
permitted restrictions of religious institutions when the likelihood 
that others will be harmed is at its greatest—in the conduct cases.292 
When religious institutions are capable of harming others, the Court 
has deferred to the legislature’s determination of the cost to society 
and followed the legislature’s dictate to restrict the liberty of 
religious institutions to act. 293 
The use of a utilitarian framework is in fact the best explanation 
of the Court’s decision in Jones v. Wolf to permit the application of 
“neutral principles of law” in contested church property cases.294 In 
that case, the Court provided legal guidance for churches in the 
future to avoid the sort of dispute that prompted the Jones litigation: 
Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provisions, 
religious societies can specify what is to happen to church property 
 291. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877–79 (1990). 
“Laws,” we said, “are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot 
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. . . . Can a 
man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit 
this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law 
of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”  
Id. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1879)); see also McDaniel v. 
Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (holding that the government may not impose special 
disabilities based on religious belief); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (holding 
that the government may not compel affirmation of religious belief); United States v. Ballard, 
322 U.S. 78, 86–88 (1944) (ruling that the government may not punish those with religious 
beliefs it believes false). 
 292. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–80; Gen. Council on Fin. and Admin. v. Superior Court 
of California, 439 U.S. 1355, 1372–73 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1978); Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (ruling that a mother could be prosecuted under 
child labor laws); Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879) (upholding a bigamy conviction). 
 293. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–80; Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 
493 U.S. 378 (1990); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145; see 
also Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 608 (1979); Gen. Council, 439 U.S. at 1372–73 (Rehnquist, 
Circuit Justice 1978) (denying motion to stay). 
 294. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 608. 
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in the event of a particular contingency, or what religious body will 
determine the ownership in the event of a schism or doctrinal 
controversy. In this manner, a religious organization can ensure 
that a dispute over the ownership of church property will be 
resolved in accord with the desires of the members. 295 
By sketching this legal map, the Court rejected church autonomy in 
favor of a system in which all of society—including the church and 
its members—would benefit. If churches followed the Court’s 
principles from the beginning, there would be fewer conflicts, fewer 
cases, and more stability in terms of church property ownership. The 
impulse was utilitarian, not autonomy. 
The utilitarian asks whether in the legal system the greater good 
is achieved through more or less restriction of a given institution or 
practice. Church autonomy, in contrast, would permit religious 
institutions to operate with a bare minimum of government 
regulation, on the theory that the public good is best served under 
such a regime. Church autonomy would argue against imposing a 
negligence standard on hiring decisions.296 This conclusion, however, 
cannot be squared with the utilitarian’s question regarding the 
greater good. 
The no-harm rule would tend to support laws that reduce the 
likelihood that religious institutions will harm others. Its utility lies 
in its ability to decrease suffering and therefore increase the public 
good. Examples include torts, regulatory laws, and criminal laws. 
The no-harm rule has two prongs: belief and conduct, which I will 
analyze under utilitarianism. 
1. Utilitarian analysis of the absolute protection of belief 
 The absolute protection of belief grants an unlimited right to 
individuals to believe whatever they choose. The question for 
utilitarianism is whether such absolute protection also serves the 
greater good. The absolute protection of belief serves a number of 
social ends. First, it increases the likelihood that there will be a 
variety of beliefs from which to choose. In a society of imperfect 
 295. Id. at 603–04. 
 296. This is in fact the argument made by Professors Lupu and Tuttle at this Conference. 
See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 35. 
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humans, each with different and limited views, the absolute 
protection of belief fosters the search for truth.297 When that belief is 
translated into speech or political action, religious belief “can be a 
resource for alternative human visions that challenge and enrich 
discussion of public policy.”298 Second, it prevents the situation in 
which those with unusual beliefs are driven to rebel against society, a 
phenomenon sometimes called the “venting function.”299 Third, it 
increases the collective creativity of the culture, which furthers 
industry, the arts, and scholarship.300  
 Failure to absolutely protect beliefs severely undermines society 
by reducing the robustness of the marketplace of ideas, by creating 
incentives for original thinkers to violently rebel, and by stifling 
creativity, and therefore industry, the arts, and scholarship. One 
might argue, however, that permitting the absolute protection of 
belief contributes to the dissemination of beliefs that are dangerous if 
they persuade others to act. It also permits individuals and groups to 
harbor antisocial beliefs, including racist, violent, and sexist views. 
However, in the absence of action (in the form of speech or 
conduct), those beliefs do not harm their targets.  
 For the utilitarian, these concerns are to be weighed against each 
other, and while the threat to the culture of dangerous beliefs is not 
 297. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970); 
Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 880 
(1963). 
 298. Sullivan, supra note 2, at 174.  
 299. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
Those who won our independence . . . knew . . . that it is hazardous to discourage 
thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds 
hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the 
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that 
the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. 
Id.; THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 12 
(1966); Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to Elijah Boardman (July 3, 1801), quoted in Charles 
A. Beard, The Great American Tradition: A Challenge for the Fourth of July, 123 NATION 7, 8 
(1923) (“We have nothing to fear from the demoralizing reasonings of some, if others are left 
free to demonstrate their errors and especially when the law stands ready to punish the first 
criminal act produced by the false reasonings; these are safer corrections than the conscience of 
the judge.”).  
 300. The Founders’ belief in the importance of this function is evident in the 
Constitution’s limitation of time for copyrights “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 785–86 (1988).  
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negligible, the benefits to society are enormous. On a utilitarian 
analysis, it is difficult to fault the rule favoring the absolute 
protection of belief. 
2. Utilitarian analysis of the regulation of conduct that harms others 
I will now apply a utilitarian analysis to a particular legal situation 
governing religious institutions. It is obvious that under a utilitarian 
analysis, the most serious crimes, even when done by religious 
entities, must be capable of regulation. These include murder, rape, 
theft, kidnapping, and assault. Many have believed that the closer 
questions arise in the tort context—in particular, liability for 
negligent hiring where a religious institution failed to do background 
checks on particular clergy, and the clergy subsequently sexually 
abused children. I have chosen this example not only because it has 
contemporary application, but also because the result may not be as 
crystal clear as issues involving criminal law or regulatory rules 
affecting safety and health. 
If religious institutions were liable for negligent hiring, their 
liberty to choose clergy would be incrementally reduced by the 
requirement that they engage in background checks for every eligible 
clergy. Under utilitarian analysis, then, one must weigh the 
diminution in liberty against the good arising out of churches having 
the information provided by background checks. 
In this era, the burden on the religious institution of doing a 
background check on a potential clergy member is not substantial. 
Businesses routinely do background checks on employees.301 Day 
care centers, hospitals, and nursing homes and services are required 
to do similar background checks.302 Even families typically do 
 301. John Bonné, Most Firms Now Use Background Checks, MSN News, at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4018280 (Jan. 21, 2004) (“A report from the Society for 
Human Resource Management shows that 80 percent of companies said they run a criminal 
check on applicants before hiring, up nearly 30 percent from 1996—making the practice as 
common as checking references or prior work histories.”). 
 302. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 77 § 250.420 (2003) (requiring hospitals to perform 
background checks on employees); Julie A. Braun & Cheryl C. Mitchell, Recent Developments 
in Seniors’ Law, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 669, 690 (1999) (“The Elder Care Safety Act of 
1997 . . . requires nursing facilities, home health agencies, and hospice programs to conduct 
criminal and abusive work history background checks for nurse aids and home health aides 
under the Medicare and Medicaid programs.”); Michael Gibbons & Dana Campbell, Liability 
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background checks on those working in the home.303 Criminal 
background checks are relatively inexpensive,304 and because there is 
so much demand for them, the paths to such information are fairly 
clear.305 It is true that criminal background checks will not capture 
some pedophiles, so in order to avoid being found negligent, the 
religious institution may have to do more. This could include old-
fashioned methods of checking potential employees, such as 
contacting references and asking about character, or more 
specifically, asking why a seminarian or priest was reassigned from a 
previous position. Even these old-fashioned methods are not 
particularly onerous, and they present a negligible burden compared 
to the harm that the duty is intended to prevent. Psychological 
testing is also likely to be necessary to avoid charges of negligence. 
Many religious institutions already impose such testing on their 
candidates.306  
of Recreation and Competitive Sport Organizations for Sexual Assaults on Children by 
Administrators, Coaches and Volunteers, 13 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 185, 209 (2003) 
(“[M]ost states require teachers and day care workers to undergo background checks as a 
condition of their employment.”); Tony Fong, Necessary Knowledge, NAT’L COUNCIL OF 
STATE BDS. OF NURSING, available at http://www.ncsbn.org/news/ncsbninthenews_ 
55E82069B54E4876928D9B9E331FD235.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004) (“Currently, 
hospitals must check with the National Practitioner Data Bank when they hire doctors. The 
databank contains information about criminal convictions, license suspensions and medical 
fraud convictions on doctors’ records.”). 
 303. There are many services that perform preemployment screening for in-home 
employees like nannies and housekeepers. The fees associated with these services depend on 
the number and depth of checks requested, but most basic screenings cost around fifty dollars. 
See, e.g., http://www.nannycheck.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
 304. See Richard Burnett, Do a Thorough Background Check on Workers—or Let the Hirer 
Beware, Bankrate.com (May 15, 2000), at http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/biz/ 
Biz_ops/20000515.asp (“It doesn’t take a Big 5 accountant or a rocket scientist to figure the 
value of pre-employment background checks. It’s simple. Pay as little as $15 to run a basic 
criminal record check.”). 
 305. See generally http://www.backgroundchecks.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2004) 
(offering several options for background checks, including a “US OneSEARCH Sex Offender” 
search, which allows subscribers to simultaneously search sex offender records of thirty-nine 
states). 
 306. For example, the Evangelical Presbyterian Church requires candidates for the 
ministerial positions to submit “cop[ies] of physical examination from physician and 
psychological assessment results.” PROCEDURE MANUAL FOR MINISTERIAL AND CANDIDATES 
COMMITTEES 27–28 (2003), available at http://www.epc.org/general-assembly/ 
documents/Procedure-Manual.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). One of the recommendations 
of the Catholic Church’s Lay Review Board was to institute more intense screening of 
seminary candidates. NATIONAL REVIEW BOARD FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND 
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On the other side of the scale and weighing against requiring 
background checks are the cost to the religious institution’s freedom 
to choose whomever it wishes to be a clergy member and the 
financial cost of the background checks. As discussed above, the 
financial cost is de minimis. The restriction on freedom posed by 
background checks is also minimal. Negligent hiring liability, 
especially when the concern is to prevent criminal child abuse does 
not dictate who can be chosen as clergy, but rather only requires that 
the religious institution know the background of those it places in 
positions of authority in proximity to children. The religious 
institution remains free to place its clergy where its theology directs, 
but it assumes the risk if harm results when it either fails to obtain 
the information that was available regarding the danger of the 
individual to children and certainly when it knowingly ignores such 
information. The knowledge gleaned from the background check—if 
used—is likely to save the religious institution money in the long 
run. Because the potential liability would encourage religious 
institutions to place fewer individuals who abuse children in 
positions of power, the cost to the institution of litigation arising 
from child abuse would decline. The cost of litigation following 
clergy abuse is likely to be far higher than the cost of the background 
check and more costly than the de minimis restriction on the 
religious institution’s actions. Weighing the benefits that flow from 
the restriction against its costs, it would appear that negligent hiring 
liability is not contrary to the best interests of religious institutions 
and is clearly in favor of children’s welfare.307 
The religious institutions, however, are likely to respond that the 
cost of background checks may be de minimis, but there are other 
elements of the tort law governing employment that do not impose 
such a small cost. For example, religious organizations are fighting 
the imposition of punitive damages in clergy abuse cases.308 While 
YOUNG PEOPLE, A REPORT ON THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE UNITED 
STATES 140–41 (2004), available at http://www.usccb.org/nrb/nrbstudy/nrbreport.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2004) [hereinafter REPORT ON THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH]. 
 307. See Tremper, supra note 157, at 439 (“Failure to hold charitable actors sufficiently 
responsible for their injury-causing activities may also threaten the legitimacy of the charitable 
sector. Thus, the tort rules for charitable actors should comport at least roughly with moral 
intuitions about responsibility and justice.”). 
 308. In cases where punitives have been proven under standing law, they have been 
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the monetary cost of a background check is small, punitive damages 
can be quite large. The benefit of the damages lies in their power to 
deter future bad behavior and to punish the person for their 
wrongful action.309 In the case of imposing punitive damages against 
the Catholic Church for the tortious actions of abusive priests, the 
justification is the same as that of any other master/servant 
relationship: “the imposition of punitive damages upon the employer 
serves as a deterrent to the employment of unfit persons for 
important positions.”310 
Opponents argue that such funds were never intended for abuse 
victims, and that they should go toward the good works for which 
they were originally intended. In effect, they are arguing that the 
funds’ intended purposes are greater in value than the deterrence 
value of a punitive damage award. They are asking the courts to 
weigh more heavily in the balance their contributing members than 
their victims. The cost being claimed is that the institution cannot 
choose at will where its funds are directed. The institution, however, 
created the choice by permitting the victimization of children, so to 
now argue that punitives burden the choice is specious. Indeed, if 
that is their world view, deterrence is even more necessary than it 
might have been thought previously. This argument is attractive to 
many on its surface, but it shows how important it is to hold the 
permitted to go forward. See Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1159 (E.D. 
Mich. 1995) (deciding to submit punitive damages to jury for “non-abusing” defendant 
church because, under the law of Wisconsin, punitive damages are only “available when the 
defendant acts in wanton, willful, or reckless disregard,” and the plaintiff did not meet the clear 
and convincing standard); Roman Catholic Diocese v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286, 291 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1998) (rejecting Archdiocese argument and upholding punitive damage award of 
$700,000 on appeal); Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806, 
812–13 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding punitive damage award for clergy sexual abuse in 
the face of archdiocese argument that punitive damages were inappropriate where the jury 
originally awarded $2,700,000 in punitive damages, but reducing the award to $187,000); 
Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, 742 A.2d 1052, 1059 (Pa. 1999) (vacating order of 
Superior Court that reversed a jury’s award of punitive damages in the amount of $1,050,000 
against bishop and archdiocese because the Supreme Court found “[t]heir inaction in the face 
of such a menace is not only negligent, [but] it is reckless and abhorrent”); see also Associated 
Press, Legal Group Argues Church Shouldn't Pay Punitive Damages in Lawsuits, Sept. 1, 2004, 
available at http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/0901churchlawsuits-ON.html (last 
visited Sept. 4, 2004) (reporting The Becket Fund’s filing of an amicus brief against punitive 
damages in a recent Arizona clergy abuse case). 
 309. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979). 
 310. Id. § 909, cmt. b. 
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institution liable to punitive damages in these cases. If the institution 
is culpable, and believers know that their donations are at risk, then 
perhaps they will monitor their own institution better and discard 
the blind trust that permits their institution to operate in such a 
reprehensible way that its actions justify punitive damages. 
Even if a religious institution could show that the cost of the 
background check or of the punitive damages would bankrupt the 
church and even put it out of existence, the religious institution 
cannot win under a utilitarian analysis. It is difficult to imagine a 
more important social interest than protecting children from physical 
and sexual abuse. The interest is even higher when the children are 
likely to trust the individuals who would abuse them, as in the case 
of clergy. Clergy hold special places of privilege in their religious 
circles, which means that negligently letting a pedophile into the 
circle puts children at greater risk than if the individual were a clerk 
at a store. Even when weighing the interest of the children in being 
protected from pedophiles in positions of trust against the continued 
existence of a particular religious institution, the religious institution 
loses. Indeed, it would be unconstitutional for a legislature to take a 
position on whether a religious institution flourishes or expires. In 
the United States, religious institutions are part of a public market in 
belief, and it is the people, as believers, that choose whether a church 
will flourish or not, not the government. The government has no 
legitimate interest in choosing public policy based on the religious 
institution’s continued existence, especially where that policy has 
been threatened by the institution’s own decisions. Thus, when a 
religious institution is decimated by its illegal actions, society is not 
harmed by the disappearance of that one institution. This is not a 
threat to the marketplace in religions per se, because the vast 
majority of religious institutions (and individuals) will be law-
abiding. 
A cost-benefit analysis, however, is insufficient to fully answer the 
utilitarian question, which also requires the determination whether 
society at large will be better off with the rule. The cost to society of 
clergy abuse is enormous, and includes the victim’s (the family’s and 
the community’s) physical and emotional suffering, the cost of 
therapy and treatment, the reduced productivity of the victim in later 
life, and the cost of prosecuting the perpetrators and litigating civil 
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harms. The increased costs in time and effort to the religious 
institution to obtain background checks simply cannot compare. In 
light of the extreme cost to society, the cost of punitive damages also 
fails to weigh in favor of autonomy. The greater good is served even 
when the religious institution bears a substantial financial burden.  
B. The Libertarian Approach to the No-Harm Rule 
 The libertarian’s or deontologist’s approach is different from the 
utilitarian’s in method, but not in outcome. The libertarian examines 
the intrinsic good in the rule and the actions governed. 
1. The absolute protection of belief 
The first prong of the no-harm rule, that belief is absolutely 
protected, is in fact a restatement of strict libertarianism. It protects 
liberty without any possibility of regulation. 
2. The libertarian analysis of the rule permitting conduct to be 
regulated 
Deontology would ask first whether imposing background 
checks on a church violates that church’s intrinsic right to autonomy 
and whether the rule that religious institutions must investigate the 
backgrounds of potential clergy is intrinsically good. The intrinsic 
good of the rule favoring background checks lies in the civil rights of 
children, which have been codified in the international United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.311 The rights of the 
 311. The international Convention on the Rights of the Child, which codifies the 
customary international law of children’s civil rights, was adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification, and accession by G.A. Res. 94/25, U.N. GAOR (Nov. 20, 1989). It entered into 
force on September 20, 1990. Convention of the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, U.N. 28 
I.L.M. 1448 [hereinafter Convention on the Rights of the Child]. The Convention, among 
other things, makes the best interest of the child a primary consideration of courts and 
administrative bodies, ensures the protection and care of the child necessary for his or her well-
being, and requires “that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the care or 
protection of children shall conform with the standards established by competent authorities, 
particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitability of their staff, as well as 
competent supervision.” Id. at art. 3. Additionally, the Convention requires the protection of 
children “from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent 
treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), 
legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child.” Id. at art. 19 (emphasis 
added). The protective measures should include judicial involvement when appropriate. The 
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religious institution reside in the libertarian notion of freedom from 
government and judicial involvement in all matters pertaining to 
clergy, or, more narrowly, the right to be free from any rule akin to a 
licensing requirement.312 There is a problem for deontology in 
general when rights must be weighed against each other, because the 
theory in some of its versions rests on an assumption that rights are 
intrinsic, and therefore unassailable.313  
In this situation, however, weighing rights against each other is 
unavoidable. Deontology thus weighs two civil rights against each 
other: the church’s liberty interest or right to be free from any 
government oversight (or any rule even remotely akin to licensure), 
and the rights of the child to be free from sexual abuse. The rights of 
the child include having public policy interests considered in the 
“best interest of the child.”314 The best interest of the child demands 
that religious institutions take reasonable steps to obtain information 
to judge whether a particular employee in proximity of children is in 
the best interest of children. On this reasoning, encouraging 
background checks through tort liability would seem quite valuable. 
The deontological right of the religious institution, on the other 
hand, is more attenuated. While there may be a right based in 
libertarian notions to be free from some government or judicial 
involvement, there can be no absolute right. For example, there can 
be no question that the right of a religious institution to be free from 
judicial oversight cannot extend to murder.  
Perhaps, however, the religious institution would nuance its 
argument by asserting that it is not claiming absolute liberty, but 
rather the solitary right to determine who its clergy are and to 
determine the reasons for choosing clergy and for dismissing them. 
United States is a signatory to the Convention; to date, however, the Senate has not yet 
ratified the treaty. The United States and Somalia are the only countries to sign the treaty but 
fail to ratify it. 1 Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, pt. I, at 283, U.N. 
Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/21. The treaty’s provisions, however, reflect international consensus 
on its principles, and therefore, even without ratification, the United States is bound by its 
principles as a matter of customary international law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS § 102 (1987). 
 312. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 35. 
 313. See generally Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort and Crime, 76 B.U. 
L. REV. 273 (1996). 
 314. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 311, at 1450. 
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Background checks infringe on that right by adding another criterion 
for decision. This is a typical argument in clergy abuse cases. This 
argument, though, is a red herring, because it is no different from 
the argument for absolute liberty. The only difference is that here 
the religious institution is suggesting that it should be immunized 
regardless of the consequences of its religious decisions in placing 
clergy. In effect, the interests of the child, on this understanding, are 
completely subjugated to a right to place clergy at will. 
No civilized society could tolerate such liberty or licentiousness, 
and therefore no respectable theory—not even Nozick’s libertarian 
approach—advocates absolute liberty of conduct. Nozick follows the 
libertarian path but then draws the line on liberty by introducing the 
concept of “side constraints” on one’s actions. He articulates the 
same no-harm principle present in Locke, Madison, Jefferson, and 
Mill: “Side constraints express the inviolability of other persons.”315 
In other words, one person’s liberty ends when another person is 
violated, and rights determinations involve line drawing, not 
absolutism. The introduction of side constraints into libertarian 
theory transforms Nozick’s theory into one that is consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s recognition of ordered, rather than absolute, 
liberty.  
Professors Lupu and Tuttle suggest that imposing negligent 
hiring theories and an obligation to engage in background checks on 
religious organizations is tantamount to a licensing scheme, which 
has been disfavored in constitutional analysis.316 The problem with 
their approach, however, is twofold. First, their analysis begs the 
question by relabeling the tort in disfavored First Amendment terms. 
Second, their argument glosses over dispositive differences. A true 
licensing scheme would have the government choosing and releasing 
clergy members at will, or would give the government the final word 
on who will be a clergy member. In that circumstance, the religious 
organization’s decisionmaking has been taken over by the 
government, leading to obvious Establishment Clause concerns. The 
serious problems with such a licensing scheme, however, do not 
 315. NOZICK, supra note 288, at 32. 
 316. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 35 (justifying a rule against negligent hiring liability 
on the theory that it is tantamount to a licensing scheme). 
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necessarily translate into an argument against tort theories that 
encourage background checks.  
The two legal regimes are quite distinct: In the licensing scheme, 
the religious institution’s decisions are displaced by the government. 
Under the tort theory, the religious institution makes its own 
decisions but is held responsible for the harm its conduct produces. 
The former dishonors the absolute right to believe, by letting the 
government make the choice. In contrast, the latter honors the right 
to believe and, at the same time, the right of others to avoid harm.  
Thus, even with a tort, like a negligent hiring theory, by 
encouraging background checks, the religious institution retains the 
right to choose its clergy. If it chooses those whom it knows are 
potential pedophiles, it simply assumes the risk. That is liberty, even 
if it is the sort of liberty freighted with social responsibility, such as 
the liberty identified by libertarian Nozick.317 
Both the utilitarian and the deontological philosophical theories 
respect and support the rule of no-harm to others. In contrast, the 
church autonomy theory is difficult to defend under either theory. A 
pure libertarian theory, without Nozick’s side constraints, would 
favor the church autonomy notion however. But even Nozick does 
not favor a regime of unrestrained licentiousness. That sort of 
libertarianism cannot be squared with a society of equals in a 
republican form of government; at a minimum, individuals must be 
charged with the responsibility of avoiding harm to others.  
C. Deterrence Theory, Which Is Based on a No-Harm Principle,  
Does Not Support Church Autonomy 
Professor Brady argues that church autonomy is necessary 
because churches provide important benefits to society.318 Professors 
Lupu and Tuttle argue in favor of a default rule, akin to that 
employed in New York Times v. Sullivan, in order to avoid even the 
semblance of a clergy licensing scheme.319 What neither theory 
 317. See generally NOZICK, supra note 288, at 32; Carmella, supra note 9, at 1033. 
 318. See Brady, supra note 11. 
 319. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 35; see also N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S 254, 
281–82 (1964) (“Any one claiming to be defamed by the communication must show actual 
malice or go remediless. This privilege extends to a great variety of subjects, and includes 
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adequately takes into account is the human character of religious 
institutions. Religious institutions are not merely religious, as in 
holy, or focused on higher values. Many are beneficent in various 
ways, to be sure, but beneficence is not even necessarily the religious 
institution’s primary or dominant character when the focus is the 
public good. These are complex institutions that are run and staffed 
by humans who are inherently imperfect. This reality is, after all, the 
world view on which the constitutional scheme is based.320 
According to the Framers, humans are inherently likely to abuse 
whatever power they hold, and only a structured society based on 
the rule of law, and a structured Constitution pitting various power 
centers against each other, could forestall the inevitable temptations 
to abuse power.321 Unlike government, which is checked by 
constitutional structures and principles, religious institutions and 
individuals are private entities and therefore, if they are to be 
checked, the rule of law must be applied. So long as the law does not 
target the religious institution, or religion in general, and so long as 
it does not mandate particular beliefs, it is the obligation of the 
courts to apply the law.322 Far from being constitutionally required, 
exemptions are the task of the legislatures, which have the 
institutional capacity to consider whether exempting religious 
institutions burdened by particular laws is consistent with the public 
good.323 
Much of the law exists to deter harm before it happens and to 
punish conduct when it renders harm; laws directed at harm include 
criminal, tort, and regulatory laws. “The ‘prophylactic factor’ of 
preventing future harm—that is, punishment and deterrence—has 
matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office.” (internal quotations and 
citations omitted)). 
 320. See generally Hamilton, supra note 149 (discussing the paradox of hope and distrust 
at the base of constitutional vision). Indeed, Professor Lupu has made this very point in past 
writings. See Lupu, supra note 29 (describing the likelihood that religious institutions will use 
church autonomy to hide secular and illegal activities). 
 321. Hamilton, supra note 149. 
  322. See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1315 (2004); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507, 529 (1997); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
533 (1993); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). 
 323.  See infra Part IV, notes 412–15, 482 and accompanying text; see also supra note 
269 (listing articles opposed to judicially compelled exemptions). 
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always been an important reason for imposing tort liability.”324 
Indeed, “[t]hese factors—punishment and deterrence—are obviously 
more important in situations in which the defendant has the clear 
ability to prevent the harm, so imposing liability will effectively and 
efficiently result in deterrence and therefore less future harm.”325 As I 
will discuss in more detail in Part IV, the recent clergy abuse 
litigation has revealed that Catholic Church authorities were aware 
that known child sexual abusers were working closely with children 
in their parishes.326 These authorities had the ability to prevent the 
harm, but they did not. The Church’s Lay Review Board found the 
Church’s actions shocking,327 and those actions are difficult to 
explain in the context of this society. One gets a sense that the social 
irresponsibility of their actions arose out of a sense of exceptionalism 
and perhaps even the vestiges of the clergy privilege and the 
ecclesiastical courts. Imposing liability on such negligent hiring, 
supervision, and retention decisions will effectively result in 
deterrence and less future harm to children. 
Church autonomy reduces both deterrence and punishment for 
religious institutions and, as a result, increases the potential and 
likely harm to others. When left autonomous, i.e., unaccountable to 
the public good identified by the common law and the legislatures, 
religious institutions are left to rely on their own devices to deter 
criminal behavior. Yet, self-policing is never a successful gambit for 
securing the public good.328 Over time, the United States has learned 
 324. Deana A. Pollard, Wrongful Analysis in Wrongful Life Jurisprudence, 55 ALA. L. 
REV. 327, 369 (2004); see also notes 65–67 and accompanying text. See generally RICHARD 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 149 (6th ed. 2002); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST 
OF ACCIDENTS 135 (1970).  
 325. Pollard, supra note 324, at 339. 
 326. See generally Richard Sipe, Priests, Celibacy, and Sexuality: Preliminary Expert Report 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  
 327.  REPORT ON THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 306, at 91–93.  
 328. It has taken lawsuits against religious institutions for society to learn about pervasive 
child abuse and subsequent cover-ups in various institutions. See, e.g., Jury Awards $37M in Sex 
Abuse by Texas Minister, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 23, 2004, at A4 (detailing a verdict for nine 
boys against the Lutheran minister who abused them); Mormon Church To Pay $3 Million in 
Sex Abuse, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2001, at A10; Spotlight Investigation: Abuse in the Catholic 
Church, BOSTON GLOBE, available at http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/ 
abuse (last visited Nov. 5, 2004) (chronicling the scandal and lawsuits against the Catholic 
Church since January 2002); see also Marci A. Hamilton, Shockingly, Only 2% of Catholic Clergy 
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that it is not sound policy to leave self-policing to attorneys, doctors, 
accountants, daycare centers, charities, or corporations.329 Each 
group has strong incentives to protect their own, and institutions in 
particular operate to perpetuate themselves.330 There must be both 
internal and external checks on the natural inclination to abuse 
power.331 
The burden rests on those who would grant churches autonomy 
from the law, or even individual laws, to prove that churches are 
sufficiently distinct from other institutions—in terms of the 
likelihood of their bad acts—to justify a diminished need for 
deterrence and punishment. While Professor Brady is undoubtedly 
correct that religious institutions make important contributions to 
society, so do all of the regulated groups listed above, from attorneys 
to day care centers. What she fails to prove is that religious 
institutions are less likely to harm the public good than other 
organizations. For the Christian realist Reinhold Niebuhr, that is an 
Sexual Abusers Were Ever Jailed: A Demonstration that the Self-Policing of Criminal Behavior 
Will Never Work (Mar. 11, 2004), available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/ 
20040311.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2004). 
 329. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) 
(protecting investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosure made 
pursuant to securities laws); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (2003) (many states 
follow the model code in their attorney ethics laws); Code of Medical Ethics (American 
Medical Association 2001) (“a body of ethical statements developed primarily for the benefit 
of the patient”); Code of Ethics and Statement of Policy Implementation & Enforcement of 
Ethical Requirements (International Federation of Accountants 2001) (model code which 
“endorses the concepts of objectivity, integrity, and professional competence and highlights 
how all accountants can attain the highest levels of performance in meeting their 
responsibilities to the public”), available at http://www.ifac.org/Ethics (last visited Nov. 11, 
2004); National Association for the Education of Young Children (NAEYC) Code of Ethical 
Conduct (1997) (describing “guidelines for responsible behavior and set[ting] forth a 
common basis for resolving the principal ethical dilemmas encountered in early childhood care 
and education”), available at http://www.naeyc.org/resources/position_statements/ 
pseth98.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2004); Standards for Charity Accountability (Better Business 
Bureau Wise Giving Alliance 2003) (developed to “encourage fair and honest solicitation 
practices, to promote ethical conduct by charitable organizations and to advance support of 
philanthropy”), available at http://www.give.org/standards/newcbbbstds.asp (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2004).  
 330. Of course, the best, most recent example of this phenomenon lies in the Catholic 
Church’s clergy abuse era, described in Part IV. See also DAVID BLOOR, WITTGENSTEIN, 
RULES AND INSTITUTIONS 32–35 (1997) (discussing the “collective pattern of self-referring 
activity” of institutions). 
 331. This is the same calculus employed by the Framers in crafting the Constitution. See 
Hamilton, supra note 149, at 293. 
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impossible burden to bear. Though one might find a religious 
individual capable of behaving selflessly in some circumstances, 
documenting such perfect behavior is a fruitless exercise.332 Indeed, 
Lord Acton’s phrase “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely”333 is as applicable to individuals in religious 
institutions as it is to those in secular institutions.  
Examples of corruption are readily apparent; religious belief and 
institutions have been and continue to be an impetus to war and 
terrorism around the globe.334 In the United States alone, religious 
groups have been responsible for the September 11th attacks that 
killed over 3,000 individuals,335 the sexual abuse of children in the 
Catholic Church at a rate at least twice that of the average 
population,336 and the death of children from easily treatable diseases 
or from severely misguided attempts at healing.337 Adequate 
deterrence in all three of these categories cannot be achieved 
through autonomy and depends on the consistent application of 
both criminal and tort liability. 
 332. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY 3–4 (1932) 
(discussing human nature and the fact that “sentiments of benevolence and social goodwill will 
never be so pure or powerful, and the rational capacity to consider the rights and needs of 
others . . . will never be so fully developed as to create . . . . [a] social utopia”). 
 333. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 1 (5th ed. 1999). 
 334. These wars include, to name just a few, the Crusades, the Inquisition, the Spanish 
Inquisition, the Yugoslavian breakup, and the Irish War between Protestants and Catholics. See 
John L. Esposito, Practice and Theory, in ISLAM AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY 
(Joshua Cohen & Deborah Cashman eds., 2004); RELIGION AND POLITICS IN SOCIETY 8 
(Michael Kelly & Lynn M. Messina eds., 2002) (discussing “religious fault zones” including 
the Middle East, the southern Sahara, the Balkans, and central and southern Asia, among 
others); MICHAEL A. SELLS, THE BRIDGE BETRAYED: RELIGION AND GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA 
89–92 (1996) (discussing the role of religion in the genocide that occurred during the Bosnian 
war). See generally RICHARD S. DUNN, THE AGE OF RELIGIOUS WARS 1559–1725 (1980). 
 335. See Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the 
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, S. REP. NO. 107-351 and H.R. REP. NO. 107-792 
(2003).  
 336. See JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE 
PROBLEM OF SEXUAL ABUSE OF MINORS BY CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND DEACONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 18 (2004), available at http://www.nccbuscc.org/nrb/johnjaystudy (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
 337. See Seth Asser & Rita Swan, Child Fatalities from Religion-Motivated Medical 
Neglect, 101 PEDIATRICS 625, 625–29 (1988); see also CNN, Autistic Boy Dies at Faith 
Healing Service, Aug. 25, 2003, available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Midwest/ 
08/24/autistic.boy.death. 
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D. Catholic Social Thought, or the Doctrine of Subsidiarity,  
Is Based on a No-Harm Principle 
The Catholic Church’s precepts reject autonomy in the face of 
violations of public order: “[T]he state may intervene in intermediate 
communities in order to protect individuals. Communities have 
power; they should use that power to benefit people, not to harm 
people.”338 These precepts reflect the republican principles 
articulated at the beginning of this Article: “[S]ociety has the right 
to defend itself against possible abuses committed on the pretext of 
freedom of religion. It is the special duty of government to provide 
this protection.”339 When a religious institution’s actions violate 
public order, the action “ceases to be religious exercise and becomes 
a penal offense.”340 
Pope Pius XI initiated what has become known as Catholic Social 
Thought in 1931.341 Catholic Social Thought, and in particular the 
theory of subsidiarity, leads to the identical theory of the good 
republican government enunciated in the first sentence of this 
Article: “The attainment of the common good is the sole reason for 
the existence of civil authorities.”342 Catholic theory advocates the 
protection of freedom but simultaneously the necessity of legal 
intervention to prevent harm. “[C]hurches may ‘govern themselves 
 338. Robert F. Cochran, Tort Law and Intermediate Communities: Calvinist and 
Catholic Insights, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 498 (“In some situations, 
where communities have caused harm to people, the state should provide a remedy to the 
injured party.”). 
 339. John Courtney Murray, S.J., Annotations to Declaration on Religious Freedom, in 
THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 675, 686 n.20 (Walter M. Abbott, S.J. ed., 1966) 
[hereinafter DOCUMENTS]. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Quadragesimo Anno, Encyclical of Pope Pius XI on Reconstruction of the Social 
Order, reprinted in THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 1909–1939, at 415–42 (Claudia Carlen Ihm 
ed., 1981). 
 342. Angela C. Carmella, A Catholic View of Law and Justice, in CHRISTIAN 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 265.  
Given our essential dignity, intelligence, free will, and social character, Catholic 
social doctrine offers a catalogue of rights and duties that ‘flow[] directly and 
simultaneously from [our] very nature’. . . . The church recognizes . . . the right to 
participate in public affairs and contribute to the common good; and the right to 
juridical protection of these rights.  
Id. (quoting Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris [Peace on Earth] 9 (1963), reprinted in THE 
GOSPEL OF PEACE AND JUSTICE 201, 203 (J. Gremillion ed., 1975)). 
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according to their own norms . . . [and] have the right not to be 
hindered, either by legal measures or by administrative action on the 
part of government, in the selection, training, appointment, and 
transferal of their own ministers.’”343 But this principle of liberty is 
limited in turn by a principle of social responsibility: “[A]ll freedoms 
enjoyed by churches are subject to restriction whenever religious 
conduct violates the public order.”344 
The theory of subsidiarity rests in the first instance on the 
theology of original sin, which has been paraphrased as follows: 
“man is a self-centred creature. He can be trusted to abuse his 
freedom.”345 
If the Christian conception of human dignity demands that people 
have the right to exercise as much control as possible over their 
own lives, then the Christian doctrine of original sin acknowledges 
that they will misuse that control and opt for morally dubious or 
unacceptable outcomes. Government is therefore necessary in order 
to restrain such sinful tendencies. However, because government 
itself is subject to the same sinful tendencies, it is right that it 
should be limited, by principles such as the Rule of Law and the 
Separation of Powers, in order that its potential for great harm may 
be constrained.346 
Catholic Social Thought makes no exception for religious individuals 
or institutions on this theory. “Catholic teachings embrace both the 
affirmative duty (owed not to the state but to God) of church leaders 
to behave morally and promote the common good in conditions of 
freedom, and the recognition of the legitimate role of the state to 
limit that freedom in some circumstances.”347 This means that they, 
too, are rightly subject to the rule of law.348 Thus, law must be 
applied to all citizens as enacted through accountable governmental 
 343. Carmella, supra note 9, at 1048 (quoting Declaration of Religious Freedom, in 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 339, at 682). 
 344. Id. 
 345. WILLIAM TEMPLE, CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL ORDER 45 (1942). 
 346. David H. McIlroy, Subsidiarity and Sphere Sovereignty: Christian Reflections on the 
Size, Shape and Scope of Government, 45 J. CHURCH & STATE 739, 746 (2003); see also 
Carmella, supra note 342, at 255. 
 347. Carmella, supra note 9, at 1045. 
 348. See id. at 1047 (“[F]reedom is to be restricted only in specific circumstances to 
correct injury, and only when it is prudent to do so.”). 
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institutions. Accordingly, the rule of law must be applied to those 
that are religious in order “to prevent the selfishness of A from 
destroying the freedom of B.”349 While the state should give liberty 
to intermediate institutions like religious institutions, these 
institutions should not be permitted to harm others.350 Rather, the 
Church must “accept[] limits to religious freedom when public order 
is violated.”351 Thus, the “biblical model for government is that of 
the shepherd, whose prime concern is for the welfare of his people 
(the sheep).”352 
Professor Angela Carmella has encapsulated the concepts of 
Catholic Social Thought, the rule of law, and freedom in the apt 
phrase “responsible freedom.”353 
Responsible freedom means first and foremost the proper, moral 
use of [a religious institution’s] freedom in the promotion of the 
common good. Second, it means the recognition of, and 
appropriate response to, legitimate state authority. Finally, it also 
means the maintenance of independence and integrity when the 
Church must work with the state on matters of common 
concern.354 
These principles, taken together, call for complete protection of a 
religious institution’s power to determine its own ecclesiology but, at 
the same time, establish a rule of no-harm to third parties or the 
general public’s interest in the rights of third parties. 
E. Protestant Theology Supports a No-Harm Rule,  
Not Church Autonomy 
The Protestant mindset, and its interpretation of the violent 
history of religion in Europe, holds relevance for understanding the 
legal system that emerged in early America. It can be no accident 
that the rise of Protestantism, its elemental rejection of the Roman 
Catholic Church and its practices, and its affirmation of the 
sinfulness of all humans—including and especially those who were 
 349. TEMPLE, supra note 345, at 68. 
 350. Id. at 70–71. 
 351. Carmella, supra note 9, at 1035. 
 352. McIlroy, supra note 346, at 747. 
 353. See generally Carmella, supra note 9. 
 354. Id. at 1033. 
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clerics—coincided with the demise of the ecclesiastical courts, 
sanctuary, and the benefit of clergy.355 
Protestant theology, the reformed branch in particular, has long 
rested on a deep mistrust of human nature rooted in original sin, 
which has led to the necessity of government and a no-harm rule.356 
In fact, the Calvinist-Presbyterian branch of reformed theology 
contributed heavily to the construction of the United States 
Constitution’s emphasis on checks and balances, separation of 
power, and the necessary division of power between state and federal 
governments.357 This starting point is shared by the Framers, 
Catholic Social Thought, and reformed theology. All three equally 
value the rule of no-harm; that is, the necessity of deterring all 
citizens and institutions from harming others. For Protestant 
theology, government rightly exists to serve the common good, and 
that good is served best when the potential to do harm is restrained 
through duly enacted laws. 
One particularly relevant idea in Protestant theology is the theory 
of “sphere sovereignty” introduced by reformed theologian Abraham 
Kuyper in the late nineteenth century.358 Under sphere sovereignty 
(or authority as some have suggested), church and state (as well as 
the arts and business, among other social organizations) each have 
their own sovereign base, but each also has a distinctive role. “[T]he 
telos of the state is the common good.”359 Thus, the distinctive role 
of the state is to “prevent the spheres from infringing upon one 
another, and it may use compulsion when necessary to maintain 
order.”360 He further explained: 
The cogwheels of all these spheres engage each other, and precisely 
through that interaction emerges the rich, multifaceted 
multiformity of human life. Hence also rises the danger that one 
sphere in life may encroach on its neighbour like a sticky wheel that 
 355. See supra notes 133–53. 
 356. See supra notes 216–23. 
 357. Carmella, supra note 342, at 296–300, 302–04. 
 358. Frederick Nymeyer, A Great Netherlander Who Had One Answer to the Problem of 
‘Liberty’ Destroying Liberty, Namely Sphere Sovereignty, in PROGRESSIVE CALVINISM (1956), 
available at http://www.visi.com/~contra_m/pc/1956/2-2great.html. 
 359. McIlroy, supra note 346, at 759. 
 360. Id. at 754–55. 
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shears off one cog after another until the whole operation is 
disrupted. Hence also the raison d’etre for the special sphere of 
authority that emerged in the State. It must provide for sound 
mutual interaction among the various spheres, insofar as they are 
externally manifest, and keep them within just limits.361 
This oversight role includes the power to protect the powerless in 
every sphere.362 Thus, no sphere is considered immune from the 
sovereignty or power of another, but rather each sphere is to exercise 
its authority according to its own telos.363 Moreover, the state holds 
the authority to “intervene when the authorities in other spheres are 
manifestly abusing their power.”364 
 The just criticism of the sphere sovereignty theory is that it is 
fuzzy at the boundaries, and it does not fully articulate the specific 
role of either the state or the religious institution.365 Its value for this 
Article, however, lies in its articulation of the role of government vis-
a-vis the Church. It is not at all a stretch to claim that the powers 
identified are those undergirding the no-harm doctrine: the state is a 
neutral arbiter that ensures peace and protects the powerless. The 
state that chooses church autonomy is at odds with this notion.  
Ultimately, history and theology illustrate that in the Anglo-
American tradition all paths lead to the contemporary Religion 
Clause doctrine of no-harm. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
AND THE DOCTRINE OF NO-HARM 
Based on the history and theory described above, church 
autonomy lies far outside accepted republican principles. The no-
 361. Abraham Kuyper, Sphere Sovereignty, NEW CHURCH SPEECH, Oct. 20, 1880, cited 
in McIlroy, supra note 346, at 755. 
 362. Id.; ABRAHAM KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM 124–25 (William B. Eerdmans 
ed., 1987) (1898–99), available at http://www.kuyper.org/stone/lecture4.html. 
 363. McIlroy, supra note 346, at 757–59. 
 364. Id. at 759; see also Johan van der Vyver, Sphere Sovereignty of Religious 
Institutions: A Contemporary Calvinistic Theory of Church-State Relations 24 (1999), at 
http://www.uni-trier.de/~ievr/konferenz/papers/vanvyver.pdf (“Persons engaged in 
government [have] the right and an obligation to scrutinize the conduct of their subjects . . . . 
Unbecoming conduct should not escape the power of the sword simply because it was 
committed in the name of religion.”). 
 365. See Johan D. van der Vyver, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of 
Multiculturalism, 17 CONN. J. INT’L L. 323, 329–31 (2002) (book review). 
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harm rule, by contrast, creates coherence between the religion 
clauses and our republican form of government. The Supreme Court 
has been correct to articulate its Religion Clause jurisprudence in 
belief, conduct, and harm categories, as it has never acknowledged 
legal independence for religious entities’ actions.366 
  Not only does the no-harm rule bring the religion clauses into 
harmony with a republican form of government, but it also 
reinforces neutrality in the church-state relation. It does not depend 
on judicial assessments of the “centrality”367 of beliefs or the identity 
of the religious entity.368 Beliefs are absolutely protected, which 
leaves courts the task for which they are best equipped: applying 
“neutral principles of law” to findings of fact regarding actions.369 
 The cases usually included under the heading of “church 
autonomy” follow the no-harm principle, not a principle of church 
independence or immunity from the law. As discussed in Part I, the 
Court has recognized in both its Free Exercise cases and its religious 
institution cases (which have invoked both religion clauses) that 
there is an absolute right of conscience.370 One can believe whatever 
one chooses, because freedom of belief confers numerous benefits on 
 366. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme Court 
has never adopted the term “church autonomy” to explain its religious institution cases). 
 367. Compare Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990)  
Judging the centrality of different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable 
“business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims. . . . [I]t is not 
within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a 
faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.” 
Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not 
presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility 
of a religious claim. 
(internal citations omitted), with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963)  
Even if consideration of such evidence [of malingering or deceit] is not foreclosed 
by the prohibition against judicial inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious 
beliefs—a question as to which we intimate no view since it is not before us—it is 
highly doubtful whether such evidence would be sufficient to warrant a substantial 
infringement of religious liberties. 
(internal citation omitted).  
 368.  See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653–54 (2002); Agostini v. 
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 230–31 (1997); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 
(1993); Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488–89 (1986). 
 369. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602–03 (1979). 
 370. See supra notes 1–61 and accompanying text. 
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society. The greater good grants religious institutions, as well as 
individuals and nonreligious institutions, that which it grants all 
other citizens—complete freedom to develop and to share ideas and 
beliefs—because a thriving marketplace in belief and speech is good 
for the country.371 The Court has included religious entities within 
the larger category of all citizens, all of which have an absolute right 
of conscience. These cases stand for the proposition that no court 
and no legislature may dictate what one believes, either individually 
or as a group. Far from placing religious institutions in a separate 
universe, this framework positions them as vital participants in a 
culture protective of belief and debate. In other words, even in the 
belief cases, religious institutions never stand above or beyond the 
laws that govern others, but rather they stand shoulder-to-shoulder 
with other citizen-believers. To be sure, religious institutions have 
merited special attention on this issue, because so much of who they 
are rests on belief itself and because the control of a people’s beliefs 
has been a potent temptation for governments throughout the ages. 
However, these reasons do not make institutions any less full citizens 
deserving the utmost protection of belief. 
 Thus, religious institutions participate in the absolute right to 
believe, not because they are autonomous from the law, but rather 
because (1) the law requires such liberty in the interest of the greater 
good and (2) the belief itself will not harm others.372  
 By the same token, religious institutions are subject to “neutral, 
generally applicable laws” (to use the phrasing in the Free Exercise 
cases)373 or, in other words, “the neutral principles of law” (the 
 371. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 124 S. Ct. 619, 729 (2003) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“The very ‘purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve an uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.’” (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. 
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969))); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) 
(“[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may 
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and 
public officials.”). 
 372. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. 
 373. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) 
(“In addressing the constitutional protection for free exercise of religion, our cases establish 
the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of 
burdening a particular religious practice.”); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 
(1990). 
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phrase employed in the religious institution cases),374 because action 
can harm others. To hold otherwise would be to permit religious 
institutions to inflict the harm that the law was intended to 
prevent.375 Thomas Jefferson described the fault line in this doctrine: 
“[I]t does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are twenty 
gods, or no God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.”376 
It is not that the religious institution was autonomous at one 
moment and then became encumbered by the social obligation to 
obey the law the next. Rather, religious institutions in the United 
States are and have always been part and parcel of the larger society. 
When a dispute extends beyond their shared beliefs into action that 
potentially harms others, religious institutions are treated as any 
other integral element of society. They are accountable to the larger 
good, as it is expressed through duly enacted laws. 
Instead of using the concept or even the terminology of church 
autonomy, the Supreme Court has made harm the measure of laws 
governing religious conduct. In a recent free exercise case, the Court 
mandated strict scrutiny in circumstances when a law burdened only 
religious entities but failed to regulate similar harm caused by other 
entities.377 The Court explained the rule, saying that strict scrutiny is 
required “[w]here government restricts only conduct protected by 
the First Amendment and fails to enact feasible measures to restrict 
other conduct producing substantial harm or alleged harm of the 
same sort.”378 In other words, the government can legitimately make 
conduct that harms others illegal for everyone, including the 
religious, but when the government targets religious actors and 
religious actors alone, it has demonstrated that the purpose of the 
 374. Jones, 443 U.S. at 604 (“[A] State is constitutionally entitled to adopt neutral 
principles of law as a means of adjudicating a church property dispute.”). 
 375. That is the message the Court is delivering with its statement: “Our cases do not at 
their farthest reach support the proposition that a stance of conscientious opposition relieves an 
objector from any colliding duty fixed by a democratic government.” Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 
(1971)). 
 376. Jefferson, supra note 251, at 221; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 
253, at 442–43 (“The declaration that religious faith shall be unpunished, does not give 
impunity to criminal acts dictated by religious error.”). 
 377. Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546–47. 
 378. Id. (applying strict scrutiny when laws target a religious institution for regulation). 
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law is not really the eradication of harm, but rather the targeting of 
religion.379 
This rule was further explained in Locke v. Davey, which held that 
a presumption of unconstitutionality does not apply to laws 
governing religious entities in the absence of “hostility” or 
“animosity” toward a religious institution or institutions.380 Hence, 
where a religious institution finds itself face-to-face with a legal 
obligation that exists to prevent harm to others, it has no First 
Amendment defense simply because the law imposes an incidental 
burden on that institution.381 
These same principles undergird both the free exercise and 
religious institution cases. The meaningful difference between the 
two sets of doctrine lies not in a rule of legal obligation in one and 
autonomy in the other. Rather, when the Court has faced a free 
exercise case involving the regulation of belief, the Court has taken 
jurisdiction and rendered the law unconstitutional.382 When it has 
faced a religious institution case involving solely a dispute over belief 
within a religious institution, the Court has declined jurisdiction, 
because deciding the case would place it in the position of 
determining belief.383 Thus, the cases are procedurally 
distinguishable, but there is no difference in the underlying theory 
that belief cannot be regulated or determined by the government. 
Whereas under both the free exercise and religious institution cases, 
if the institution has engaged in conduct, that conduct can be 
considered by the courts when they apply neutral principles of law.384 
 379. Id. at 533; Fraternal Order of Police v. Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 364–67 (3d Cir. 
1999); see also Locke, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1312–13 (2004). 
 380. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1314–15 (holding that a presumption of constitutionality—
strict scrutiny—applies when there is “animus” or “hostility” toward a religious institution). 
 381. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).  
 382. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 
496 (1961); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87–88 (1944); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. 
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 383. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929) (affirming the 
dismissal by the Philippines Supreme Court of a claim improperly decided by the district court 
because it was solely ecclesiastical in nature). 
 384. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604–05 (1979); Md. & Va. Churches v. 
Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (dismissing an appeal for want of a federal 
question because “the Maryland court’s resolution of the dispute involved no inquiry into 
religious doctrine”); see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
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Religious institutions have pushed for autonomy from judicial 
oversight, and therefore the rule of law, in three particular arenas: 
cases in which the parties are asking the courts to mediate a dispute 
solely based on ecclesiology or belief,385 disputes between the 
religious institution and adult clergy or lay employees,386 and claims 
 385. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 712–20 (1976) 
(holding that courts have no authority to decide solely ecclesiastical issues); Presbyterian 
Church in United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 
440, 445–47 (1969) (“[It is] wholly inconsistent with the American concept of the 
relationship between church and state to permit civil courts to determine ecclesiastical 
questions[; hence, the First Amendment’s] language leaves the civil courts no role in 
determining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving property disputes.” (emphasis 
added)), distinguished by Gen. Council on Fin. & Admin. United States Methodist Church v. 
California Superior Court, 439 U.S. 1369, 1372 (1978) (“There are constitutional limitations 
on the extent to which a civil court may inquire into and determine matters of ecclesiastical 
cognizance and polity in adjudicating intrachurch disputes.”); Gen. Council, 439 U.S. at 1372 
(“But this Court never has suggested that those constraints similarly apply outside the context 
of such intraorganization disputes. Thus, Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese and the other cases 
cited by applicant are not on point.”); see also Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16 (“[D]ecisions of the 
proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are 
accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest 
made them so by contract or otherwise.”); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 (1871) 
(“[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have 
been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, 
the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their 
application to the case before them.”); German Reformed Church v. Commonwealth ex rel. 
Seibert, 3 Pa. 282, 291 (1846) (“The decisions of ecclesiastical courts, like those of every other 
judicial tribunal, are final; as they are the best judges of what constitutes an offence against the 
word of God and the discipline of the church.”). 
 386. See, e.g., Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648 (10th 
Cir. 2002) (invoking the principle of church autonomy and refusing to decide an ecclesiastical 
question); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299 (11th 
Cir. 2000) (observing a ministerial exception for clergy); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the 
Society of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999) (declining to apply a ministerial exception for 
clergy); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conf. of United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (same); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (observing 
a ministerial exception for clergy); Young v. N. Ill. Conf. of United Methodist Church, 21 
F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994) (same); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 
F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991) (same); Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 
1164 (4th Cir. 1985); Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122 (Colo. 1996) (observing a 
ministerial exception for clergy); Williams v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 766 N.E.2d 820 
(Mass. 2002) (acknowledging, without formally adopting, the ministerial exception in 
affirming the dismissal of a claim brought by clergy); McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840 (N.J. 
2002) (declining to observe a ministerial exception); Newport Church of Nazarene v. Hensley, 
56 P.3d 386 (Or. 2002) (finding a statutory ministerial exception not unconstitutional); 
Church of Christ at Centerville v. Carder, 713 P.2d 101 (Wash. 1986) (upholding a church 
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brought by third parties against clergy and/or the religious 
institution.387 
 The Supreme Court’s cases lay down a complementary set of 
rules for the three categories of cases involving religious institutions. 
First, the courts may not determine “solely” ecclesiastical matters.388 
Second, some courts have created a judicial doctrine, called the 
board’s termination of a minister); Gillespie v. Elkins S. Baptist Church, 350 S.E.2d 715 (W. 
Va. 1986) (same); see also EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795 (4th 
Cir. 2000) (observing a ministerial exception for lay employee); Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 
(3d Cir. 1991) (same); Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-South Bend Diocese, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 286 
(Ind. 2003) (same); Montrose Christian Sch. Corp. v. Walsh, 770 A.2d 111 (Md. 2001) 
(finding constitutional a statute that applied a ministerial exception to lay employees); Madsen 
v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985) (observing a ministerial exception for a lay 
employee’s wrongful termination claims, but not for other claims), distinguished by Hiles v. 
Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 773 N.E.2d 929, 937 (Mass. 2002) (disallowing defamation 
claims if they “arise[] out of the church-minister relationship”); Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers 
v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857 (Minn. 1992) (declining to apply the ministerial 
exception to lay employees in collective bargaining); South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. 
v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus Church Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709 (N.J. 1997) (same); 
cf. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding a Title VII 
exemption for church employees).  
 387. See, e.g., Davis v. Studdert, No. 02-4110, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 3622 (10th Cir. 
Feb. 25, 2003) (dismissing an action against a church for its leaders’ alleged fraud); Kelly v. 
Marcantonio, 187 F.3d 192 (1st Cir. 1999) (sexual abuse action against a church and its 
leaders); Doe v. Hartz, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998) (same); Ayron v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 
2d 1246 (D. Colo. 1998), aff’d, 185 F.3d 873 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); Bear Valley Church 
of Christ v. DuBose, 928 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1996) (allowing some claims in a sexual abuse 
action against a church and local leader); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002) (action 
against church and local leadership for negligent hiring); Kliebenstein v. Iowa Conf. of United 
Methodist Church, 663 N.W.2d 404 (Iowa 2003) (holding that the Establishment Clause did 
not bar a defamation action against a church and its leaders); Odenthal v. Minn. Conf. of 
Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. 2002) (allowing an action against a church 
and local leader for negligence in counseling); Davis v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
Saints, 852 P.2d 640 (Mont. 1993) (multiple causes of action against a church and local 
leadership for the local leadership’s handling of an injury that occurred on church property); 
Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997) (allowing some claims in a sexual abuse action 
against a church and local leader); Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 
P.3d 198 (Utah 2001) (multiple causes of action against a church and local leadership 
resulting from harm suffered by the plaintiff after reporting sexual abuse); Pritzlaff v. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 1995) (allowing some claims in a sexual 
abuse action against a church and local leader).  
 388. See, e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 712–20; Presbyterian Church 
in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 
449–50 (1968); Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 191 (1960); Kedroff v. St. 
Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 113–15 (1952); 
Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 7–8; Shepard v. Barkley, 247 U.S. 1, 2 (1918); Watson, 80 U.S. at 727; 
see also Carmella, supra note 9, at 1039–40.  
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“ministerial exception,” to avoid deciding cases involving the 
relationship between the religious institution and its adult clergy or 
employees in some circumstances.389  
The cases in each of these first two categories cannot be justified 
by a theory that religious institutions stand autonomously outside 
society. Rather, the first is fully explained by the absolute right to 
believe, and therefore there is no cognizable harm. In the second, 
objections to the harm were waived by the adult’s decision to accept 
employment with a religious employer. Neither category presents the 
specter of harm to innocent parties. 
The third category of cases involves harm to third parties.390 The 
courts may, and indeed must, apply neutral principles of law, even if 
the case involves a religious institution and religiously motivated 
conduct, because harm resulting from actions must be redressed or 
prevented to serve the public good.391  
Where the law can be applied by reference to actions and not just 
belief, and where third parties are legally harmed, there is no 
constitutional justification for precluding the courts from exercising 
their usual function of applying neutral, generally applicable laws to 
defendants, whoever they may be. Although the Supreme Court has 
 389. See supra note 386 (listing cases); see also Carmella, supra note 9, at 1039 
(explaining the ministerial exception cases as involving a “church-clergy relationship”; thus, 
“[b]ecause he or she is deemed to have consented to the internal governance of the employer 
institution, the clergy person, as employee, must rely on those protections” provided under 
church law). 
 390. See Carmella, supra note 9, at 1040 (“The general rule of broad institutional 
autonomy for the church-clergy relationship no longer applies . . . when a third party sues a 
church regarding clergy conduct. In fact, a growing majority of jurisdictions allow judicial 
scrutiny of church decision making in many tort actions.”). 
 391. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546–
47 (1993) (applying strict scrutiny when laws are not neutral and generally applicable and 
“[w]here government restricts only conduct protected by the First Amendment and fails to 
enact feasible measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial harm or alleged harm of 
the same sort”); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 539 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he most plausible reading of the ‘free exercise’ enactments . . . is a virtual restatement of 
Smith: Religious exercise shall be permitted so long as it does not violate general laws governing 
conduct.”); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 n.2 (1990) (“[I]t is hard to see any 
reason in principle or practicality why the government should have to tailor its health and 
safety laws to conform to the diversity of religious belief . . . .”); Serbian Eastern Orthodox 
Diocese, 426 U.S. at 713 (reserving the question of whether there may be an exception where 
civil courts may review ecclesiastical decisions in instances of fraud or collusion, while holding 
there is no exception for arbitrary decisions). 
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yet to directly address the liability of a religious institution for harm 
to third parties in certain circumstances,392 the logic of its Religion 
Clause jurisprudence requires deference to legislative judgments 
when the dispute involves conduct resulting in legally cognizable 
harm, especially when the harms impact those who are incapable of 
consenting to such harm, e.g., children or emotionally disabled 
adults.393 To be sure, some state court decisions have misread the 
principles justifying judicial intervention in the belief and adult 
employee cases and concluded that they lack jurisdiction even when 
there is third-party harm, but those cases are inconsistent with the 
parameters of the Supreme Court’s Religion Clause jurisprudence, 
the no-harm rule, and the First Amendment’s grounding in the 
United States’ republican form of government. 
A. The Solely Ecclesiastical Dispute Cases 
The Court traditionally has refused to further investigate 
ecclesiastical disputes that invite the Court to settle 
intraorganizational disputes over belief or reopen ecclesiastical 
decisions made by an institution’s highest authority. This is because 
religious institutions—just like individuals—have complete dominion 
over belief.394 The key to understanding these cases lies in the 
 392. See ATLA-TORT § 54:42 (“The United States Supreme Court has not yet resolved 
the question of whether the First Amendment protects a religious organization from direct 
liability for the sexual abuse of third parties by clergy, either in the context of the sexual abuse 
of children or in the context of adult counseling.”).  
 393. See, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320–21 (Colo. 1993) (ruling 
that the plaintiff’s claim was not barred by the First Amendment where she entered into a 
sexual relationship with her priest, who had counseled her regarding mental and emotional 
problems); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002) (holding that the First Amendment 
cannot be used to “shut the courthouse door” on claims of negligence against a church in a 
sexual abuse case). 
 394. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (“The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, 
the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.”); Thomas v. Review 
Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (“[R]eligious beliefs need 
not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First 
Amendment protection.”); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (White, J., 
dissenting) (“Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,—freedom to believe and freedom 
to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940))); 
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965) (“The validity of what [the conscientious 
objector] believes cannot be questioned.”); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 443 (1961) 
(“No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or 
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Court’s use of the term “solely” to modify “ecclesiastical.” The mere 
presence of religious belief or ecclesiology, however, does not 
necessarily bar the Court’s jurisdiction.395 It is not possible to decide 
a free exercise or even many Establishment Clause cases without 
taking judicial notice of the religious entity’s beliefs. For example, 
the Court took judicial notice of the Native American Church’s 
beliefs in Smith, the Santerians beliefs in Lukumi, and the 
conscientious objector’s beliefs in Seeger. The Court has only 
withdrawn from cases where it has been asked to be the arbiter of 
belief for the organization. 
The Court has consistently declined jurisdiction in order to 
protect the religious institution’s absolute right to determine its own 
beliefs. For example, in Watson v. Jones,396 the Court was asked to 
settle a property dispute turning on the question of whether the 
church had changed its doctrine, an alteration which would 
invalidate its property interest in the local church building. The 
Supreme Court held: 1) civil judges are incompetent to resolve 
questions concerning religious doctrine; 2) members of a hierarchical 
church have voluntarily joined the general church body, thus giving 
implied consent to its internal governance; and 3) the structure of 
our political system requires a severe limit on involvement by civil 
courts in the affairs of religious bodies.397 The Court noted that “it is 
a very different thing where a subject-matter of dispute, strictly and 
purely ecclesiastical in its character,—a matter over which the civil 
courts exercise no jurisdiction—. . . becomes the subject of its 
action.”398 
In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,399 the 
Supreme Court of Illinois had held that the proceedings of the 
disbeliefs . . . .”); see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (invalidating the 
compelled display of a license plate slogan that offended individual religious beliefs); W. Va. 
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943) (invalidating a compulsory flag salute 
statute challenged by religious objectors and noting, “[t]o sustain the compulsory flag salute 
we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual’s right to speak his own 
mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind”). 
 395. See infra Part IV.B. 
 396. 80 U.S. 679 (1871). 
 397. Id. at 725–33. 
 398. Id. at 733. 
 399. 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
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Mother Church respecting a bishop were procedurally and 
substantively defective under the internal regulations of the Mother 
Church and were therefore arbitrary and invalid. The United States 
Supreme Court ruled that the inquiries made by the state supreme 
court into matters of ecclesiastical cognizance and polity contravened 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.400 In doing so, the Court 
announced, “it is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical 
decisions are reached and are to be accepted as matters of faith 
whether or not rational or measurable by objective criteria.”401 
In addition, in Presbyterian Church in United States v. Mary 
Elizabeth Blue Hull,402 the question presented to the Court was 
whether the restraints of the First Amendment (as applied to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment) permitted a civil court 
to determine title to church property on the basis of the court’s 
interpretation of church doctrine. The Supreme Court determined 
that civil courts had no role in determining purely ecclesiastical 
questions in the process of resolving property disputes.403 
The Court did not intend the “solely ecclesiastical” category, 
however, to create a means by which religious institutions could use 
their beliefs as a smoke screen for illegal behavior. The presence of 
“fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness” would have altered the Court’s 
decision to decline jurisdiction over the dispute, despite the 
ecclesiastical elements in the case.404  
 400. Id. at 698. 
 401. Id. at 714–15. 
 402. 393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
 403. Id. at 446; see also Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929) 
(“[D]ecisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting 
civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties 
in interest made them so by contract or otherwise.”). The Court reiterated this point in 
Watson:  
[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or 
law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the 
matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and 
as binding on them, in their application to the case before them. 
80 U.S. at 727. 
 404. Hull, 393 U.S. at 447 (quoting Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16); cf. Milivojevich, 426 
U.S. at 713–15 n.7 (holding that any inquiry into arbitrariness of church actions was 
foreclosed but noting that “[n]o issue of ‘fraud’ or ‘collusion’ is involved in this case”).  
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B. The Ministerial Exception Cases 
Many suits in the second category of cases—those involving 
claims brought by an adult employee against a religious institution—
involve the question of the application of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.405 These cases involve judicial application of the 
law in the context of a relationship between a religious institution 
and its clergy. Before the Court’s decision in Smith, which 
legitimated legislative exemptions but not judicially crafted 
exemptions, some courts crafted a “ministerial exception.” It stood 
for the proposition that the religion clauses “require a narrowing 
construction of Title VII in order to insulate the relationship 
between a religious organization and its ministers . . . .”406 The 
ministerial exception was first articulated in McClure v. Salvation 
Army.407 Nearly every Circuit Court has adopted it, although it is 
enforced with varying degrees of vigor depending on the Circuit.408 
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on its constitutionality.  
Courts adopting the exception justify it as “a long-standing 
tradition that churches are to be free from government interference 
in matters of church governance and administration.”409 What they 
 405. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). 
 406. Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 1999). 
The ministerial exception is a doctrinal creation that protects churches from Title VII beyond 
the protection provided by the legislative exemption for employment of those of the same 
faith. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
 407. 460 F.2d 553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 408. Compare EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(affirming the application of a ministerial exception to a sex discrimination claim brought on 
behalf of a Cathedral’s female Director of Music Ministry and part-time music teacher at the 
Cathedral elementary school), Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 
1299 (11th Cir. 2000) (affirming a ministerial exception to a minister’s retaliation and 
constructive discharge claim), and Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conf. of the United 
Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming a ministerial exception to a 
plaintiff minister’s sex and pregnancy discrimination claims when she was terminated after 
returning from maternity leave), with Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947–48 (declining to apply the 
ministerial exception to sexual abuse). See also supra note 386 (listing church-employee cases). 
 409. Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1304 (citing, among others, Kedroff v. St. Nicholas 
Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 107 (1952)). The circuits have held 
that the ministerial exception was not overruled by Smith because 
it was not developed to provide protection to individuals who wish to observe a 
religious practice that contravenes a generally applicable law . . . [and] because the 
ministerial exception is [not] based . . . on strict scrutiny, [so] the Court’s rejection 
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properly mean is that there is a long-standing prohibition on courts 
mediating solely ecclesiastical disputes, which is true; they err, 
however, when they decline jurisdiction in a case involving not only 
ecclesiology, but also the application of neutral principles of law, 
especially in a context where the law does not substantially burden 
any religious belief.410  
While some courts have read the ministerial exception broadly, 
the Ninth Circuit did not apply it in a situation where the church did 
not claim that its right to oversee its ministers was infringed and 
where the behavior was not religiously mandated.411 Additionally, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court declined to apply it in McKelvey v. 
Pierce,412 remanding the case to the lower court to determine the 
issues, instead of assuming the courts lacked jurisdiction simply 
because the case was brought by a seminarian against a religious 
institution. 
To be clear, the ministerial exception cases involve only the 
employee and the employer and hinge on the notion that no one is 
being harmed because the adults have consented to the religious 
institution’s requirements.413 In those jurisdictions that recognize the 
in Smith of the compelling interest test does not affect the continuing vitality of the 
ministerial exception.  
Id. This formalistic reading of the Court’s free exercise cases, which does not address the issue 
of institutional competence to decide whether an exemption is warranted, is not terribly 
persuasive. 
 410. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990). In the absence of a 
substantial burden on religious belief, there is in fact no justification for invoking or applying 
the machinery of the religion clauses. The term has been imported into federal religious liberty 
legislation, again as a threshold issue. See, e.g., Midrash Sephardi v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 
1214 (11th Cir. 2004); San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1035 
(9th Cir. 2004); Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 
761 (7th Cir. 2003), cert denied, 124 S. Ct. 2816 (2004); see also 106 CONG. REC. S7,776 
(2000) (“[RLUIPA] does not include a definition of the term ‘substantial burden’ because it is 
not the intent of this Act to create a new standard for the definition of ‘substantial burden’ on 
religious exercise. Instead, that term as used in the Act should be interpreted by reference to 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.”). 
 411. See Bollard, 196 F.3d at 948.  
 412. 800 A.2d 840, 852–53 (N.J. 2002) (holding that despite the ministerial exception, 
the trial court should not have assumed that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a seminarian’s claims 
without examining each one to determine whether it could be heard without excessive 
entanglement in religious affairs); see also Williams v. Episcopal Diocese, 766 N.E.2d 820, 
824–26 (Mass. 2002) (acknowledging the ministerial exception without adopting it in 
affirming the dismissal of an employment discrimination claim brought by clergy). 
 413. See infra Part III.B. 
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ministerial exception, it is unlikely to be reversed in the near future, 
but it is in tension with the Court’s most recent cases clarifying the 
Free Exercise Clause. 
Title VII already provides an exemption for religious entities by 
permitting them to discriminate in their employment decisions on 
the basis of faith. The exemption was upheld in Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop v. Amos.414 On any measure of the public good, it 
makes tremendous sense. Without a doubt, there would be 
something unseemly about a federal law that would require an 
Orthodox Jewish shul to hire a Baptist as a rabbi, or a Pentecostal 
Church to hire a Muslim as a pastor. 
The ministerial exception, however, is a judicial invention that 
has been used at times to extend Congress’s exemption for 
discrimination on the basis of religious belief to other types of 
discrimination.415 Strictly speaking, the judicially crafted ministerial 
exception is inconsistent with Locke v. Davey, Boerne, and Smith and 
may be vulnerable to reversal by the Supreme Court.416 The principle 
at issue is whether the courts are institutionally competent to craft 
free exercise exemptions. Under the reasoning of these cases, courts 
are not competent to carve out individual exemptions from generally 
applicable laws; that is the province of the legislature. That is the 
explicit holding in Smith.417  
This is not to say that the state or federal legislatures could not 
craft a statute that would do the work of the ministerial exception. 
They could. When the legislature does so, it brings better tools to 
assess the exemption options than a court has available. It can study 
the issue from many angles, from listening to constituents to using 
hearings, experts, and appointed commissions to assess the issue. The 
legislature is in a strong position to make a judgment regarding what 
degree of harm will result from permitting a religious institution to 
 414. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
 415. See, e.g., Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that a minister’s claims of discrimination on the basis of sex, in the form of sexual 
harassment, could go forward); Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the N.C. Conf. of the United 
Methodist Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (finding that a ministerial exemption 
did not bar suit by secular church employees alleging discrimination on the basis of sex). 
 416. Locke, 124 S. Ct. 1307; Boerne, 521 U.S. 507; Smith, 494 U.S. 872. 
 417. 494 U.S. at 890. 
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discriminate “because of such individual’s race, color, . . . sex, or 
national origin.”418 In sharp contrast, a court has only the evidence 
in one case and the views of two parties before it, and there is no 
guarantee that the facts before it or the parties’ positions are 
representative of such disputes. Nor does a court have the capacity to 
independently investigate the issue. Indeed, its lack of investigative 
power makes it all too likely that its determinations will be based on 
opinion and personal views, rather than factors relevant to the public 
good. To be sure, legislatures are not perfect institutions; the point 
here is simply that they are comparatively better than courts in 
choosing which exemptions to carve out of a law and which to reject.  
To be consistent with the Supreme Court’s Religion Clause 
jurisprudence, the courts should apply Title VII as its neutral 
language dictates and leave ministerial exemptions to the legislative 
process.419 For purposes of this Article, however, the ministerial 
exception cases are relevant because they are consistent with the no-
harm principle. Their rationale is that the religious employee has 
acquiesced in the religious entity’s governance and therefore is not 
harmed by the religious institution’s application of its religious 
principles to him or her. 
C. The Third-Party Harm Cases 
This third category of cases involves church accountability for the 
harm caused by its clergy and its leadership. This is the arena where 
the notion of church autonomy stands in starkest contrast to the no-
harm principle. Many of these cases involve instances in which 
members of the clergy abuse children or adults who are disabled or 
in a disabled state. While it can be argued that clergy members 
voluntarily have given up their rights against a hierarchical church 
and therefore may not sue for discrimination (though, again, that is a 
 418. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). 
 419. Of course, to the extent a clergy employee case involves solely questions of belief, 
the courts properly should refuse jurisdiction. See supra notes 366–76` and accompanying text. 
Where the relevant law does not require the courts to decide belief, however, under existing 
Supreme Court Religion Clause jurisprudence, the courts should take jurisdiction and apply 
the law. See supra notes 377–93 and accompanying text. There is also an emerging line of cases 
that only applies the ministerial exception where the religious institution claims that its 
conduct was driven by its religious beliefs. See, e.g., Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 
F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2004); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th 
Cir. 1999). 
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question best left to legislatures, not courts), many victims of 
religious institutions, especially children, are not in a position to 
assent to the harm perpetrated by the clergy and the religious 
institution. The reasons for avoiding jurisdiction over solely 
ecclesiastical disputes “are not applicable to purely secular disputes 
between third parties and a particular defendant, albeit a religiously 
affiliated organization.”420 
If the claims in a case involve nothing more than a demand for 
the court to interpret and apply the religious institution’s canon, the 
courts will not resolve the dispute, and barring other claims, the case 
is dismissed.421 That is completely consistent with the position of 
Jefferson, Madison, and the Supreme Court that belief must be 
protected absolutely from government interference.422 Where the 
claims involve the “legal effects and consequences” arising out of 
such beliefs,423 however, the courts may take judicial notice of the 
beliefs, but they must rule solely on whether the actions taken were 
consistent with the legal standards governing those actions.424 This is 
sometimes referred to as the “neutral principles” rule.425 
 Since 1990, the Supreme Court has articulated with increasing 
detail the constitutional metes and bounds regarding (1) the 
legislature’s power to regulate a religious institution’s conduct and 
(2) the judiciary’s lack of power to create exemptions.426 According 
 420. Gen. Council on Fin. and Admin. of the United Methodist Church v. Superior 
Court of California, 439 U.S. 1355, 1372–73 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1978) (internal 
citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Malicki, 814 So. 2d 347, 356–57 (Fla. 2002) 
(distinguishing internal church disputes from third-party harm cases).  
 421. See supra notes 394–98. 
 422. See supra Part III.C. It is also consonant with the Court’s emerging freedom of 
association jurisprudence. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) 
(“[P]rotection of the right to expressive association is ‘especially important in preserving 
political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by the 
majority.’” (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984))). 
 423. Den, 12 N.J.L. at 226. 
 424. Nelson, 18 Vt. at 567 (“In the decision of this case we have endeavored to conform 
our decision to the principles of law, as they are applicable to our State.  If we have recognized 
no ecclesiastical jurisdiction, it is because none such exists here; and it certainly will contribute 
to our peace, that there is no such jurisdiction in this State.”). 
 425. Solid Rock Baptist Church v. Carlton, 789 A.2d 149, 155 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 
2002). 
 426. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997); Employment Div. v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
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to the Court, legislatures are in the most appropriate position to 
determine whether harm needs be prevented, and so long as the 
legislature regulates to rid society of a particular harm, and does not 
single out a religious institution or individual in the process, the law 
is presumptively constitutional.427 In other words, the proper focus 
of the legislature is the public good, the needs of society. The same 
public good horizon can then be applied by a legislature to create 
exemptions from neutral, generally applicable laws, but the 
exemption is driven by a full consideration of the public good, not 
constitutional necessity.428  
 In the religious conduct cases, the Court has held that 
accommodation is a more appropriate task for the legislature than 
the courts. The republican theory of government is needed to 
explain this. First, under a republican theory of government, the 
judiciary and the legislature play distinctive roles.429 Second, the 
legislature is supposed to rule above the passions of the people and 
to govern in the interest of the larger public good.430 That is its only 
legitimate role, and its inevitable role if the form of government is 
sufficiently well constructed.431  
 427. Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1309 (2004) (holding that nothing in 
Washington’s Promise Scholarship Program “suggests [the requisite] animus towards religion” 
needed to justify the application of strict scrutiny); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535 (“When the 
exercise of religion has been burdened in an incidental way by a law of general application, it 
does not follow that the persons affected have been burdened any more than other citizens, let 
alone burdened because of their religious beliefs.”). The Court also emphasized this point in 
Smith: 
It is a permissible reading of the text, in the one case as in the other, to say that if 
prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is not the 
object of the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and 
otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended. 
494 U.S. at 878. 
 428. The Court discussed the applicability of legislative exemptions in Smith: 
[A] number of States have made an exception to their drug laws for sacramental 
peyote use. . . . But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is 
permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, 
and that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts. 
Id. at 890 (citations omitted). 
 429. SELLERS, SACRED FIRE, supra note 1, at 24–27; see also WOOD, THE CREATION, 
supra note 19, at 460–63. 
 430. See SELLERS, SACRED FIRE, supra note 1, at 75–77; WOOD, THE CREATION, supra 
note 19, at 371, 381. 
 431. See SELLERS, SACRED FIRE, supra note 1, at 75–77; WOOD, THE CREATION, supra 
note 19, at 608.  
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 The question is left where to draw the line between legitimate 
exemptions and those that are illegitimate. There are two scenarios 
that raise questions: exemptions that involve laws making harmless 
conduct illegal and those exemptions that are not lifting a burden on 
religiously motivated conduct, but rather granting religious entities 
special privileges simply because they are religious. The first should 
raise red flags of potential discrimination, while the second is in 
violation of the Establishment Clause. 
1. Exemptions that make harmless conduct illegal 
 Where the legislature addresses only actions by individuals that 
do not impact and harm others, there is a good question whether the 
public good has been or can be served. Laws outlawing harmless 
behavior are hard to justify in light of the public good. John Stuart 
Mill explained as follows:  
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their 
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power 
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.432  
 This is not to say that a law that regulates harmless conduct 
would be unconstitutional, but rather that the proper role of the 
legislature is to identify actions that actually harm others for the 
purpose of regulation.433 If they do not, then the public good does 
not seem to be implicated, and the law is not a proper exercise of 
power by a republican form of government. 
 The slipperiness in this approach lies in the definition of harm. 
Some philosophers have abandoned the Mill/Hart/Feinberg 
concept because it does not lead to concrete conclusions about 
certain moral issues facing the society.434 Others have found that the 
 432. MILL, supra note 46, at 10–11. 
 433. It may be that such laws could be invalidated under constitutional analysis—either as 
irrational or as pretexts for discrimination—but none comes to mind. 
 434. See generally Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(wherein Judge Frank Easterbrook rejects the harm principle); JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE 
SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE (1997); Ethan A. Nadelmann, Learning To Live 
with Drugs, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1999, at A21. 
2HAM-FIN 12/1/2004 7:29 PM 




principle is as valuable for conservative policies as it was at one time 
for liberal policies, which is to say that both sides in a debate over 
regulation are capable of arguing “harm.”435 Joel Feinberg rightly 
stated, “harm is a very complex concept with hidden normative 
dimensions. . . .”436 This is a legitimate philosophical concern, but it 
need not deter its application in the legal-political arena. 
 The representative form of government assigns to the legislature 
the task of assessing the public good in light of all the circumstances 
and facts. In fact, the legislative task at its very core is to weigh 
competing social goods and harms. In this context, the task is no 
different. When considering whether to relieve a religious entity of a 
legal duty, the legislature should weigh on the one hand the 
importance of respect and tolerance for a wide panoply of religious 
faiths, and on the other whether the harm that the law was intended 
to prevent can be tolerated in a just society. For the philosophers, 
the problem with this approach is that it could result in endless 
cycling of the harm concept because there is no logical or 
hermeneutical principle that will finally determine actual harm. The 
finality problem is solved in the republican form of government, 
however, because a determination of harm can be made final. When 
the legislature determines that there should be no exemption or that 
there should be one, and enacts a law reflecting its judgment, it 
renders the final word on the balance of harms. The law reflects no 
more than contemporary understandings and need make no claims 
to transcendent value, but it is final for contemporary purposes. 
  The utility of employing legislative judgment here (as opposed 
to judicial judgment) is that the legislature has tremendous power to 
repeal the laws that it finds are noxious in practice. Precedent has not 
nearly the pull that it has in the judicial arena. Thus, judgments 
about relative harm can be revisited and reweighed. The repealability 
of the harm analysis takes into account the human nature of 
regulation—it is always based on imperfect understanding and always 
capable of being viewed through different lenses at a later time.437 
 435. See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1999).  
 436. FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 247, at 214.  
 437. That is in fact happening in the context of children’s interests. Religious 
organizations have been successful in obtaining state and federal laws that exempt faith-healing 
parents from the force of the laws that protect children. See Rita Swan, Moral, Economic, and 
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 What may be most interesting here is that the public good can be 
served best by exempting the religiously motivated conduct while 
retaining the rule against all other actors. A good example of this 
phenomenon can be found in the exemptions for the religious use of 
peyote,438 which appear to be harmless to society. The drug, unlike 
heroin, is not quickly addictive or part of a worldwide illegal market. 
It is also unattractive to recreational users because it often leads to 
nausea and headaches and in a significant number of instances yields 
no result. Moreover, those who use it tend to stay in the place of 
worship well beyond its effectiveness and therefore do not drive 
impaired or engage in any other harmful behavior that could affect 
others following its use. Thus, the Church’s use of peyote is harmless 
to society and therefore worthy of an exemption.  
 That does not mean, however, that its use should be legalized for 
all users. A recreational user (if one is inclined to take it despite its 
recreational defects) is likely to be more inclined to drive or 
otherwise harm others under the influence, because the use would 
not be limited to a religious ceremony that lasts longer than the 
effects of the hallucinogen. The harm calculus thus weighs in favor of 
a religious exemption but not in favor of outright legalization.  
Social Issues in Children's Health Care: On Statutes Depriving a Class of Children of Rights to 
Medical Care: Can this Discrimination Be Litigated?, 2 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 73, 79–80 
(1998). Children’s rights, however, have become internationally recognized, and the argument 
for giving such latitude to parents to harm their children, even if religiously motivated, has lost 
a significant degree of force. See, e.g., Weld Approves Child Abuse Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 
29, 1993, at Metro-24 (reporting the passage of legislation that “repeals a statutory provision 
that states a child shall not be deemed neglected if treated with spiritual healing alone”); CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 11166(a)(2)(c)(1)–(2) (2004) (noting that the duty-to-report statute excludes 
reporting information received during “penitential communication,” but clarifies that 
“[n]othing in this subdivision shall be construed to modify or limit a clergy member’s duty to 
report known or suspected child abuse or neglect when the clergy member is acting in some 
other capacity that would otherwise make the clergy member a mandated reporter”).  
 438. The federal government and a majority of states exempt the religious use of peyote. 
See James D. Gordon III, The New Free Exercise Clause, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 65, 77–78 (1997); 
see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).  
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2. Exemptions that do more than lift a burden on religiously motivated 
conduct 
 The Smith Court implied that there are some legislative 
exemptions that may violate the Establishment Clause.439 Legislative 
exemptions that only lift the burden placed on the religiously 
motivated because the conduct when done by the religious entity 
will not harm individuals or society, and do no more, have followed 
the Court’s doctrine. The open question is what happens when a 
legislature grants an exemption for religious institutions that 
provides more than is needed to lift the burden. For example, the 
peyote exemptions for religious use are constitutional, but an 
exemption for any use by religious entities would not be. The latter 
gives religious entities the right to use peyote in all circumstances, 
not only in religious ceremonies, and therefore provides a benefit to 
religious entities solely because of their religious status, not because 
their religious conduct has been burdened. That is a violation of the 
Establishment Clause.440 
 The RFRAs violate the Establishment Clause in a different way, 
by flaunting the republican government principle. They make all or 
most of the federal or relevant state laws presumptively illegal. Justice 
Stevens referred to this as “a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic 
can obtain.”441 The process of enactment is the precise opposite of 
what should occur in a legitimate legislative determination of 
exemptions. It is blind accommodation, where the legislature has 
given religious entities across the board power to trump thousands of 
laws. These across-the-board approaches make it impossible for any 
legislature to make the public good determination that legitimates an 
exemption. The legislature is handing religious entities a power to 
battle generally applicable, neutral laws, without taking upon itself 
the necessity of determining whether voiding the law for some is in 
the public’s interest. It is a benefit without consideration of the 
public good and therefore is a subsidy as opposed to a legitimate 
exemption. 
 439. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886–87. 
 440. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (noting that to avoid 
violating the Establishment Clause, a statute’s “principal or primary effect must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion”). 
 441. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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 In sum, a discussion of so-called church autonomy starts at the 
wrong end when it begins—and certainly when it ends—with only a 
discussion of what the church needs or demands.442 The 
constitutionally relevant question is not what is best for any church—
indeed that question is forbidden by the neutrality principle 
underlying the Establishment Clause443—but rather whether the 
liberty accorded is consonant with the rule against harming others. If 
so, the public good has been properly served. If not, the public 
good, and therefore the constitutional order, has been subverted. 
Both values—liberty and no harm to others—are necessary elements 
of any First Amendment calculus. 
Misunderstandings by some state courts have led them to 
conclude that because the religious institution chose a particular 
placement for a cleric on the basis of religious belief, that the courts 
are thereby barred from applying general, neutral laws regulating 
harm inflicted by such clerics.444 These courts have made a category 
 442. See, e.g., Brady, supra note 11; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 35. 
 443. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648–49 (2002); Good News Club v. 
Milford, 533 U.S. 98, 112–14 (2001).  
 444. See, e.g., Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441, 445 (Me. 
1997). The court in this case held that the First Amendment barred a negligent supervision 
claim against a church regarding the sexual relationship between an adult parishioner and priest 
during the course of marital counseling because  
on the facts of this case, imposing a secular duty of supervision on the church and 
enforcing that duty through civil liability would restrict its freedom to interact with 
its clergy in the manner deemed proper by ecclesiastical authorities and would not 
serve a societal interest sufficient to overcome the religious freedoms inhibited.  
Id.; L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 444–45 (Wis. 1997) (holding that the First 
Amendment barred consideration of a negligent supervision claim against a diocese for a sexual 
relationship between an adult parishioner and priest while the priest was counseling the 
parishioner in his position as a hospital chaplain); Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 
N.W.2d 780, 790 (Wis. 1995) (concluding “that the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution prevents the courts of this state from determining what makes one competent to 
serve as a Catholic priest since such a determination would require interpretation of church 
canons and internal church policies and practices” in the context of negligent retaining, 
training, and supervision). But see Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 358–60 (Fla. 2002) 
(finding that the First Amendment does not preclude a religious institution’s liability for 
tortious acts arising out of sexual misconduct of clergy); Gibson v. Brower, 952 S.W.2d 239, 
248 (Mo. 1997) (affirming the dismissal of breach of fiduciary duty, negligent hiring and 
supervision claim, and conspiracy claims, but reversing dismissal on intentional failure to 
supervise clergy claim) (“This rule clearly applies to ‘generally applicable criminal law.’ It also 
logically applies to intentional torts. Religious conduct intended or certain to cause harm need 
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mistake. The law may not forbid religious institutions from believing 
clergy belong in certain positions, but it certainly can govern their 
actions that cause harm to third parties. Thus, courts are not being 
asked to resolve a dispute over religious doctrine, or even to apply 
religious doctrine, but rather to apply settled legal principles to 
actions. “Although normally the practice of transferring a priest is a 
religious decision left up to his superiors, in [the context of 
childhood sexual abuse by clergy] it comes squarely within the state’s 
jurisdiction.”445 While the logic of the ministerial exception—if one 
accepts it as good law and sets aside the question whether courts are 
institutionally competent to make what is in fact a public 
determination—may provide some justification for protecting the 
relationship between a religious institution and its adult clergy from 
judicial scrutiny, it cannot justify failure of the courts to apply 
generally applicable laws when the church and its clergy have harmed 
a third party.446 To return to the rule of Smith and its antecedents, 
once the church takes action, it opens itself to legal liability, and the 
fact that it acted out of religious motivation is irrelevant to a court’s 
inquiry into whether the legally proscribed action was taken and the 
legally proscribed harm accrued. 
V. A CASE STUDY OF THE NO-HARM DOCTRINE:  
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH’S CLERGY ABUSE ERA 
The elephant in the room at a conference addressing “church 
autonomy” in the early twenty-first century is the worldwide 
phenomenon of childhood sexual abuse by members of the clergy—
with the knowledge of their individual churches—around the 
world.447 Although it has been a problem for children for decades, 
not be tolerated under the First Amendment.” (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 884 (1990), and citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940))). 
 445. Carmella, supra note 9, at 1049. 
 446. The Florida Supreme Court reasoned: 
Substantial authority in both the state and federal courts concludes that the right to 
religious freedom and autonomy protected by the First Amendment is not violated 
by permitting the courts to adjudicate tort liability against a religious institution 
based on a claim that a clergy member engaged in tortious conduct such as sexual 
assault and battery in the course of his or her relationship with a parishioner. 
Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 358–59. 
 447. See JASON BERRY & GERARD RENNER, VOWS OF SILENCE (2004); DAVID FRANCE, 
OUR FATHERS: THE SECRET LIFE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN AN AGE OF SCANDAL 
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and in truth centuries, it became impossible to ignore or deny in the 
United States when the Boston Globe broke the story of the Boston 
Archdiocese’s extensive clergy abuse.448 The magnitude of clergy 
sexual abuse is shocking in the Catholic Church, but it is also present 
in many other denominations.449 
In the Catholic Church, the phenomenon of child abuse by 
clergy members is an issue with which the Church has struggled for 
centuries, reaching as far back as the fourth century.450 But the 
(2004); see also REPORT ON THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH supra note 306, at 92; 
Ireland Orders Priest Abuse Inquiry, BBC NEWS, Apr. 5, 2002, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1912153.stm; Jury Awards $37M in Sex Abuse 
by Texas Minister, supra note 328; Brian Lavery, Archbishop of Dublin, Under Fire, Is Replaced, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/27/ 
international/europe/27irel.html; Sex Abuse Scandal Flares in Australia, CBS NEWS, June 3, 
2002, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/06/03/world/main510854. 
shtml; Thousands of Jehovah’s Witnesses Abused, Groups Say, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2004, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A29713-2004Mar27.html 
(relating that more than six thousand victims made allegations since 1991). 
 448. The Boston Globe received a Pulitzer Prize for uncovering extensive childhood sexual 
abuse by priests with full knowledge of the Boston Archdiocese. See Mark Feeney, Globe Wins 
Pulitzer Gold Medal for Coverage of Clergy Sex Abuse, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 8, 2003, at A1, 
available at http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/extras/pulitzers.htm. Every 
article written about the scandal by the Globe’s investigative reporters since they broke the story 
in January 2002 can be accessed by visiting http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse. 
 449. “While recent cases have focused on Catholic clergy, virtually every religious 
denomination has had its scandals. Over the past decade, reports of sexual misdeeds by clergy 
have cut across the religious landscape, from Protestant and Mormon churches to Jewish, 
Muslim, and Buddhist congregations.” Jeffery Sheler, Unholy Crisis, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, Feb. 11, 2002, at 25; see, e.g., Kevin Eckstrom, Presbyterian Church Mulls New Rules 
in Sex Abuse Cases, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2002, at B9 (reporting that an internal Presbyterian 
church report indicates that a “serial molester might have been stopped had officials 
intervened”); Jury Awards $37M in Sex Abuse by Texas Minister, supra note 328 (reporting 
that, in addition to the jury award of $37 million to nine plaintiffs abused by a Lutheran 
minister, plaintiffs’ attorneys disclosed that the church paid out more than $32 million in 
settlements prior to the verdict); LDS Church, Hospital Settle Child-abuse Case Out of Court, 
DESERET NEWS, March 28, 2000, at B6 (settling a $750 million child abuse case out of court); 
Carrie A. Moore, Church Settles Abuse Case, DESERET NEWS, Sept. 4, 2001, at A1 (reporting 
that the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints settled a child abuse case in Portland for 
$3 million). 
 450. FRANCE, supra note 447, at 64; KAROL JACKOWSKI, THE SILENCE WE KEEP: A 
NUN’S VIEW OF THE CATHOLIC PRIEST SCANDAL 44–45 (2004); Frances Grandy Taylor, 
Report Falls Short, Whistleblower Says, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 28, 2004 (discussing Father 
Thomas Doyle’s response to the John Jay and National Review Board Reports); Press Release, 
Fr. Thomas P. Doyle, The John Jay Report and The National Review Board Report (Feb. 26, 
2004) (on file with author). 
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Church has continued to operate as though it were a separate 
sovereign legal system, which is the heritage of the now-defunct 
ecclesiastical court jurisdiction over crimes in Britain and elsewhere 
in Europe.451 It has operated as though it was autonomous of the law 
and unaccountable to the public good. In 1962, the Vatican issued a 
directive addressing the abuse phenomenon, which ordered secrecy 
and excommunication for those who did not abide by that secrecy.452 
The fundamental question posed and answered by this era of 
clergy abuse revelations is whether religious institutions should be 
left alone to discipline criminally errant, tortious clergy. In 1987, 
Professor Lupu described precisely the problem that occurs when 
religious institutions, like the Catholic Church, operate as though 
they are autonomous of the law: 
Recognizing such claims of autonomy will, by definition, insulate 
from regulation behavior that the political branches have decided 
needs regulating. As the autonomy cloak spreads, the quantity of 
such otherwise illegal behavior, and the harm it causes, will 
presumably increase. And as the scope of autonomy moves farther 
away from the special activities that legitimate the autonomy claim, 
tolerance of those harms becomes increasingly difficult to justify. 
 Moreover, assertions of autonomy may be likely to cloak 
economically self-interested behavior as they are to protect 
ideological purity. Because institutional autonomy claims will 
provide this cloak for behavior that is self-interested and otherwise 
unlawful behavior, their availability will create incentives for 
organizations to hide a variety of non-religious or non-speech 
activity behind the cloak. This, in turn, will tend to debase activities 
which we have come to respect as constitutionally special, turning 
them into easily accessible havens for economic and social 
outlaws.453 
It is painfully apparent that self-policing has not worked to 
protect thousands of children from severe childhood sexual abuse.454 
 451. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 452. Vatican Press, Instruction on the Manner of Proceeding in Cases of Solicitation from 
the Supreme and Holy Congregation of the Holy Office to All Patriarchs, Archbishops, Bishops and 
Other Diocesan Ordinaries Even “Of the Oriental Rite” (1962), available at 
http://www.survivorsfirst.org/downloads/Crimine.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
 453. Lupu, supra note 29, at 403. 
 454. REPORT ON THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 306, at 92. 
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The church autonomy theory being proposed in briefs authored by 
Catholic Church lawyers across the United States argues in favor of 
letting the Church handle its problems internally, without legal or 
judicial involvement, regardless of the harm that has or will result 
from the Church’s actions.455 Other churches have not voluntarily 
come forward regarding abuse until they were haled into court.456 
Indeed, but for the law, the abuse may have stayed out of the 
public’s awareness forever. Quite similar reasoning is present in 
papers presented at this conference.457 The no-harm principle, 
however, drives to an opposite conclusion. 
If all churches were internally and naturally inclined always to 
take into account and to act for the public good in the oversight of 
clergy actions taken with respect to children or disabled adults, a 
church autonomy doctrine might be consistent with the public 
good. The facts of this era prove without question that the public 
good cannot be entrusted to private ordering, even when the private 
entity is a religious institution. The public good was not a driving 
factor in the handling of clergy abuse within the Catholic Church 
over decades, to say the least. Rather than employing the “moral use 
of its freedom in the promotion of the common good,” the Church 
Too many [B]ishops[’] . . . responses were characterized by moral laxity, excessive 
leniency, insensitivity, secrecy, and neglect. Aspects of the failure to respond 
properly to sexual abuse of minors by priests included: (i) inadequately dealing with 
victims of clergy sexual abuse, both pastorally and legally; (ii) allowing offending 
priests to remain in positions of risk; (iii) transferring offending priests to new 
parishes or other dioceses without informing others of their histories; (iv) failing to 
report instances of criminal conduct by priests to secular law enforcement 
authorities, whether such a report was required by law or not; and (v) declining to 
take steps to laicize priests who clearly had violated canon law. 
Id. 
 455.  The Catholic Church has resisted releasing its files under subpoena in many 
jurisdictions, including Boston, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia. In Boston, Judge Constance 
Sweeney rejected the privilege claims, including arguments made not to release documents to 
the public, lamenting “the increasingly dreary attempts of the [Roman Catholic Archbishop] 
to slow or limit disclosure of discovery.” Walter V. Robinson, Judge Finds Records, Law at 
Odds, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 26, 2002, at A1; see also William Lobdell and Larry B. Stammer, 
Mahony Criticized by National Review Panel, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2004, at A1 (quoting the 
National Review Panel, which said “the [Los Angeles] archdiocese engaged in a very public 
spat with law enforcement agencies who questioned his level of cooperation in the criminal 
investigation”). 
 456. See, e.g., Jury Awards $37M in Sex Abuse by Texas Minister, supra note 328. 
 457. Brady, supra note 11; Dane, supra note 70; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 35. 
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has concentrated solely, almost narcissistically, on its power and 
public reputation.458 
Despite clear knowledge of widespread pedophilia and 
ephebophilia459 within the Church over the course of decades,460 
cardinals and bishops worldwide hid the sexual abuse of minors from 
prosecutors, parents, and professionals.461 As a result, the hierarchy 
of the Church knowingly and negligently put children at risk of 
sexual abuse by repeat offenders. Given that most pedophiles abuse a 
series of children, not just one,462 the repeated opportunities made 
available with each new parish virtually guaranteed the large number 
of victims that resulted. The Church’s own numbers, which cannot 
reflect the many victims who have yet to report their childhood 
sexual abuse, indicate that at least 10,667 children suffered 
childhood sexual abuse at the hands of 4,392 members of the clergy 
within the Church between 1950 and 2002.463 Rather than reporting 
this criminal activity to the authorities, the Church systematically 
covered up the criminal behavior and thereby created further 
opportunities for pedophile priests to access children. 
For church autonomy to work in a society, the churches would 
have to take it upon themselves to ensure that their actions served 
 458. Carmella, supra note 9, at 1033; REPORT ON THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC 
CHURCH, supra note 306, at 100–12. 
 459. Ephebophilia is the psychological term for the attraction of adults to adolescents. It 
is derived from the root “ephebe,” which means “a young man.” WEBSTER’S NEW 
ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY 610 (2002). 
 460. Sipe, supra note 326.  
 461. REPORT ON THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 306; see also Sipe, 
supra note 326. 
 462. “Pedophiles molest four times the number of children than do non-pedophile 
molesters. On average, a pedophile molests 11.7 children compared to a non-pedophile 
molester, who molests, on average, 2.9 children.” GENE G. ABEL & NORA HARLOW, THE 
ABEL AND HARLOW CHILD MOLESTATION PREVENTION STUDY 3 (2002), available at 
http://www.stopchildmolestation.org/pages/study3.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). One 
Catholic psychologist, Thomas Plante, expected an average of eight victims per clergy 
perpetrator and was surprised that the report’s average was only three. Clergy Abuse Report 
Cites ‘Homo-Erotic Culture,’ S.F. CHRON., Feb. 28, 2004, at A2. 
 463. JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 336, at viii–ix. Victims of 
childhood sexual abuse report their abuse between five and thirty-five percent of the time, 
which means that the Report’s numbers probably should be multiplied by three to twenty 
times. Sociologist and Catholic priest, Andrew Greeley, predicted that there are probably 
100,000 clergy abuse victims in the United States. Michael Paulson, Abuse Study Says 4% of 
Priests in US Accused, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 17, 2004, at A1. 
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the public good, or at least did not harm it. In the clergy abuse 
context, the Church would have needed a foolproof plan to get 
pedophile priests away from children and to find the most effective 
ways of treating the problems of the children who were molested.  
Neither the public good nor the best interest of children was an 
overriding concern of the Church; rather, perpetuation of the 
institution, avoidance of public scandal, and preservation of power 
were far more potent motivators. One commentator characterizes 
the problem as follows: 
Where was the deficiency? In each diocese, the bishop enjoyed 
virtually unlimited discretionary power without serious checks and 
balances. The life and employment of every priest depended on 
him, every complaint converged on him, and all decisions 
originated from him. He was immune from any control from 
within his jurisdiction . . . . In the diocese, the divine power of the 
bishop has been exaggerated to the point that protection from 
human frailties has been omitted or neglected.464 
In the review of clergy sexual abuse written by the Church’s own 
lay review board, the response to victims from too many bishops was 
“characterized by moral laxity, excessive leniency, insensitivity, 
secrecy, and neglect.”465 The result has been shocking; in effect, the 
Church was abetting, if not condoning, thousands of child rapes. It 
is the largest child abuse scandal in United States history.466 And the 
 464. Ladislas Orsy, Bishops’ Norms: Commentary and Evaluation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 999, 
1025 (2003). 
 465. REPORT ON THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 306, at 92. The 
report also notes that “Church leaders . . . were altogether too easy on their fellow clergy and 
too willing to take the easy way out . . . . All of the presumptions weighed in favor of the 
accused priest . . . . This tilt is attributable in part to ‘clericalism’ . . . .” Id. at 93; see also Scott 
Appleby, The Church at Risk: Remarks to the USCCB (June 13, 2002), available at 
http://www.usccb.org/bishops/appleby.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2004) (noting that all 
Catholics agree that the cause of the scandal is “a betrayal of fidelity enabled by the arrogance 
that comes with unchecked power”); JASON BERRY, LEAD US NOT INTO TEMPTATION: 
CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN (2000); BERRY & RENNER, supra 
note 447; A.W. RICHARD SIPE, CELIBACY IN CRISIS: A SECRET WORLD REVISITED (2003); 
A.W. RICHARD SIPE, A SECRET WORLD: SEXUALITY AND THE SEARCH FOR CELIBACY (1990); 
A.W. RICHARD SIPE, SEX, PRIESTS, AND POWER: ANATOMY OF A CRISIS (1995). 
 466. It is an extreme understatement to state that other institutional child abuse scandals 
pale in comparison. See, e.g., Nancy Hass, Margaret Kelly Michaels Wants Her Innocence Back, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1995, at 37 (describing a day care sexual abuse scandal in Maplewood, 
New Jersey, where a worker was charged with molesting twenty children); Lynn Sweet, On a 
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resulting harm to the public good is enormous. “The practice of 
reassigning abusive priests implicated public order in all three of its 
dimensions: it violated the rights of others, the public peace, and the 
public morality.”467  
It is difficult enough to concentrate elected representatives’ focus 
on the common good, even though the system is geared to move 
their attention in that direction and even though that is their 
assigned obligation in the constitutional order. Relying on private 
institutions to act only in the interest of the public good is an 
exercise in futility. There are no checks in the system that can 
transform private entities into public-regarding entities. They are 
neither positioned to have all that is necessary to calculate the public 
good nor do they operate from a horizon that necessarily includes all 
classes of citizens.468 In addition, they typically operate within a 
world view that measures harm from a self-interested perspective 
and, therefore, are likely to underestimate the actual quantum of 
harm to others.469 
Quest for Vindication, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 6, 1999, at 30 (describing a day care sexual 
abuse case in Chicago in which a worker was acquitted of molesting four girls); see also Taylor 
v. Litteer, No. 94-78-SD, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15803 (D.N.H. Oct. 24, 1994) (describing 
one of several Boy Scout sex abuse cases involving a single child’s allegations of abuse); 
MARTIN J. COSTELLO, HATING THE SIN, LOVING THE SINNER: THE MINNEAPOLIS 
CHILDREN’S THEATRE COMPANY ADOLESCENT SEXUAL ABUSE PROSECUTIONS 110–12 
(1991) (analyzing child abuse prosecutions of staff at a youth theatre company in 1984); 
Barbara Baird, Youth Groups Fear Specter of Sexual Abuse, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1988, § 2, at 4 
(describing abuse in the Little League and Big Brothers); Tom Coakley, Brockton Preschool 
Withdraws State Appeal; License Revocation Stands in Sexual Abuse Case, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Sept. 29, 1989, Metro-17 (describing abuse in a Massachusetts preschool); Steve Crane, 
Woman Maintains Innocence in Preschoolers’ Abuse Case, WASH. TIMES, July 26, 1989, at B1 
(describing abuse in a Maryland preschool); Seth Mydans, Child Abuse: Some Prosecutions Win, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1990, at A12 (describing the notorious McMartin Preschool sexual abuse 
scandal in Manhattan Beach, California, where owners were charged with seventy-five counts 
relating to child molestation; Dade County day care owners convicted in Florida); Eileen 
Ogintz, Jordan Sex Case Is Over; Trauma Isn’t, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15, 1985, at C6 (describing 
child abuse sex ring in Jordan, Minnesota). 
 467. Carmella, supra note 9, at 1049. 
 468. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 469. See John McElhenny, Monsignor Says Harm of Abuse Wasn’t Recognized, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 23, 2004, at A1 (reporting the comments of Monsignor Richard S. Sniezyk, 
interim leader of the Springfield Diocese, during an interview in which he said that the scandal 
that has rocked the Catholic Church stems from a belief among some priests during the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s that sex with young men was acceptable). 
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While the Church has a constitutional right to complete control 
over its belief system, including those beliefs that dictate clergy 
placement, it is not immunized thereby for the actions it takes that 
result in harm to third parties. For example, and taking an example 
distinct from childhood sexual abuse, a church may believe in 
purifying the bodies of babies by not feeding them.470 A court may 
not mandate that the church alter its beliefs, or require admission 
into the church of those who disagree with those beliefs, no matter 
how heinous.471 The church’s beliefs are autonomous and may 
revolve in a completely autopoietic universe for eternity, untouchable 
by state control. When the group translates its beliefs into action, 
however, and children are near death or dying, the state has an 
obligation to interfere with the group by applying the laws against 
child neglect, endangerment, and murder, regardless of religious 
motivation.472 When injurious conduct is present, the entity’s 
religious beliefs, if invoked to forestall the law, are a smoke screen to 
accountability. Beliefs do not immunize actions,473 and thus the 
state—through legislation and judicial enforcement—has the power 
to redress the harm caused by the religious entity even though the 
conduct was religiously motivated. 
In the clergy abuse cases, the Church does not profess a belief in 
making children available to pedophiles, but it has expressed a belief 
in priest “formation,” which entails guidance of priests by their 
religious superiors. That belief is sacrosanct, and no legitimate 
government can force the Church to alter the belief. But where the 
Church renders third-party harm through its conduct, that conduct 
is fair game for criminal, tort, and regulatory law. 
The sole question before the courts in the third-party harm cases 
is whether the religious group or individual took illegal action that 
caused harm and whether the law is generally applicable and neutral 
toward all who took similar actions. If the law was neutral, the action 
was taken, and the proscribed harm ensued, the group or individual 
is culpable and liable under the law. For example, where a church 
 470. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cottam, 616 A.2d 988, 993 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). 
 471. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 472. See, e.g., Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775, 775–76 (Fla. 1992); Nicholson v. 
State, 600 So. 2d 1101, 1102–03 (Fla. 1992). 
 473. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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moves a pedophile from one parish to another, and new victims are 
created with each move, the church is accountable under the 
governing law, which may include prohibitions against reckless 
endangerment, negligent supervision, conspiracy to child abuse, 
aiding and abetting child abuse, accessory to child abuse, a panoply 
of tort laws, and regulations involving the operation of a school.474 It 
is the price for living in a democratic society. 
Some would argue that the no-harm rule is detrimental to 
“minority” religions, because they will be unlikely to obtain 
exemptions from generally applicable, neutral laws. Thus, they would 
raise the specter of mainstream religions obtaining numerous 
exemptions from the law, while minority religions cannot. The 
concern deserves some response, because it is based on multiple 
misunderstandings regarding the United States and its republican 
form of government. 
Minority religions are not necessarily or even usually consigned 
to a life of belief divorced from action under a republican form of 
government. First, the reference to “minority” religions is somewhat 
misleading. In the United States, there is no majority religion. 
Protestantism, taken as a whole, which would encompass a vast 
number of faiths, is a dwindling majority and will not be the majority 
religion in the very near future.475  
Second, it is a fact that minority religions have done quite well in 
obtaining exemptions in the legislatures, which would seem to 
weaken the argument significantly.476 The often-stated concern that 
the courts are the better institution to secure religious liberty 
because they are better than legislatures at protecting minorities has 
not been proven as an empirical matter. During Prohibition, which 
 474. See, e.g., Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73 (D.R.I. 1997) (negligent 
supervision); Mark K. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1998) (negligent supervision, retention, and fraud and conspiracy to suppress facts); Gagne v. 
O’Donoghue, No. CA 941158 1996 WL 1185145 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 26, 1996) 
(negligent hiring and supervision, breach of fiduciary duty, and clergy malpractice); Kenneth 
R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 A.D.2d 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (negligent 
hiring, supervision, and retention); Jones by Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1992) (breach of trust, outrageous conduct, and negligent hiring); Hutchison ex rel. 
Hutchison v. Luddy, 742 A.2d 1052 (Pa. 1999) (negligent hiring, supervision, and retention); 
C.J.C. v. Corp. of Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 985 P.2d 262 (Wash. 1999) (negligence). 
 475. See Peter Smith, Protestants Are Close to Losing Majority Status, LOUISVILLE 
COURIER-JOURNAL, July 21, 2004, at 1A. 
 476. See generally HAMILTON, supra note 3. 
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was a time when anticlericalism was strong in the United States, 
Congress provided an exemption to the Catholic Church for the use 
of sacramental wine.477 In more recent years, orthodox Jews obtained 
a right to wear yarmulkes in the military after the courts declined to 
create an exemption from the military’s uniform rules.478 Before and 
after the Supreme Court declined to craft an exemption for Native 
American Church members to use the prohibited drug peyote, many 
states and the federal government created such exemptions.479 In all 
three of these instances, small or disfavored religious entities were 
able to obtain the legislative exemption they sought.  
Third, the republican form of government is not a system 
whereby majorities of the people govern. Rather, a majority of the 
people choose their rulers, but those rulers are then set free from the 
majority to rule in the public good.480 Political scientists moreover 
now accept as fact that minorities with a coherent message fare better 
in the legislative process than unorganized majorities.481  
Fourth, the argument seems to be that small religions will be 
subject to covert discrimination. The religion clauses discourage 
legislatures from acting on such motives. Any law specifically singling 
out a particular religious organization for detrimental treatment is 
unconstitutional.482 Where the legislature has decided that particular 
 477. See National Prohibition Act of 1919, ch. 85, tit. II, § 3, 41 Stat. 305, 308–09 
(1919). 
 478. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509–10 (1986) (holding that a government 
prohibition on wearing a yarmulke did not violate the Free Exercise clause because the military 
evenhandedly regulated its interest in uniform and discipline). Congress responded by 
amending the regulations. See 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2000). 
 479. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990). After the decision in Smith, 
Oregon and the federal government joined other states and created legislative exemptions for 
the use of peyote. See Louis Fisher, Indian Religious Freedom: To Litigate or Legislate?, 26 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 1, 32–36 (2001). 
 480. See generally Hamilton, Direct Democracy, supra note 1; Marci A. Hamilton, 
Discussion and Decisions: A Proposal to Replace the Myth of Self-Rule With an Attorneyship Model 
of Representation, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 477 (1994); Hamilton, Why the People Do Not Rule, 
supra note 1. 
 481.  See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 144 (2d ed. 1971); see 
also JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE NEW LIBERALISM: THE RISING POWER OF CITIZEN GROUPS 154 
(1999) (“The dominant scholarly explanation of interest group mobilization—then and now—
is Mancur Olson’s selective incentive theory of collective action.”). 
 482. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 
(1993). 
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actions are unacceptable, because they generate certain harm, and 
issued a blanket prohibition on the action, there is some insurance 
that the legislature has not acted out of discriminatory motives. The 
willingness to burden all actors with the law means that the 
legislature is concerned about the harm, not the identity of the actor.  
Even then, perhaps there is a risk that some small, politically 
powerless religions that are incapable of putting together a coherent 
message for the legislature and incapable of enlisting the support of 
mainstream religions may well have problems obtaining exemptions. 
The system does not generate perfect results, no matter how 
exemptions are handled. In the end, the Smith Court weighed the 
alternatives in this scenario as follows: 
 It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political 
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices 
that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence 
of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which 
each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the 
social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious 
beliefs.483 
 
The legislature is the entity that is institutionally competent to 
hear the concerns of burdened religious entities and to make the 
determination whether relieving them of obligations to a particular 
law is consistent with the public good. Thus, the route for those 
individuals and institutions that find their religious conduct at odds 
with the prevailing law lies beyond the courts. The Supreme Court 
in Smith made it clear that religious entities may ask for legislative 
exemptions narrowly tailored to their religious practices.484 If a 
religious entity can persuade a legislature that exempting it from the 
 483. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.  
 484. Id.; see also Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987) 
(upholding an exemption from Title VII for the secular, nonprofit activities of a religious 
organization). It is, however, interesting to note that for Justice Brennan, the religious nature 
of the organization was not important in this case: 
I write separately to emphasize that my concurrence in the judgment rests on the 
fact that these cases involve a challenge to the application of § 702’s categorical 
exemption to the activities of a nonprofit organization. I believe that the particular 
character of nonprofit activity makes inappropriate a case-by-case determination 
whether its nature is religious or secular. 
Id. at 340 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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law will not harm the public good, then an exemption is consistent 
with ordered democracy.485 If not, then the church is rightly 
prevented from doing the harm proscribed by the legislature. 
An expansive church autonomy doctrine, in contrast, would turn 
the democratic process on its head. If churches were autonomous, 
courts would be jurisdictionally barred from examining any action 
that is religiously motivated, because they would have to address 
some ecclesiastical beliefs. In effect, the courts would have to abstain 
from applying the law to the religious entity or individual. Even a 
weaker version, wherein the courts weighed the church’s interest in 
autonomy against the needs of the society, undermines the search for 
the larger public good because the courts’ weighing is inevitably 
limited by the case and controversy requirement, which forbids the 
court from investigating the issues beyond the bounds of the parties’ 
filings.  
Courts are institutionally incompetent to determine what is in 
fact in the public’s interest. The church autonomy that would 
remove courts from hearing legal disputes brought by third parties 
against religious institutions in effect nullifies those laws. Thus, the 
theory displaces the legislature’s judgment regarding the public 
good. Moreover, where the courts would take jurisdiction, but 
would weigh the public interest against the religious entity, as in the 
Sherbert line of cases,486 they are especially incompetent. The courts 
do not have the tools or the resources to investigate the larger public 
good and therefore are in no position to determine whether an 
exemption should be carved out of a particular law. The exemption 
decision properly belongs to the body entrusted with ensuring the 
public good—the legislature—which is situated through its many 
contacts with the people and its access to wide-ranging, independent 
investigation to determine how particular religious practices will 
impact and therefore potentially harm citizens.  
 485. For further elaboration of this concept, see Hamilton, Direct Democracy, supra note 1. 
 486. Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. 
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. 
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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When religious institutions demand autonomy from duly enacted 
laws, they are asking to be set outside society, which is an 
impossibility. Even more problematic, they are asking to be placed 
beyond the rule that demands accountability for actions that harm 
others.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
“Church autonomy” is no doctrine at all but rather a theory 
fundamentally at odds with the Constitution, its history, and the rule 
of law it institutes. An expansive church autonomy regime would 
turn all religious entities into potential threats to fellow citizens and 
inevitably cause the sort of interdenominational strife that this 
country largely has avoided to date. The era of immunity for 
religious institutions and individuals from laws that punish harm 
inflicted upon others has long passed, with the demise of the benefit 
of clergy, the ecclesiastical courts’ jurisdiction over crimes, sanctuary, 
the decline in charitable immunity, and the inexorable rise of the no-
harm rule. 
The no-harm rule, with its distinguished pedigree in John Locke, 
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, John Stuart Mill, H.L.A. Hart, 
Joel Feinberg, utilitarian and deontological philosophy, and Catholic 
and Protestant theology, ensures expansive liberty of conscience but 
protects citizens from the harmful actions of all others, whether 
religious or secular. 
The no-harm doctrine is already deeply embedded in the 
Supreme Court’s cases, in which the Court has repeatedly affirmed 
both the absolute liberty of conscience and the principle of no harm. 
The draw of the church autonomy theory among religious 
institutions in this era is a throwback to long-rejected principles that 
cannot coexist with the continual working out of the principle of the 
rule of law in a republican democracy. The Catholic Church’s clergy 
abuse era is strong testimony to the cost to society of religious 
institutions that seek to operate in a secret sphere, where unchecked, 
they may harm untold numbers and forestall the administration of 
justice. It is no longer an open question whether religious 
institutions should be governed by the laws that govern everyone 
else, if it ever was; it is a proven necessity. 
 
